Military stalemate in Rhodesia
Peter Kemp
I referred with some pessimism in a previous article (8 December) to the outlook for a cease-fire in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Now I read that, whereas the news of a basic agreement has been welcomed by Bishop Muzorewa, the Patriotic Front has greeted it by stepping up guerrilla action —moreover a PF spokesman, warning Lord Soames not to wander around the country, added ominously: 'Our orders to escalate the armed struggle remain.' Even when, or if, those orders are rescinded, I fear it will be a long time before the difference is apparent to the tribesmen in rural areas or the white farmers in isolated districts — even, perhaps, to the Rhodesian security forces.
The security forces number between 45-50,000 at full mobilisation — which can only be maintained, of course, for a limited period, such as last April's election campaign. They include 6,000 regulars, the police and all reserves — every able-bodied person subject to call-up. Official figures for terrorists operating inside the country are grossly misleading: 10,000 ZANLA and 3,000 ZIPRA; the true figure is nearer 25,000 guerrillas.
During the Malayan emergency it was calculated that the security forces needed to outnumber the guerrillas by at least 15 to one in order to contain the situation. It says little for the fighting qualities of ZIPRA and ZANLA that, with odds far more favourable to them, they have been unable to establish even one 'liberated' zone to set up their own administration. If they did so, security forces could break it up any time they wished. Mao Tse-tung identified three stages in the development of revolutionary warfare: first, the 'strategic defensive', involving the political mobilisation of the population prior to guerrilla warfare; the next stage is one of 'stalemate', where the government forces are unable to achieve a quick victory over the guerrillas; the final stage is the 'strategic counter-offensive'. After seven years of insurrection the PF have only just achieved stage two. The security forces can be thankful they aren't confronting the Vietcong.
PF attacks on towns — surely the easiest and morally most effective of targets — have been models of irresolution and ineptitude: usually a few bombs from badly sited mortars or an RPG 7 (rocket-propelled grenade) — an inaccurate weapon of limited effect — followed by a hasty retreat. It is curious that they have never employed either the Russian 122mm or the Chinese 107mm rocket, both of which are easily transported and launched, and devastating to morale in cities; the Vietcong used them extensively, especially on Saigon. 'Fifty of those pumped into Salisbury one night,' said a friend of mine, 'and you'd see a mass exodus of whites from the country.'
The Rhodesian security torces work closely with the police and Special Branch, especially in the field of intelligence. The teeth of the security forces are the Rhodesian Light Infantry (R1.1), a crack unit composed exclusively of white regulars, and the Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) — with, of course, the air force. Eighty per cent of the security forces are black — the air force is 25 per cent black, but all air crew are white. Until this summer, when Bishop Muzorewa's government introduced black conscription, all black soldiers were volunteers. They came almost entirely from the Shona tribes, especially the Karanea, because the Ndbele don't take kindly to the constraints of military life — 'an undisciplined lot of bastards,' as one general described them to me — although when they can be trained they are better than the Shona because they are more aggressive. The motive for volunteering is usually family tradition, as in the old Indian Army; a young man will follow his father or his uncle into the regiment. The RAR has both black and white officers who mess together, and all-black other ranks; it is not uncommon for a black captain, for example, to be commanding white subalterns. Indeed, the army claims to have been the forerunner in abolishing colour distinction; as long ago as the late Fifties their official regulations stipulated that an officer could have up to four wives. Now they have a programme of commissioning black officers from all walks of life and, despite much political intimidation, they have plenty of applicants. Black troops have their own special skills, denied to whites, which come in very useful in this kind of war. A black soldier can go into the bush, watch a village for two hours from an observation post, and tell there is something wrong — for instance that terrorists are lurking there; whereas a white could sit there all day and learn 'nothing. The RLI conduct only 'Fireforce' operations, while the RAR do a certain amount of 'Fireforce' as well as normal infantry work. 'Fireforce' is a concept, derived from the Indochina wars, of lifting troops by helicopter from their base and landing them right on the target — some area, for example, where a guerrilla concentration has been reported. It is also the method of carrying out cross-border raids into Zambia and Mozambique. Its main advantages are, of course, speed and surprise, its chief hazard that helicopters are very vulnerable to ground fire —which is why they usually land under cover of air attack.
