THE CHANNEL TUNNEL. T HE controversy as to the making of
the Channel Tunnel has been revived .during the past week by the issue to the public on Wednesday of the new Bill for its construction, and by a number of communications which have been appearing in the Daily Mail. Let us say at the outset that we see no reason to alter the opinion which we have always held upon the subject,—viz., that the tunnel is unnecessary from the commercial point of view, and that though it is easy to exaggerate the positive dangers which would result therefrom, they are on the whole greater than the advan- tages. We will enumerate the advantages first. Though the tunnel would not make the exchange of products between France and England easier or cheaper than they are at present—sea carriage is always cheaper for the bulky objects of general trade than is land transport—it would ne doubt facilitate passenger traffic. It would be a great convenience to men bent on business or pleasure who want to pass from England to France, or from France to England, not to have to get out of their railway carriages at Dover or Calais. Passengers would not only save at least half-an-hour or three-quarters on the journey, but they would be able to have the pleasure and con- venience of sitting still all the way. We do not therefore doubt that the South-Eastern and Chatham and Dover Railways in England, and the Chemin de Fer du Nord in France, would greatly benefit by the unbroken through communication. Many persons who now only go to Paris once a year would probably go three or four times in the course of the twelvemonth. That such increase of personal intercourse between the two countries would be a good thing we do not doubt. When, however, we have said 'this we have almost exhausted the benefits to be derived from the tunnel. That it would make the entente cordiale which now so happily exists between the two nations more stable we do not believe. That entente is founded upon a. stronger basis than mere facilities for personal intercourse between individuals. It is based on the fact that both countries are pacific self-governing com- munities who, while anxious to promote the general concord of Europe, are also determined to maintain their indepen- dence and to preserve their free institutions against all hostile influences.
We have said that the increase of intercourse is almost the only benefit that would accrue; but we admit that it is possible to argue that there might in special circumstances be a certain strategic benefit due to the construction of the tunnel. It has been urged that supposing, after its construction, we temporarily lost command of the sea, and that our shores were blockaded by an enemy bent on starving us out rather than upon invading us, we might draw a considerable amount of our food-supplies in safety through the Channel Tunnel. We do not deny the theoretical possibilities here set forth. At the same time, our readers, we think, will agree with us in declaring them somewhat too fantastic, or, at any rate, too remote, for any very serious consideration. We come, then, to this point,—the chief advantages which will be gained by the making of the tunnel will be those which will belong to its promoters and to the persons who provide the necessary capital. They may, we believe, expect good dividends and the possession of a very valuable property. Now, in the abstract, we are anything but averse to seeing another prosperous international company founded which will pay good interest and do good business. What we have to consider, however, is not .the interests of the capitalists, but whether there are not public inconveni- ences and dangers which in the special circumstances render it inadvisable to allow the private investor to provide improved passenger communication between France and England by means of a submarine tunnel. On the whole, we think. it inadvisable, because we believe that, in spite of all precautions that may be taken, England with a tunnel will not be quite so safe from the risk of invasion as she is without the tunnel, and that she will certainly not be so safe from panics and alarms of invasion as at the present moment.
We fully admit that on paper it is quite possible to show that, even with two tunnels with double lines, it, would be extremely difficult to bring fifty thousand troops quickly through the " gimlet-hole " under the sea and dispose them in a position strong enough to prevent the destruction of the tunnel before they could be reinforced by three or four corps d'annee. Again, we admit that on paper nothing is easier than to make arrangements by which the tunnel could be flooded or closed or the air-pumping arrangements put out of gear by pressing a button, which button would be always in English hands. At the same time, and however complete are the precautions taken, the fact remains that our national safety would, after the tunnel was made, depend more upon pre- cautions, and less upon what we may call the facts of Nature, than at present. It is notorious that human pre- cautions sometimes fail in the most extraordinary way. Mr. Anthony Hope could, we are sure; devise a dozen ways in which the guards at the English end of the tunnel might be suddenly surprised, and enough troops rushed through in half-an-hour to hold the position for the three or four hours that would be necessary for bringing up reinforcements. There are no pre- cautions, in fact, which cannot be overcome by a happy combination of boldness, or, if you will, mad impudence, on the one side, and sleepiness and carelessness on the other.
