ORGANISING EUROPE
THE decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and the United States regarding the future of Western Germany, if reinforced by decisions which it is hoped the Council of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will take at Ottawa this week, may considerably affect the structure and the psychology of Europe. But for that certain conditions must be fulfilled, chief among them the unreserved acceptance by Germany of the invitation extended to her to take her place " on a basis of equality in a continental European community, which will itself form part of a constantly developing Atlantic community." The importance of this second and larger con- ception must by no means be ignored. In that Western world in which Europe west of the Iron Curtain is embodied the United States, and to a less extent Canada, play a foremost part. With- out the co-operation they provide in men and money and the maintenance of international confidence a successful defence of Western Europe in the event of aggression from the East would be beyond all hope. But there is more in it than that. The Atlantic community needs to concern itself with other tasks than military defence alone. An economic unity is necessary as well as a political unity, and so, on a different level of importance, is a social and a cultural unity. Mr. Lester Pearson, the Cana- dian Foreign Minister, has particularly stressed that, and it is satisfactory that one step taken at Ottawa has been the appoint- ment of a committee to consider ways of progress in these fields. Now that the coasts of America and Europe are no more than twenty-four hours apart, and public speakers in one continent can be listened to in another, the evolution of an Atlantic com- munity is in a sense something inevitable, but -at the same time something that it is essential to direct and foster wisely.
But that must be held less immediate than the consolidation of Western Europe aimed at first by the three chief Foreign Ministers and then by N.A.T.O. as a whole. The realisation of the aim, it must be recognised, depends to an almost disturb- ingly large extent on Germany. There can be no Western Europe of which she is not an integral part, and with which she does not co-operate with conviction and without reservations. For- tunately, nothing impossible or unreasonable is being asked of her, and everything proposed is patently to her own advantage. That appears to be fully acknowledged by the German Chan- cellor, Dr. Adenauer, who sees in the virtually complete independence now accorded to his country the reward of the prudent and statesmanlike policy he has pursued since he assumed his present post two years ago. But the river is not yet crossed. It is not in concerting agreement on broad prin- ciples that the grbatest difficulties necessarily arise ; more often they are encountered in the attempt to apply the principles in detail. That stage begins in this case when the Allied High Commissioners and German representatives meet next week to decide precisely what Western Germany's new status is to be when the occupation ends, what authority the Allies are still to retain in Germany, and various financial problems arising out of that. Since the Allied Powers have definitely renounced for the future any intervention in Germany's domestic affairs, and their future transactions with her will be through the ordi- nary medium of Ambassadors, not High Commissioners, the road to a general agreement should be reasonably smooth. - But-all this is linked, in the statement issued from Washington a week ago, with the acceptance by Germany of her due place in a European defence community. That indeed was, logically enough, put first, the argument running that a Germany taking her place on a basis of equality in a European army could clearly not be a Germany under foreign occupation. At the same time, the two things are separate. There is a decisive case for giving Germany her independence even apart from her contribution to European defence. There would be the strongest reason for her to make that contribution, even if occupation still continued, if she cares at all for the defence of her country against possible attack. No spirit of bargaining ought to intrude into the coming discussions. If the Allies spontaneously concede independence to Germany, as they have done, and Germany spontaneously accepts responsibility for a due share in European defence, a relationship will have been established equally hopeful for Germany herself, for Western Europe and for the whole Atlantic community. But that has still to be achieved, and while the German Cabinet has approved the European Army plan, it is by no means clear how far the country as a whole accepts it. The plan, of course, is in no sense being imposed on Germany. German experts have been working on it on an equality with the French and other participants since February. In its final form it will be a genuine co-operative effort.
If it did not reach a final form the failure would be disastrous for no one so much as Germany. The political effects might be far-reaching, for it might be necessary in such a case to deter- mine that the line of defence would be the Rhine, not the Elbe. That, no doubt, was among the factors which determined the German Cabinet's approval of what is known as the Paris Plan. But it is some way yet to the approval of the plan by the Bundestag at Bonn and its embodiment in an international treaty: In that German domestic politics will inevitably play a certain part. Dr. Schumacher is highly critical. That is partly because he is the Opposition leader, and the business of an Opposition is to criticise, partly because he is Dr. Schumacher, in whose make-up there is more than an average element of bitterness and angularity. But the Social Democratic leader is arguing in a circle when be contends that Western Germany should not risk her potential soldiers till the Allies have shown; themselves strong enough to hold the Elbe line ; for it is pre• cisely to make the holding of the Elbe line a reasonable proposition that German participation in European defence is needed. Many practical questions will no doubt have to be decided, and some of them will be difficult—what should be the size of the German contingent ; how it should be raised ; from what level of command, if any, German officers will be debarred ; how all suspicion that the Germans are being definitely subordinated to the French can be dispelled. Given good will on both sides, there is no problem here that should prove insuperable. The fact that for a long time to come, as long indeed as anyone can see, the European Army will form part of the N.A.T.O. defence force under General Eisenhower', command should be a sufficient guarantee to the Germans that they need fear no discriminatory treatment. It is, of course, clear that rearmament in Western German}, will emphasise the unhappy partition of the country. It did not need Herr Grotewohl's plausible offer of free elections in a united Germany to emphasise that. This offer does indeed go a little further than the last, and though Dr. Adenauer and Dr. Schumacher are for once in accord in their opinion °Mt, bona fides, the Cabinet would be wise to prefer tentative explora, tion to flat rejection. A reunited Germany is the common hop(' of all Germans, but the best hope of its attainment lies in Weste Germany's achieving position and prosperity as partner in democratic Western European association. Herr Grotewo speaks of rearmament in Western Germany as constituting threat of civil war. What is in reality more dangerous to him IS the prospect of Western Germany managing its own affairs with; out external interference, while the determining factor in the several Eastern regions is still the Kremlin.
The North Atlantic Council will meet again at Rome next month, and-many questions under discussion now at Ottawa will have to wait till then for final decision, among them General Eisenhower's urgent call for more troops for Western Europe. The widely supported proposal for the admission of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Organisation seems likely to be adopted after all, Denmark having now withdrawn her opposi- tion. The argunient ;that the Organisation should neither be too large nor too scattered has point, but the balance of advantage on political and psychological grounds is plainly in favour of admis- sion, which need in no way prejudice the subsequent creation of a Middle East Defence League. Much may go wrong with paper plans ; but if the proposals framed in the last ten days, including permission for Italy to increase her -military establishment, are accepted in substance a Western Europe distinctly stronger and more closely welded should emerge.
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