USERS' CHOICE
AFTER the Prime Minister's assurance that Great Britain will go to the United Nations if Egypt refuses to co- operate with the proposed Suez Canal users' associa- tion, the danger of military action by the Western Powers has receded, and Mr. Dulles's new plan stands revealed as a way of getting negotiations with the Egyptians started again—an aim which had always seemed the most likely interpretation of American intentions. Unfortunately, the effect of the Prime Minister's first speech in the House of Commons on world opinion has hardly been removed by his later pledge. To announce what was intended to be a conciliatory plan so that it was widely taken to be just the opposite was, even on the most charitable interpretation of events, decisively to get off on the wrong foot. However, it is now little use crying over spilt milk. When the second Suez conference ends its sittings in London, supposing that unanimous agreement is reached (which is unlikely), the States who agree to join the users' association will be faced by an atmosphere which has worsened since the Menzies mission and in which it is in the highest degree improbable that Egypt will consent to facilitate the association's operations.
What then remains? An appeal to the UN, given the Soviet veto, can only stave off any real decision. Its purpose—apart from its important effect on world opinion—can be to gain time, which is, indeed, useful enough..However, we shall then once more be back at the old crossroads between negotiation and sanctions. The arguments against military action still hold good, while the American plan of a boycott of the Canal is a reductio ad absurdum of the whole situation. To ensure free- dom of navigation on the Suez Canal we are to boycott it for an indefinite period, thereby assisting Colonel Nasser to run it with a reduced staff and harming ourselves economically— even though we harm Egypt far more. However, the boycott may be justified by prestige considerations—a total victory for Colonel Nasser in present circumstances would obviously be dangerous. There remains negotiation, and it is impossible not to regret the lack of flexibility in the positions of Britain and France which prevented them from accepting the Indian pro- posals at the first London conference. Very possibly Colonel Nasser would not have accepted these, but the Western position would in any event have been strengthened by India's support. * * * Students of British policy in the Middle East can, indeed, find plenty of traces of the same fault elsewhere. The Suez muddle is only the latest manifestation of it. Fundamentally, there seems to be a feeling among British policy-makers that Arab States should be in some sense clients of this country. As such they are entitled to our protection, but must be docile where British interests are concerned. This attitude explains the ambiguity of our policy towards them, the alternation of appeasement and toughness which leads us, for instance, to continue to refuse arms to Israel at the very moment when we are engaged in strife with Colonel Nasser.
This position of hegemony was based originally on one very simple fact : the existence of the Indian Army and of British power in India. This gave us the demographic basis for domination of the vast land area lying between India and the Mediterranean. When that ceased to be so, to maintain large forces of troops so far from home became, as we have recently come to realise, a difficult matter and an intolerable economic strain. Under these circumstances, the best way of safeguarding our interests and our oil is to normalise our relations with the Arab States, to treat them as equals neither to be controlled nor to be appeased at the expense of other countries in the area. To trade with Kuwait and Bahrein we do not necessarily need Residents there. To argue that political hegemony is necessary to ensure the flow of oil is much like saying that we need a garrison in Buenos Aires to buy meat from the Argentine—an argument which we should, no doubt, have heard if the British expedition sent there in the early nineteenth century had succeeded instead of failing.
It is in the light of these general principles that the Suez question should be considered, and it is evident that, from a long-term point of view, a reoccupation of the Canal Zone would not merely be an attempt to put the clock back, but also a project likely to ruin what chance we have of carrying out a necessary transition with the minimum amount of damage. Suez has, in fact, made it still more urgent to introduce a new realism into British policy in the Levant. Since we can no longer control events there, we must now choose our allies on the same principles as we do elsewhere, among governments and peoples who are friendly to us and who present some degree of internal stability. This means a closer association with Israel.
Indeed, even from the point of view of settling the Arab- Israel conflict such an association would have its advantages. How else can the matter be settled except by an Arab recogni- tion of the existence of a State which they can hardly destroy? And that recognition is much more likely to come about if they realise that Israel has the firm support of Great Britain. At present, Britain acts like a schoolmaster who is indulgent when some breach of the rules is committed by the small boys of the Arab League, but who, when the more grown-up Israelis are at fault, grows suddenly stern : 'I expected better things of you. Ben-Gurion.' This is, surely, an impossible attitude to adopt as between States whose governments, one must assume, are equally responsible for their actions. It is but one example among many springing from the same cause : a false con- ception of policy and possibilities in the Middle East. Suez came as a nasty shock, and is now bound to end with some degree of retreat on our part, but it will have had its uses if it persuades experts and politicians to take a prolonged look at British foreign policy and its aims, as they affect the Levant.
Previous page