As well as the Rhodesia Regiment, composed principally of national servicemen, black and white, and officered by territorials, there are various specialised units in the security forces. Perhaps the best known are the Selous Scouts. Formed three or four years ago specifically for tracking, they are made up of 75 per cent blacks and 25 per cent whites, and are a fully integrated force, with white and black officers and other ranks; they are regulars, but have a support group composed of very carefully selected national servicemen. One of their specialities is to 'freeze' an area, warning all other units to keep clear of it, and then to go in themselves in small groups, often wearing guerrilla clothing, to see what kind of reception they get from the villagers and where those villagers' sympathies lie. Apart from gathering valuable information, they will also go after any terrorists they find.
'A lot of people owe their lives to the Selous Scouts', said a coffee planter I stayed with on the Mozambique border. Their very success has directed the PF propaganda on to them as a useful scapegoat for terrorist activities. Whenever the guerrillas commit some particularly odious crime, such as the various massacres of missionaries, the PF puts the blame on the Selous Scouts — and the tribesmen often believe them. In fact, of course, if ever the Selous Scouts or any regular unit of the security forces were guilty of such a crime and General Walls heard of it, he would have the culprits in front of a court martial in no time. But in Africa perceived truth can be more effective than the real thing.
Another specialised unit is the Rhodesian SAS, who operate much as SAS have always done, and also play an important part in cross-border raids. They are all regulars and all white. An interesting formation are the Grey's Scouts, who operate on horseback. Raised five years ago and named after Lord Grey of Fallodon, they are a 'fast reaction' force for quick pursuit of guerrillas after a 'contact'. One of their squadron commanders told me that if they really pushed their horses they could traverse 100 kilometres of bush in one night — as compared with an infantryman's eight. They also do border patrols. They are mostly white because Rhodesian Africans don't take kindly to horses; but the major told me they used one black tracker section.
Lastly, there are the Auxiliaries, grandly named Pfumo Re Vanhu, 'Spear of the People'. They are a militia, in theory wholly under the army's control, although at first many were mere private armies, manned by ex-convicts and totally undisciplined. Those groups have been disbanded or 'taken out' by the security forces and the remainder do valuable work in denying areas to the terrorists, helping to restore clinics, schools, and cattle dips destroyed by the Patriotic Front, and on occasion guarding the 'protected villages'. These villages represent another attempt to apply the lessons of Malaya and deny food and help to the terrorists. They vary a lot; some are welldesigned and well-run and their inhabitants feel happy and secure, while others are like concentration camps.
While morale is generally high in the security forces, the guerrillas seem to lack training, experience and, above all, resolution. I heard several accounts of ambushes where the victims survived only because the terrorists failed to follow up their success. A lady who drove me in a convoy from Chipinga to Umtali told me her house near Chipinga had twice suffered attack. 'After the first time', she told me, 'we counted over 700 spent cartridges in front of the house, and there were just 20 bullet holes in the walls —plus a few in the roof.' I understand it is very difficult to train Africans not to shut their eyes as they squeeze the trigger.
'This is a peek-a-boo war', I was told by a journalist who had seen plenty of it. Whatever their fighting qualities, the terrorists have mastered the essential guerrilla skills of evasion and escape. Immediately after a — an ambush or attack on a farm, for instance — or a 'contact' with the security forces the group involved will 'bombshell', or spread out like the fingers of a hand, each member taking a different track, to meet again at an agreed rendezvous. It may be a long way away because the terrorists know the country and can cover 30-40 kilometres in a night — through the bush on foot. The security forces put in 'stops' or ambushes on known terrorists routes or at waterholes — the most likely rendezvous in the dry season. But the odds are with the guerrillas. Because the security forces are so overstretched on the ground, they have come to rely much more on the air force for bombing villages suspected of harbouring terrorists or known to have succoured them. This is hardly the best way to win the people's hearts and minds. Indeed, the plight of the villager or tribesman in this war is truly terrible. If he helps the terrorists, his kraal may be burnt by the security forces and he may even be killed. What can happen to him if he denies them help was described to me by a lecturer at the University of Rhodesia — a lady whose views incline more towards the left than the right. She paid an African to clean her car, but he disappeared without doing so. A fortnight later he turned up full of apologies. 'I had to go quickly to my home in the Honda valley', he explained, 'The bastards [his own term for ZANLA] have beaten up my father and cut off both his legs. There is no one to look after our family.'
It is no wonder that more and more tribesmen, ground between those two millstones, the guerrillas and the security forces, flee from the war zones and into the safety of the cities to swell the increasing number of refugees in townships like Harari on the outskirts of Salisbury. There are some 70,000 of them in and around the capital. Encamped — or rather squatting — under makeshift plastic shelters on ground that the rains have made into a quagmire, they present such a spectacle of sodden humanity and destitution as I never wish to see again.
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