Israeli minds
David Gilmour
The Rabin Memoirs Yitzhak Rabin (Weidenfeld £10) The Israeli Mind John Laffin (Cassell E5.95) 'I do not think Nasser wanted war,' declared General Rabin shortly after his 1967 victory. 'The two divisions he sent to the Sinai in May would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.' The remark was quoted in Le Monde (29 February 1968) but it appears nowhere in this book. Had it done so Rabin would have had to re-write a large chunk of it and explain why he, as chief of staff of the Israeli army, spent several weeks trying to persuade the government to let him attack Egypt if he knew that Nasser did not intend to fight. Like most autobiographies, this one neatly smooths over the contradictions in its author's behaviour, justifying actions by events that took place afterwards, and according the central character a prescience he cannot possibly have enjoyed at the time. But, despite his glamorous career as Palmach commander, chief of staff, ambassador in Washington and prime minister, Rabin emerges, even from his own pen, as an unattractive man of no great talent, devoid of charisma and personality. Not that he ever underestimates his own importance: indeed, reflexive back-slapping is one of the main ingredients of the book — 'I sensed that my words had a profound impact upon my listeners'; 'I could well understand why Americans were tempted to seek counsel from the man who had commanded the tiny Israeli army in its mighty victory of 1967.'
Although he is considered a moderate in Israeli politics, Rabin presents himself as an unrepentant hardliner who takes pride in his refusal to compromise. He appears to have been an opponent of all peace proposals, whether they came from the Russians, UN Ambassador Jarring or the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, and an enthusiastic advocate of all war proposals. Apart from the 1967 war, which he seems to have started not for reasons of strategy or self-defence but because Israel's 'credibility' was somehow at risk, he was also behind Israel's bombing raids over the heavily-populated Nile Delta in 1970 —a policy, we are told, which used to give President Nixon such a 'feeling of satisfaction'.
The most interesting section of the book deals with Rabin's years in America, and he is particularly enlightening about the duties expected of an Israeli ambassador in Washington. His chief objectives, we are informed, are to persuade the US government to give Israel all the economic and military aid it needs and to gain American support for anything Israel wants to do, while at the same time ensuring that the US administration is prevented from applying political pressure on Israel. This is achieved by setting Congress (dominated by the Zionist lobby) against the government and although, as Rabin admits, 'sensitive souls' may find this sort of manipulation 'distasteful', it is the way in which Israel operates. After Rogers had outlined a possible peace, settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242 (which Israel had accepted), Rabin told Dr Kissinger: personally shall do everything within th,F bounds of American law to arouse pub" opinion against the administration's moves!' He was as good as his word asei during the next few weeks he tuttonholec senators, congressmen and representatives of the media' in order to force the government to drop its proposals. What is so depressing (and dangerous)! that this sort of pressure invariably succeeu.ss and thus the American government !t frequently unable to pursue policies rs conside to be in the national because the Israeli ambassador can bille6" interl: ball them. Since 1967 successive American governments have been faced by this problem and, while each has given the Israelis all the support they need, it is clear that both the White House and the State Department are intensely frustrated both by these tactics and by the attitudes which inspire them. Rabin frequently quotes bewildered Americans — Rogers, Kissinger, Sisco, Vance — who could not understand why Israel automatically rejected every body's peace proposals. Why are you so negative? they ask Rabin. Why do you refuse to discuss your terrns? Why do you say 'no' to everything? When Rabin became prime minister after the October war, the Israeli attitude was much the same. Dr Kissinger's attempts to bring about a limited Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai collapsed, causing President Ford to write to Rabin and express his 'profound disappointment over Israel's attitude in the course of the negotiations'. When an agreement was finally reached, it was only after weeks of haggling. 'Five hours', Rabin tells us, `might be spent discussing a stretch of sand 100 metres long'.
Many readers of this book will no doubt ask at this juncture: why spend five hours discussing 100 metres of desert over 100 miles from Israel? Why not spend 'that time discussing matters that could have brought Peace to the area: Gaza, Jerusalem, the West Bank, the future of the Palestinians? What was going on in Israel during all those years that made it impossible for the government to talk about a peace settlement?
Conceivably, some people might be tempted to pick up John Laffin's The Israeli Mind and look for a few clues. They will be disappointed. Almost the only insight Which the book provides is the photograph nn the cover which shows a number of Israelis strolling around in front of Arab houses as if to suggest that the dominant Preoccupation of the Israeli mind is the expropriation of Arab property. The book reads like a parody of amateur Propaganda, The approach is gushing, the writing banal: 'Israelis enjoy poetry because they are sensitive people'; they like manual labour because for them it is 'akin to composing poetry'; 'Israelis are sensitive to hurt'; 'Israelis loathe war and refuse to hate'.
It is futile and pretentious to try to write a book about the 'mind' of a nation, especially if you don't speak its language — though here Mr Laffin is on familiar ground since he is the author of an even worse book called The Arab Mind. Nor are you likely to learn much about a people's 'mind' through the propaganda organs of its own government. Yet, by his own admission, the author's three main sources are the Friends of Israel, the Anglo-Israel Association and the Jerusalem Post. Consequently, the end product is about as illuminating as an analysis of the Russian 'mind' would be if based on a perusal of /zvestia and the Publications of the Anglo-Soviet Friendship League.
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