THE VICTORY IN FRANCE.
MHE victory in France is complete, and it is as new as it is complete. The parliamentary principle is vindicated ; the political prosecutions are stopped ; the newspapers are again sold freely in the streets ; the Ministry is one entirely named by the Prime Minister, without any reserves by the President ; and the latter has accepted avowedly the result of the appeal to the people, and promised that the crisis shall not be renewed. It is impossible to conceive a more perfect or a more finished victory. M. Dufaure,—whose character as a statesman we have discussed elsewhere,—has at least the great merit of having left nothing which should be liable to misinterpretation in future, though he has spared the Marshal as far as it was possible with .due regard to the prin- ciples for which he was fighting. But after all, the new feature in the case is not the completeness of the victory,—for various revolutions and coups d'etat have been equally complete,—but the unsensational instruments by which it has been won. We, in England, boast of being a political people, and nothing has been commoner for months back than to hear people say that the French people really do not understand politics, that they are always changing their mind, that you cannot tell what they would be at, that it is the same miserable round of sensational crises from decade to decade, —a revolution in one decade, a coup de'tost in the next,— that a quiet Constitutional struggle is impossible to them, and violence the natural end of all their disputes. Now, people who talk thus have really a very narrow conception of history. We venture to say that taking the history of France as a whole, there is less excuse for such language about France than there would be for its application to England, by any one who took the history of England as a whole. Popular struggles, in the modern sense, began in France much later, no doubt, than in England ; and when they did begin, were excited from a centre much more deeply sunk in the ranks of the people than was the first great English revolt against the authority of the Crown. And the first great outbreak of popular French feeling was, therefore, of course, one of a much more exciting kind, and accompanied by far more tragic results than the corresponding outbreak in England. Still it must be remembered that the struggle between the people and the principle of irresponsible authority has even now lasted in France less than ninety years, of which period nearly, two-thirds have been occupied by intervals of profound tranquillity, though no doubt the forces were accumulating which led to the next outbreak ; while in our corresponding unsettled period—the sixteenth cen- tury—there occurred a civil war much more destruc- tive of the whole peace of society than even the bloody agony of the Reign of Terror in France. Indeed, fairly comparing the history of the two countries, without falling into the mistake of requiring the same achieve- ments at the same time from each, we should be inclined to deny that there is any reason to give the palm to England for sobriety and moderation. Of course, England from the last decade of the eighteenth century to the present time, has been much more sober than France during the same epoch, but that is only saying that the different stages of these two peoples' political development have occurred at different times. Looking at the history of France and England in the long- run, we doubt whether it would be true to assert that England in the hour of her political passion showed any more sobriety or less disposition to violence, than France. The spasms of France have been fiery and short, while those of England were somewhat less fiery, and longer. The excitability of France has always centred in Paris, while that of England has generally been greatest in the provinces. And there are other differences. But it is quite open to any thinking man to doubt whether, when the histories of both countries shall be at last complete, France will show a history of less Conservative feeling, of less political sagacity, of less tenacity and strength m the popular fibre, than England. Assuredly the distinctive features of this last victory are in every respect most remarkable, and most hopeful for the political future of the French people. The party which intrigued in 1873 to bring back the most un- popular of all the rival dynasties which claim the throne of France, had, by inspiring the Marshal with a panic-fear of Radicalism, induced him to seize abruptly on a very unsuitable occasion for dismissing his Republican advisers, summoning back the Minister who had BO nearly restored Henri V., and who had placed the Marshal where he is, and calling upon the Senate to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. All this was within the Marshal's legal right, but the means by which his counsellors sought to make his policy successful,—the enormous intimidation exerted by unscrupulous Prefects,—the interference with the liberty of the Press just protected by an Act of the Legislature, which was, indeed, open to quibbling misinterpretation, but the inten- tion of which was never for a moment ambiguous,—and worst of all, the open announcement by the Marshal that he intended to support his Ministers and to stand by their subordinates, whether or not the vote of the people should be found to have condemned them,—were not at all within any one's legal right, and were of a nature to excite in every Department of France the deepest sense of injury and apprehension. Yet not a disturbance occurred. Nowhere was there a pretence given for calling in the aid of the Army. Even when the great popular leader was prosecuted, and most unjustly and illegally condemned, for pointing out that if the popular vote should, be against the Government, the Marshal would have no choice but either to do what he has now done or resign, —no one stirred. The silent resolve of France to make her will known, was strengthened, but the profound tranquillity of the country seemed deeper than ever. Then came the triumph of the people, and then a period of two months of most trying and anxious suspense, during which the Marshal, who refused either to submit or to resign, tried every expedient not obviously a breach of the Constitution, to get the Budget voted without doing either, and during which he was publicly exhorted by the most violent of his adherents to try force as the only 'Con- servative' solution of any value. During all this time the popu- lar party remained as quiescent as if their victory was assured, but quiescent in such a mood that M. Pouyer-Quertier could tell the Marshal, without fear of being dis- believed, that if he attempted to collect the taxes without their being legally voted, he would have thousands of prosecutions on his hands, while the officials who made the attempt would be overwhelmed with actions for illegal attempts to extort money, on the merits of which even French tribunals would be likely to waver. In what country or age of the world has the self-possession of sagacious caution been better combined with the moral attitude which dis- courages and even alarms tyranny, than it was so combined in France in this case ? At last even the Marshal had to give way, and verify M. Gambetta's declaration. It was not that there was any imposing popular demonstration against him. That would have been an excuse for the use of force. But the Deputies, when asked for money, gently put the question by. The people, it was known, when asked for money, would follow the example of their Deputies. And without money, how was an Administration to be carried on ? A regular monarchy of like mind would, of course, have tried a coup d'cleat. Napoleon IV. or even Henri V., if placed in a similar position, might probably have tried it. But how could a soldier of no great repute and no great name, whose former popularity had rested on his supposed honour and faithfulness rather than on any brilliant achievement, attempt such a feat,—in which so many must co-operate to secure the least chance of success,—without even the excuse of a mob or a popular illegality of any kind ? And so the Marshal was driven, sorely against his will, it must be admitted, into disavowing abso- lutely and adequately the whole of M. de Broglie's policy, accepting the appeal to the country as final, admitting that a dissolution can never be justified except as an appeal to a final authority, and promising in the most distinct language that the crisis should not occur again. No greater triumph of calm tena- city, of silent fortitude, of political endurance was ever gained, and this by the party which was actually accused by M. de Broglie of having excited far more terror at the polls than his own Prefects, with all their authority and all the soldiers at their disposal, and almost all the tribunals to back them, had been able to excite. If the weapons of the Liberals during the recent contest can be described as terrorism, terrorism must be defined anew as that which does not cry aloud in the streets, which suffers innumerable wrongs in silence, which has no weapons of war at its disposal, and which works by no instruments except moral sympathy and infleiuble will. A greater triumph of the spirit 'of endurance over the spirit of un- constitutional aggression has not been achieved in the whole history of European politics, than this triumph of the Re- publicans in France during the seven months' crisis which is at last happily terminated.
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