22 FEBRUARY 1879, Page 7

THE NEWS FROM CAIRO.

THAT admirable arrangement for the administration of Egypt, under which the country was to be governed by an International Commission of clerks, and two great Govern- ments pledged themselves to help in stripping the peasantry for the benefit of Bondholders, seems to be already breaking down. It went very well at first. A clever Armenian, an able Englishman, and an adroit Frenchman were appointed Ministers, with absolute power, the Khedive, having sullenly surrendered his lands, and the burdens on them, " retired into his interior," declining all responsibility, and the Triumvirate set themselves to regenerate Egypt. They made strict in- quiries into the offices, hunted up all manner of " jobs," told the peasants to resist oppression, examined endless reports upon finance, and made an arrangement under which the Floating Debt was reduced, one regular dividend paid, and some eight millions added to the huge claim already existing against Egypt. The Bondholders were delighted. Here were statesmen actually going to pay Asiatic interest with European punctuality, and make 7 per cent. on bonds purchased at 50 as secure as Consols. The speculators never had made such a coup before, and City articles were full of the praise of an arrangement which had placed " the most fertile country in the world" under the control of European and most modern principles of finance. Very speedily, how- ever, there came a little cloud in the sky. The proceeds of the Rothschild loan disappeared like a little water in a sand- heap. The receipts fell off—the Fellahs being a little less flogged —by two millions a year. The Triumvirate, who were really able, and two of whom were certainly honest, poked into every- thing in the most determined way, and speedily discovered, first, that the Egyptian Debt was in part a swindle on the coun- try, Egypt never having had the money ; secondly, that the enormous profits of the Bondholders, seven per cent. on stock at half-value, could never be maintained ; and thirdly, that if civil government was to go on at all, and even moderate interest be paid on the Debt, the military expenditure must be courage- ously reduced. Convinced of these facts, they proposed a most drastic measure of reform, the reduction of the Army to 10,000 men, a fourth of its normal establishment, and the dismissal

of some 2,000 officers of all grades. Whether it was intended that these officers should receive their arrears is not known, but it was reported and believed in Egypt that they would not, but would be dismissed without compensation either for dis- missal or for arrears.

This was too much for the stout gentleman who, under the title of " Khedive," is alternately praised and vilified in England, according to the position of his bonds in the markets, but who is really an ordinary Turkish Pasha, rather above the average in capacity; and he resolved, if he could, to bring the In- ternational arrangement to a close. He had borne to be deprived of his estates, estates meaning little to an abso- lute Sovereign who can dip his fingers in the Treasury; to be limited in his expenses, private borrowing being still possible ; and to be tutored by a knot of Infidels, their chatter not being couched in Arabic or intelligible to his people,—but the destruction of his army was too much for him. What, give up all extensions of territory, all chance of contending with Abyssinia, all his position of first feudatory of the Empire, all hope, when England and France at last decreed his dethronement, of teach- ing them one lesson ? He would not do it. He looked about for an opportunity, and found it in a riot arranged by four hundred of the dismissed officers, who attacked the Ministry, threatened Nubar Pasha's life, hustled Mr. Rivers Wilson, but did not hustle M. de Blignieres, and went, without actual bloodshed, through all the forms of an Oriental revolt. The Khedive drove to the Ministry, tried to pacify the rioters, and after a time succeeded, and then declined to be responsible for preventing a massacre, or at all events, an &cute, unless Nubar Pasha were removed. Nubar Pasha resigned, the Khedive took his place at the Council Board, and whether the International Commissioners resign, as they ought to do, or not, the old Native Government is practically restored, and the disbandment, we venture to pre- dict, will not be carried out. Affairs will go on very much as before, and when the worst comes to the worst, and the Khedive sees he must choose between his army and his creditors, he will decide for his army. The soldiers are of use to him ; but creditors who have lent all they will lend, of what use are they ?

It is, of course, imagined in this country that the Govern- ments of France and England will interfere, but it may be doubted if they can interfere effectually without employing direct force. The Khedive must have calculated his chances, and be prepared to face anything except a combined expedi- tion for his dethronement,—which would involve, be it remembered, a direct coercion to be placed upon his Suzerain the Sultan. We question if the two Govern- ments are prepared for so extreme a measure, especially as they must either govern the country afterwards, or garrison it to support some Christian nominee, or call to the throne some Pasha of Mehemet Ali's family, who would be just Ismail over again, plus an exceedingly bad title. The new Khedive would not like being "reformed,"—that is, badgered, and lectured, and bullied, and affronted, in order to get money out of him, any more than the present man, and might have the nerve for some much more desperate proceeding. He would plunder the FeRaheen contentedly or delightedly, as long as he received the money, but he would not plunder them for the benefit of people whom he very naturally—not knowing of quiet investors, but only of financiers—regards as a knot of rascally dealers in premiums, who send him, at enormous interest, hardly half the money he borrows. The experiment has been tried over and over again since the time when Verelst and Vansittart and Clive went through it all in Bengal, and it always ends in failure. Either the reformed Prince is feeble, and then the Treasury goes to pieces, or he is able, and then he declares war, either by massacre or intrigue, on his " re- formers." In either case, the experiment ends either in a sur- render, or in the direct management of the country through European agents. Possibly, the latter may be the result this time, if M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury can agree ; but we do not envy the two Foreign Secretaries, or the two countries they represent. The former will be torn to pieces by the Bondholders, the Parliaments, and the Press ; while the latter will be brought to the verge of war by national jealousies, fomented by aspirants for place. Suppose, as neither England nor France will allow the other to take the only reasonable course, and as our Government is too timid to insist, and M. Grevy desires peace, the Dutch are allowed to try if they cannot govern Egypt as well and as easily as Java, on condition of paying the bondholders three per cent. on the money actually sent to Egypt. Neither England nor France would fear Holland, and another province would be saved from the regime of the Pashas.