21 SEPTEMBER 1951, Page 2

'Obligatory Pause

Neither the British nor the Persian Government seems 'to have any very clear idea about what to do next. To fill in the time they are plaguing each other with economic assaults, most of which are a breach of contract, or of good faith, or Of both. The only proceedings directly related to the oil dispute have been concerned with Dr. Moussadek's " ultimatum." In it Dr. Moussadek invited the British to continue negotiations where they broke off. By sending the Note in the first place to Mr. Harriman, Dr. Moussadek gained a little time—and nothing else, for Mr. Harriman would have none of the Note. He may also have hoped 'to trap the Americans into tacit acceptance of the Persian point 'of view, though if this was indeed his hope it was doomed to .disappointment. While it is true that the West has tended to 'under-estimate Dr. Moussadek's political skill in dealing with this own countrymen, it is just as true that Dr. Moussadek has consistently over-estimated his own skill in dealing with the West. Just as the Persian deputies are beginning to grow a little weary of their Prime Minister's tears and heart attacks, so the West is beginning to get a little bored with the bogey of Russian intervention. Certainly, Dr. Moussadek's health is weak ; certainly, the Russian menacejs real. But neither fact is new and neither is an argument. The gamble to which we appear to be committed is that at some moment before the economic crisis reaches its peak the Persians will become as tired of Dr. Moussadek's bluriderings. But it is a gamble. Meanwhile it would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that our object, as Government and Opposition speakers hav&on several occasions confirmed, is not only to reach a just settlement of the oil dispute, but also to see Persia a strong and friendly State once again. But if Dr. Moussadek's " ultimatum " runs its full course we may find ourselves concentrating all our attention on the fate of the technicians who are left in Abadan. There is a risk that their position will become as symbolic for the British public as that of the isolated General Gordon became for an earlier generation. But it must be remembered what they are a symbol of ; and that is not so much British prestige, or even the British capital locked up in Abadan, as the example of. Anglo- Persian co-operation which they once represented, and which they could still be made the nucleus for rebuilding.