21 OCTOBER 1871, Page 16

BOOKS.

RUSSIA.* THERE has been recently published at Leipzig a pamphlet which well deserves the attention of whoever is curious to know about the present condition of Russia. It is in German, and anony- mous, the author styling himself merely " A Russian," and its title is Russland ant 1 Januar, 1871. From internal evidence we infer the writer to be from the Baltic Provinces, and there are pages which even forcibly suggest the probability of our having to do with the work of one who has acquired considerable reputation by several masterly publications on modern Russia. But whoever the writer may be, the present essay is most interesting, for it furnishes the clearest and fullest summary of the means and condition of Russia, and it needs no comment to point out the value of such information at a moment when so much un- * Ituastand an; 1 Januar, 1671. LeipzIg, certainty hangs over the political horizon of Europe, and political speculation is so largely affected with misgivings about the intentions and powers of Russia. Undoubtedly, a bias unfavour- able to those Slavonic aims and purposes which animate the so-called Muscovite party, and constitute the peculiarly- aggressive political code of which General Fadajeff has made him- self the forcible organ, runs markedly through the pages of this pamphlet. But this does not impair its particular importance, which resides, not in the author's polemics, but in his figures and statements. It is the singular amount of data given, the mass of positive information furnished, which makes in our eyes this suc- cinct essay so valuable a contribution to our knowledge about a State which certainly invites attention.

No experience was brought home more keenly to the Russian Government by the Crimean campaign than that of the military weakness consequent on the vast distances in the Empire with no proportionate means for rapid communication. Therefore on con- clusion of peace it set itself at once to work to create a network of railways, and the writer of a remarkable article in the July num- ber of the Edinburgh Revieto goes so far as emphatically to affirm that the creation of these lines has quite transformed the strategical facilities of the Russian Empire. The "Russian" quite admits the changes wrought in the condition of the country by the creation of these lines, as he also testifies to;the singular activity displayed in their promotion, but the figures given by him certainly do not seem to warrant for them generally great commercial returns. The first railways were made by the State, which latterly suc- ceeded in taking advantage of a speculative mania to dispose of most to companies, but only in a few instances have the profits relieved the Treasury of the guarantee secured by the deed of sale ; nor, if we are to trust the statistical figures adduced in these pages, would it seem that the sparse population and unde- veloped industry of the Empire are likely to alter this state of things for some time. The interesting fact to note, however, is that the Government in pushing the creation of railway communication distinctly considers military objects of paramount importance. We learn that it has been resolved to sanction the building of new lines henceforth only under the express limitation that one-fourth of the work to be done within the year be expended on specified lines, which are avowedly constructed merely to subserve strategical pur- poses. We should be glad to know how many of these purely military lines are supplied only with single rails, as we have been assured. There is no information in the pamphlet on this important point, yet it is self-evident that lines in such a condition can never prove adequate means for the rapid transport of large bodies of troops and stores in a sudden emergency, over vast distances. We venture to draw the attention of the Edinburgh reviewer to this point.

Probably the most important sections in the pamphlet are the two that treat of the Imperial finances, and of the results so far attained by the measure for the emancipation of the Serfs. Un- deniably the power of Russia, as a State, must depend mainly on these two points, for war cannot be waged without money, and a country cannot put forth strength abroad if within it is distracted. It is, then, a capital question for whoever cares to gauge the actual force at the disposal of this mysterious colossus, how far its real power be at all commensurate with its bulk,—to learn what may be the money resources at the com- mand of the Empire, and what progress may have been made in the conversion of a serf population little capable of active patriotism into a people of freemen invested with the strong senti- ments that should spring from a sense of ownership. A mere tiger cub may indeed be without teeth or claws, but the ogre that is supposed capable to tear you to pieces must needs have his fangs grown, if he is in truth to be so dangerous.

The year 1862 marks the beginning of an improved system of accounts. What happened before in the Exchequer escapes in- vestigation, but from that moment it is possible to see clear. In 1862 the receipts amounted to 332,000,000 roubles, while the ex- penditure reached 315,000,000 roubles. Every successive year until the beginning of the current one showed a deficit, which amounted by the end of 1869 in the aggregate to 360,000,000 roubles, or 50,000,000 a year, a sum made good by periodical loans, of which only a very small portion was devoted to works of im- provement. In the current year's estimates for the first time there s an expected equilibrium, incomings and outgoings being put at 478,000,000 roubles—one-third of the latter being spent on the War Office—a proportion greatly in excess of what is allotted in any other country. This is unsatisfactory enough in a State so far behind in the most important respects ; where schools are hardly to be found, and the richest stores of natural wealth lie unworked because material means and requisite intelligence are wanting. But there are two heavy weights that press terribly on Russian Ministers of Finance,—the depreciation of the currency, and the difficulty of finding any productive imposts but a poll-tax in a country so little blessed with manufactures. The former evil, represented by a paper currency of more than 700,000,000 roubles, has disturbed all money transactions, and is causing the most perplexing oscillations in prices. It is a cancer which Minister after Minister has vainly sought to grapple with. The second evil, that of taxation, is not less grievous. It is true that from sheer impossibility, after centuries of serfdom, of securing the continued rivotting of the emancipated town serfs to their town domicile, the city poll.taxes have been converted into a tax on trades; but still in the rural communities the old system pre- vails, and this is estimated to impose in some localities a pay- ment of not less than twelve roubles a head on every male• peasant, irrespective of age. The mode of assessment is too characteristic of Russian things not to be noticed. It rests on that simple principle of common holding which is the distin- guishing feature of Russian rural organization and the main- spring of Russian Socialism. The tax is imposed, not on the in- dividual, but on the community, which is bound for the sum to the State, and is left to assess its members as it sees fit. The necessary condition of such a system is that the members of a community must be bound to its soil, for if they could betake themselves away at will, the tax might soon fall in some localities ou a few individuals. In the days of serfage this condition was not out of order, but now that the peasants have been declared free, and have been directly prompted by the State to become owners, the incompatibility of such a principle with the new system has made itself felt. We have already said that in the towns an alteration has already been introduced, but in the rural districts nothing has yet been done, and what is curious, a proposal for the conversion of the poll tax into a land tax directly assessed on the separate holdings and without any guarantee on the part of the community, has not met with favour. The Russian peasantry are attached to their communal system, which practically acts as a poor law, securing to every in- dividual a certain maintenance,—an indefeasible title, irrespective of personal industry or thrift, to the perpetual enjoyment of a patch of laud. This is the so-called Mir, that institution which is the cherished object of enthusiastic Slavophiles, but in the eyes of many, amongst whom is our author, is the source of infi- nite evils to Russia, in the destruction of any vigorous sense of individuality in the peasantry. It is an eminently typical fact, that although the law sanctions the conversion of common into individual holdings at the desire of two-thirds of the community, there is no case on record of this power having been put in force.

