CORRESPONDENCE.
[To TUE EDITOR Olt THE " SPECTATOR:1
Sin,—An attempt will be made in this letter to give a brief, but accurate, account of the "weeding-out" process which has been applied to his Majesty's ships during the last twp years. That process was mentioned last week in connexion with alleged resultant "economies" on repairs, which were shown to be fictitious to a large extent. So much has been made of the matter, however, in eulogies of recent Admiralty administration that the truth should be understood.
In every great fleet—whether used for war or commerce— as individual ships advance in age, and as new inventions enable vessels of later date to be made relatively more efficient, a gradual but continuous clearance of the older ships must be made. For mercantile vessels the test of continued profit- earning settles the matter ; ships are sold by the great com- panies long before they are worn out, when they can no longer achieve commercial success. In war-fleets, although other considerations determine length of service, a period arrives when ships must be "struck off" the Effective List. The decision rests with the responsible authorities of each Navy.; different views prevail in different countries at a given date, and in the same country at different dates. No fixed or statutory period of effective service can be named for any class of warship. For the regulation of shipbuilding pro- grammes certain average periods of service are commonly assumed. For instance, the German Naval Bill was based on the assumptions that the useful life of a battleship was twenty-five years, and that of a cruiser from twenty to fifteen years. It was arranged that vessels should be laid down to " replace " their predecessors when specified ages had been attained; but it did not follow that when new units were completed the ships they nominally "replaced" would be discarded entirely or broken up. On the contrary, Germany has spent large sums on the repair and reconstruction of a considerable number of vessels nominally past further service, and has built up a valuable reserve of ships in that manner. A similar provision of reserve ships was made in this country for many years prior to the issue of Lord
Selborne's 'Memoranduin of December; 1904, wherein' a "heroic" new departure was announced, since termed the " scrap-heap " policy. •
The importance attached thereto by leading members of the Government was evidenced in many ways, and they were greatly impressed with the supposed merits of the scheme. Within a few weeks of its announcement Mr. Balfonr (then Prime Minister) devoted a considerable portion of his speech at Glasgow to the subject, and expressed his appreciation in no measured terms. As a whole, he thought it " perhaps the biggest of all the reforms which have taken place since the time of Nelson." Men familiar with naval history, and the notable developments which marked the nineteenth century considered this " a tall order" ; to Mr. Balfour and his colleagues it was clearly no exaggeration. "Speaking from memory," Mr. Balfour gave one hundred and thirty as the total number of vessels to be removed; some months later the official total was found to be one hundred and -fifty- five. He said :—" The Board of Admiralty had laid. down the rule that an [out-of-date] ship, howeVer useful in time of peace—and we have to do, it must be admitted, a great deal of small police work in a time of peace, for diplomatic or other purposes—is not only useless but worse than useless in time of war. If it possesses neither fighting power nor speed, it is merely a ship which exists to embarrass British Admirals and to discredit the British flag." This recital of the governing principles of the "scrap-heap" policy left nothing to be desired in regard to clearness ; un- fortunately, it contravened the teachings of history and experience. War-fleets have always contained, and must always contain, a considerable variety of sizes and types of ships. Other requirements have to be fulfilled besides those which are met by (what is termed) the " first fighting-line " in recent Admiralty documents; classes of ships which writers on naval subjects usually term " capital ships " forming the " line of battle." Limited space prevents further allusion to this branch of the subject, interesting as it undoubtedly is. My concern is with the action taken two years ago rather than with the motives which produced it.
Parliamentary Papers (presented at the end of March, 1905) revealed the names of the hundred and fifty-five "worse than useless ships" said to have been "struck of the Effective List." The disclosures made in those Papers were astounding; and it was fortunate for the authors of the scheme—who had claimed (through the Prime Minister and the Press) such a wonderful achievement—that few people read either Blue-books or criticisms *.thereof. The "general reader" accepts statements put forward in "brightly written" paragraphs or "popular" articles, prepared for his consump- tion. Still, the hard facts remain, and here they are for those who care to master them.