Perhaps we shall be told that in suggesting these possibili- ties we are assuming an unfriendly attitude towards France, and that it is monstrous to suppose that she would ever attempt to take advantage of the tunnel. Nothing is further from our thought than to insinuate that France is in the future likely to become a hostile Power. We not only were among the first, and remain among the staunchest, supporters of the entente cordiale, but we also sincerely believe that it is most unlikely that France and Britain will in future become estranged. In spite of that, how- ever, our objections remain, and they would remain even if were possible to obtain some absolute and complete guarantee for a perpetual peace between Britain and France. Surely it must have occurred to the promoters and advocates of the Channel Tunnel that there is no guarantee for a permanent peace between France and her great neighbour on the Eastern frontier, and that the position of Calais is perilously near that frontier. We are ourselves firm believers in the military strength of France, but, although we have not the slightest fear of France as a whole being conquered by Germany, we cannot banish from our mind the possibility of Calais being temporarily seized and occupied by a German force during a Continental war. It is by no means difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would strategically be wise for France to give way in the North-Eastern theatre of the war in order to be able to strike harder blows, or assume a firmer position, in the South-West. No doubt it is highly probable that in the case of a war between France and Germany we should find ourselves on • the side of the French ; but, whether we were allies or neutrals, the prospect of Calais—we will not say in the hands of the Germans, but seriously threatened by a German force—is not one which we could contemplate with anything but alarm were the tunnel constructed. We do not, however, wish to base our objections to the tunnel on any particular hypothetical case. We found our opposition rather on the negative proposition that it is impossible to divine accurately the risks which would arise from the tunnel, though we can at any rate know that those risks must be very great.
That our refusal to allow the tunnel to be built will in the least interfere with the entente cordiale we cannot admit for a moment. No doubt it may give a certain amount of dissatisfaction to leading capitalists in France as in England, and for a time they may talk big as to the impossibility of having a real understanding with Britain. We must not forget, however, that the entente is with the French people and not with the capitalist class, and that the French nation in the true sense will be absolutely and entirely unmoved by any disappointment among those who desire a 10 per cent. investment. Neither the French Government nor the French people will, we are confident, be in the least inclined to alter their view as to the advantages of a good understanding with Britain.
Though we are opposed to the making of the tunnel, we see no objection whatever to the alternative proposal of employing ferry-boats so large and so steady that they will take a whole train and transport it from Dover to Calais, as trains are transported in several places in the North of Europe and in many parts of America over even wider stretches of water. We believe that all that is required to make the train-ferry system applicable to the Channel is the construction of a harbour on the French side. Dover Harbour, if not already capable, will very shortly be capable of accommodating ferry-boats of an appropriate kind. No doubt there are some considerable engineering difficulties in the way of constructing a harbour for ships of deep draught on the French side, but we venture to say that those engineering difficulties can be quite as easily overcome as can the piercing of the chalk under the Channel with a tunnel and its proper ventilation. The plan of running the trains in ferry- boats will make the through carriage between Paris and London quite as easy as the through carriage by the tunnel, and we believe that even the difficulty of sea-sickness could be met by the ferry-boat. The boats in question would be so large and so steady that if pro- pelled by turbine engines there would be no sea in the Channel which could move them unpleasantly. We trust, then, that while refusing the Bill for the construction of the Channel Tunnel, Parliament will give a careful con- sideration to the ferry-boat system. If the capitalists will be content to make a harbour on the French coast, and to build the five or six ferry-boats that would be required for a daily and nightly service throughout the year, they will, we believe, get as sound an investment as by delving under the Channel, and will not deprive us of any of the advau- tag-es of our insular position. It may be that the tunnel would only diminish those advantages by a scintilla. If that is so, ail we can say is that in a matter so vital and so precious we would rather not part with even a scintilla of safety.
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