22 AUGUST 1896, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

J English history as the ablest Foreign Minister who ever preached to Europe in the plainest possible language, while showing the utmost reluctance to let his action accompany, much less go before, his warnings. In some sense it may be said that his thunder anticipates his iightning instead of following it. Nor do we say that he is in that respect in the wrong. He knows better than we do what might be the consequence of letting his action interpret too abruptly his policy to the world. When he said at Dover last Saturday that the preacher who warns the impenitent sinner of the ultimate consequences of his sin, is by no means bound to come down from the pulpit with a thick stick and chastise him himself, he pointed the moral of his own career as a Foreign Minister. When he went first to Constantinople as Lord Beaconsfield's special delegate, nobody could have been plainer in his warnings to Turkey ; yet he allowed Lord Beaconsfield's policy to dominate his own when the Treaty of Berlin came to be discussed and drawn up. "Der alto Jude," as Bismarck is said to have called Disraeli, ob- tained for the Turk another pretty long extension of his lease of sovereignty, to the great sorrow of both East and West, though we are very far from saying that in the condition of opinion which then prevailed in England and still betrays its tenacious hold on not a few of the permanent advisers of our Government, he could have achieved what we believe that his own bias would have suggested for the pur- pose of controlling the action of Turkey, and, perhaps, even of using the help of Russia for that most desirable end. Nor is it possible for any one who does not command an interior view of the tangled relations of the various Powers 4f Europe, as Lord Salisbury commands it, to deny that even now he may be doing what is wisest in speaking out 30 plainly as he does, and yet declining to take the lead in action. No one probably who is not at the centre of affairs appreciates the depth and intensity of the jealousy felt by the other Powers of the action of England. It may well be that they are all under the delusion that we covet Crete, and would like to add that second prize to the stake of Cyprus, which Lord Beaconsfield unfortu- nately won for us in 1878. In some respects, our great naval power may even render it more, instead of less, diffi- cult for Lord Salisbury to intervene with authority in Crete, if the real danger to be apprehended is a formidable European combination against England. No one knows better than Lord Salisbury how real that danger may be. And it is quite possible that the mere fact of our having it in our power to precipitate the emancipation of Crete, makes it necessary to give the most ample security for our disinterestedness in the matter before we take any prac- tical action. Nothing could be more disastrous than to divert Europe from the duty of providing for the ultimate ex- pulsion of Turkey as the great " gangrene " of European and Asiatic politics, into an attempt on the part of her many jealous colleagues in the police of Europe, to paralyse England. Still, it is a little disappointing to find that the statesman who expounds in such plain and unanswerable language, the moral logic of the pre- sent situation as it presents itself at the point where Europe and Asia all but touch each other, should be obliged to waste half his force in allaying the fears of his colleagues in the counsels of Europe, and that, too, even in relation to a question, on which if they would only trust him for absolute disinterestedness, Lord Salisbury could strike the blow which would be the beginning of the end of the Turkish collapse. Nothing can now arrest that collapse except the jealousy felt of England, and the wish to prolong the existence of the wickedest of all existing, if not of all possible, Governments, in order that English pride and policy may be mortified. Lord Salisbury knows, as no other English statesman knows, how deep this jealousy is. And he may be not only perfectly right, but even singularly far-sighted, in refraining from any actwhich would irritate that jealousy into an explosion of confused ?assions. Still, it is certainly disappointing to England, Led must be very mortifying to Lord Salisbury to feel the necessity of holding his hand, just when England has the opportunity, if she could command the confidence of the other Powers, of shattering the weak and wicked Administra tion which has so long lied, and murdered, and embodied the abomination of desolation in the East of Europe. Surely Lord Salisbury will not finish his great career without con- vincing the other Powers that in this matter we have no arriere pens& except for the benefit of both Europe and Asia ; that far from coveting Crete, we would not tithe such another bribe, even at their earnest request ; and that. ifwe could but commence the necessary work of replacing the evil government of the Turk by some healthier regime, we should be more than satisfied,—elated,—to be allowed to. give, from the most disinterested of motives, the first impulse to the collapse of this monstrous spider-web of cunning and malicious cruelty. We indulge the earnest hope that the statesman who has exposed most relentlessly the iniquity of the Turkish rule, will yet find the moment when he can safely commence the great work of its cautious but effectual extinction.

The short speech made by Lord Salisbury in the earlier part of the day on which he was installed in the great historic post of Warden of the Cinque Ports, was on a subject in which his policy promises an earlier and more brilliant issue. He referred to the efforts which he and his colleagues are making, in conjunction with the Government of the United States, "to withdraw a. portion of the causes that have led mankind from ages past to the terrible judgment of the battle-field," and in- dulged the hope that they might win "this peaceful victory, which, if it is won, will be more precious than the many victories with which this part of the island is asso- ciated." He alluded, of course, to the proposal for estab- lishing some general Court of Arbitration between this country and the United States, which may at least pre- sent vividly to the minds of both nations the duty and the wisdom of settling peacefully disputes which too often lead to bloody and dangerous struggles. We do not expect much, and have never expected much, from the mere construction of such a Court, that could not be equally well accomplished without it, if only both Powers had the good sense and the conciliatory disposition to regard war as the most desperate of all expedients for settling such disputes. There are some kinds of disputes which no nation could or would submit to arbi- tration, because the mere fact of doing so would in- volve the surrender of its national existence. And on other questions of less moment we do not think that any general Court of Arbitration would often be the appropriate tribunal for the settlement of such disputes, though it may be as good an instrument as any other for deciding what that special tribunal should be. Our own belief is that the good effect of Lord Salisbury's proposed treaty with the United States, will be rather its general effect on the opinion of the two countries, than its special effect on the various arbitrations in which it may happen to result. These last would, in all probability, be quite as well provided by the Governments of the two countries without any such general treaty, as they would be in virtue of that treaty, were it equally likely that the temper of the two countries would be as cordial and conciliatory without a general treaty, as it would be with it. But we are convinced that that would not be the case. The existence of such a treaty, if we can construct and ratify it, would have a great educating effect on the minds of the two peoples. It would be a sort of pledge to the world that the ideal of each nation should be to find a means of getting rid of the arbitrament of war, and nothing would exert a more beneficial influence on a self-governing people than such a public notice of the aim to be kept in view. This is why we so heartily approve Lord Salisbury's policy in negotiating such a treaty with the United States. It will not cover the case of every quarrel, though we trust that it may cover the case of the most probable quarrels. And even for those quarrels of which it may effectually cover the ground, it will hardly provide any better tribunal than the two Governments would provide without it, if the temper of the two peoples were equally pacific. But we are sure that it will tend to make the temper of the two peoples much more pacific than it otherwise would be ; and that alone is a very great object to secure.

We firmly believe that of all the Foreign Ministers we have had for many a long day, Lord Salisbury is at heart the most opposed to unnecessary wars. And we can have no better Warden of the Cinque Ports in days like these, than one who will diminish materially the risk of war. If war should come, it will not be to the Warden of the Cinque Ports that we should look to make our preparations effectual. For that we should look to the First Lord of the Admiralty and to the Minister for War. But behind and beyond these it is to such a statesman as Lord Salisbury that we must look for seeing that the chances of war are minimised, and also for choosing competent Ministers to protect our coasts and to drill our soldiers, and to direct our strategy, if, by misadventure, and in spite of all the wisdom of our statesmen, we have at any time to fight for our Colonies or even for our own in- dependence.