According to one Parliamentary Return of 1905, a hundred and fifty-five ships were "Struck off the List of Effective Ships of War "; whereas another Return (issued nearly simul- taneously) enumerated twenty-seven of the same vessels as "not struck off." They hid been placed (accord- ing to the second Return) in a " Special Reserve.", Thirty-eight other vessels were described as still " avail- able for subsidiary services,"—and, it may be remarked in passing, they had been designed originally for sub- sidiary services, and not for the first fighting-line. Conse- quently the "courageous stroke of the pen" not merely struck off a hundred and fifty-five ships, but restored sixty-five of them to the lists as "available for further service," " sub- sidiary " or otherwise. Discretion seems to have been the " better part of valour." Of the remaining ninety ships, twenty- fivewerehulks and harbour vessels which had been used as float- ing barracks, school-ships, &c., and were no longer required when buildings on shore were completed: eleven were small gunboats used for training men, and eleven were vessels of great age and nondescript character which would have been sold in the ordinary course without calling public attention to the fact. Not one of these forty-seven vessels could by any stretch of imagination be regarded as "an effective ship of war." One wonders if Mr. Balfour ever saw this list, or understood how the large total was attained ; he probably accepted what was -told him. One would like to know the name of his informant.
Only forty-three vessels, out of the. hundred and fifty- five claimed, were struck off the real Effective List. Of these, seventeen would have disappeared soon on account of age under ordinary conditions. Further scrutiny shows that twenty-six vessels of comparatively modern types 'were dealt with : three of these were " belted " cruisers (' Orlando' type), seventeen were protected cruisers (mostly third-class), and six were torpedo-gunboats. This is the "true inwardness" of the "reform" described as perhaps the "biggest" since the time of Nelson : only twenty-six vessels having claims to fighting power were removed. Many of these twenty-six vessels were equal or superior to vessels retained and kept effective in foreign fleets; and strong protests were made against their removal from our available force. When these facts were pressed home in Parliament, and the action was questioned, Mr. Pretyman took a singular line of defence. He practically threw over Mr. Balfour and the " biggest reform " idea, and said : " This was not a new policy : in the last three years eighty-four ships had been placed upon the scrap-heap." He was compelled to admit also that eighteen of the hundred and fifty-five ships nominally struck off bad been described previously in Parliamentary Papers as " unfit for service." In other words, these eighteen ships had been " struck off " for the second time in 1905 in order to swell the total number of ships nominally dealt with at that period.
Hurry and theatrical display marked the initial stages of this "scrap-heap" performance. There was no real urgency, but the public mind was to be impressed. Orders were sent by telegram to put ships out of commission on distant foreign stations; where they have since been left to deteriorate. Other vessels, nominally " struck off," remained on active service (some receiving a subvention from Australasia) for a consider- able time after they had been described as " non-effective," and their names had been placed on a " List for Sale." Not a few of the vessels " scrapped " had been thoroughly refitted or extensively repaired not long before by Admiralty order.. The only change in the Board had been the appointment of a new First Sea Lord. Lord Selborne and his colleagues have never been able to justify their sudden change of front. The Public Accounts Committee condemned this inconsistent and wasteful action. During the three years ending March Slist, 1905, no less than £338,000 was spent on the repairs of vessels "weeded out" early in 1905, and nearly One half .of the waste was incurred on the twenty-six modern vessels. During the last two years the unwisdom of the action taken in 1905 has been demonstrated repeatedly. Ships declared worthless and " struck off," although considerable sums had been spent on repairs, have been again taken in hand to be prepared for further service. Such vacillation is inexcusable ; its results must be serious. Ill-considered and hasty action has been associated with wide advertisement and claims to credit for the introduction of novel and improved methods of administration. But as a matter of fact our effective reserves of warships have been weakened; and a well-established policY—copied and still continued abroad—has been broken down. At first it was specifically stated that "not a penny" was to be spent on the repairs and maintenance of ships "in special reserve." When it was shown that this course must involve serious deterioration and loss of efficiency, reports of amended Admiralty instructions appeared approving expenditure abso-' lutely necessary for upkeep. Recently it has been announced that a " sliding-scale" of nucleus crews will be adopted for "ships in Commission in Reserve" and that older ships will have very small crews. What has happened already to ships " in Commission in Reserve," whose condition has become un- satisfactory even with larger nucleus crews, gives rise to serious apprehension that the reductions in crews now con- templated will lead to worse results in future. It is idle to live in a " fool's paradise " and to take credit for reserves of ships which in the day of trouble would be found non-effeCtive because their repairs bad been neglected. Only false economies are to be gained by such a procedure, and a heavy price will have to be paid hereafter if this folly is continued. Upkeep of modern warships is costly, no doubt, but it is essential to 'efficiency, and must be faced.