The capital event of the present Emperor's reign—one that must for all time make it memorable—is the emancipation of the Serfs, and our author gives interesting data as to the progress of this great organic change. The Imperial decree of 1861 declared all serfs free, and conferred on every male a specified lot of land, vary. ing in quantity according to quality and site. The land was to be held in perpetual copyhold, the payments being fixed for a term of twenty years. If then the peasant desires to convert his copyhold tenure into freehold, he is entitled to exact purchase at a fixed price of his homestead and cartilage, but his acquisition of the remaining land depends on the readiness of the owner to sell. Should he be so disposed, then the State steps in, assesses the value of the land, and assumes a charge of 80 per cent. on the pur- chase-money, which it pays to the owner in interest-bearing bonds, taking on itself the task of getting repayment in a course of forty-nine years from the peasants, who besides, have to find the other 20 per cent. on the purchase-money. But there is yet another provision whereby it is rendered possible for the owners to force the peasants in spite of themselves to purchase their copy- hold occupations, and it is by the voluntary surrender of this 20 per cent. Let the landlord elect to forego this amount, and the peasant must become an owner at his bidding. In 1801 there were found to be in Russia 9,939,717 male serfs, of whom 6,245,034 had come to terms about land through the medium of Government machinery in March this year. The mortgage con- tracted for this operation amounted to 550,000,000 roubles, which, bearing 6 per cent. interest, should be paid off by the peasants in forty-nine years. We believe that so far the authorities have been tolerably successful in obtaining from the newly enfranchised peasants the dues to which by law they have made themselves liable, but it remains a question how much longer they may con- tinuo amenable when we are informed that a large proportion have become purchasers only under coercion from their lords. The latter are, as a body, so uneasy as to the possible consequences of

this land legislation that they seek a settlement that may he considered final even at a loss of 20 per cent. Again, we most with the singular fact, and it is noteworthy as a proof of how little the sense of freehold has taken hold of the Russian peasantry's mind, that no less than 570,000 serfs have chosen to come to an extra-legal arrangement with their lords, by which they have been content to receive scot-free one-fourth of the land lot, which by law they were entitled to get on payment with Government assistance. We cannot be surprised to learn that year by year the proportion of involuntary enfranchisements at the dictation of the lords is on the increase, and that discontent is becoming more and more apparent amongst the peasantry, both at payments which they declare to be in excess of what they can bear, and at their obligatory attachment to the soil for the long period over which their payments have to run. In the opinion of our author this forms the point which will call for immediate attention. He con- siders the groundwork of the measure of 1861 to have been dis- tinguished by a proper understanding of Russian conditions, and to be deserving of all praise on the score of well-adapted provisions. But he holds that circumstances imperatively demand the abolition of a coercive enactment which binds a generation immovably to a spot, and so imposes an unbearable fetter on the development of individual pursuits which must become more and more galling, and more and more injurious in proportion, as, through railways and other means, it is sought to stimulate the general productive- ness of the Empire.

The impression left after the perusal of this pamphlet on our minds is, on the whole, that Russia, though big and full of resources, is yet unwieldy from imperfect development; and greatly cramped, partly by natural conditions, and partly by administrative evils which are still far from being relieved. Our author goes systematically through every branch of the State and every section of the administration. The figures given show certainly advance in wealth and improvement in internal arrangement, yet both are greatly in the rear of what is shown by other countries. There is a deadness about the whole life of the Empire, a certain barbarous sluggishness, which does not offer the conditions for the kind of vigour requisite for the efforts incumbent on that spirit of aggres- sive ambition which Russia is freely credited with harbouring. No doubt " a Russian " is animated with strong views which may colour some of his conclusions and render him throughout partial. Let the reader take his data and his figures and form then his own conclusions. It is not as a controversial pamphlet, but as a sum- mary of positive information, that we recommend the perusal of this thin treatise, the amount of solid matter in which is cer- tainly not to be measured by the tinyness of its size. Anyhow, we apprehend that there are few, especially in this country, who will not admit that they have found in these pages much which they did not know before on a subject of the very greatest political interest.