It is possible, no doubt, to incur wasteful expenditure on old warships. That danger is readily avoided by careful administration. Only the elements affecting fighting efficiency require to be maintained,—propelling apparatus and armament must be kept ready for use, and moderate outlay suffices to ensure this. Lord CawdoFs Statement is misleading on this matter. It contains " fancy " Estimates of two millions for rearming the Admiral ' class, and half-a- million to be spent on the Apollo' class ; and suggests that to be of " any good at all " ships must be refitted, and probably rearmed. This is pure assumption, unjustified by experience. But the most remarkable claim made by Lord Cawdor refers to the " financial result of the removal of ships from the Effective List." Again the claim is put forward that, " after a searching criticism of all ships belonging to the Navy in order to estimate their value as fighting machines," it was decided to relegate "some hundred and fifty ships to the non-effective list." Lord Cawdor, or his naval advisers, clearly believe in the method of "reiteration" as a means of convincing the public that this was the " biggest " reform since the time of Nelson ; but mere reiteration of a statement is no proof of. its accuracy. Amongst the financial results claimed is a saving of five millions on new works which had been projected, and are said to have " appeared inevitable owing to want of dockyard accommodation." These can now " be abandoned, as well as those [works] which were becoming necessary for the increase in personnel," and the estimated saving is " about five millions sterling,"—consequent on " striking off " ships. This is a preposterous assertion, which cannot be justified in view of the facts stated above as to the action taken in removing ships. What has really happened is that in regard to new works, as in regard to other matters, there has been vacillation and change of Admiralty policy. Costly extensions of existing dockyards, said to be abso- lutely necessary, have been abandoned, the character of the new naval station at Rosyth has been reconsidered, and so anticipated expenditure on new works has been reduced or postponed. The claim that removal of ships has been the primary cause of this reduced expenditure has no foundation in fact, and ought never to have been made.
Another "courageous stroke of the pen" is said to be impending. Many important vessels in the British Navy— including the Royal Sovereign' class—which are unquestion- ably superior to a great number of ships reckoned effective, and kept ready for service in foreign fleets, according to officious statements recently published are . to be either relegated to Special Reserves, or "scrapped." Such persist- ence in wilful waste of fighting power and expenditure surely will not be permitted by the present Government after the demonstration that has been given above of the real character and effect of the " scrap-heap " policy of 1904. It cannot be supposed that " reformers " are to be allowed to do as they please with our " first line of defence." Advantages which wiser administrators secured for us by long and persistent planning and effort are now being sacrificed in order to reduce expenditure on repairs. Recent events have illustrated the ravages on materiel which are involved in a modern naval war. The Japanese lost two out of six battleships on one day ; Russian ships were so damaged in a single action that they remained ineffective for long periods undergoing repairs. The " waste " of war is great. In the later stages the issue may be determined by bringing into action older ships treated as " reserves " when the war began. Much has been made of the supposed disad- vantage incurred by attaching older ships to Rozhdestvensky's squadron ; but the fact is ignored that the victorious Japanese mobilised and brought to bear at Tsu-shima every ship avail- able, involving many which were in no way superior to those which have been "scrapped " here during the last two years. Victory was won by superior skill and preparedness, not by mere superiority in ships. But the victors had adhered to the policy long followed for the Royal Navy, and by wise expenditure on older ships had created a valuable Reserve. This is the true lesson, and we should take heed thereto.—I
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