TOPICS OF THE DAY.
11:11. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLIANCE.
WE felt it our duty last week to make the strongest protest in our power against the policy of Alliance with Japan. But though we are as strongly convinced as ever of the validity of every argument then used, we realise that it would be unwise and unpatriotic in us to attempt to undermine the foundations of that Alliance. The thing is done, and. no words of ours will avail to undo it. Had it still been possible to prevent the undertaking of the dangerous and unnecessary obligations which we have undertaken, we should have laboured in season and out of season to show the public the folly of the contemplated action. Now we must, for the time at any rate, allow the policy to be developed without interference. We cannot agree with those who think that the foreign policy of the country is to be above all criticism, but we have always realised the need for continuity, even at the risk of such continuity being made the ground for following a bad rather than a good course of action. Not only patriotism but common prudence demands that even when we think the coach is being driven badly and by a dangerous route, we should not snatch at the reins or confuse the coachman with complaints and outcries. It is, besides, most important that people abroad should not have the impression fhat we are a divided nation. That might tempt them to strike, and we have no desire that they should learn by experience that, however much we may differ before war begins, the instant war has begun there is only one thought in the nation's mind,—to beat the enemy, and to beat him, if possible, so that he will never be able to fight us again. Since, then, we cannot hope to undo the Treaty, and since we realise the danger of a divided nation on a matter of great public concern, we must acquiesce in the Alliance. We may hope that it will not be acted on during the next five years, but till that period is passed etcquiescence, coupled with vigilant inquiry into the develop- ment of affairs in the Far East, is, in our view, the only aourse open to those who agree with us.
But though we may be obliged to acquiesce in the Alliance, acquiescence is by no means the only thing to be expected from the Government who have formed the Alliance. They are bound, if they mean to do their duty towards the country, to look the possible consequences• of their Treaty straight in the faze, and to make every possible preparation for meeting those consequences. The Govern- ment have done an act, and that act is bound to have results. They must not shrink from facing those results, or shelter themselves behind their good intentions and the purity of their motives. The Alliance with Japan, rightly or wrongly, is a blow to Russia. It is no good to argue that it is not a blow to Russia because Russia ought not to have been standing where the blow would fall, and because she had assured us officially that she would not occupy that position. If, knowing there is some one on the other side of a door, although you have been told "officially" that there is no one there, you force it open violently and strike the person who is standing on the other side, that person may have no theoretic ground of complaint, but he does not love you for the blow. Russia has received one blow, and fears another and worse blow, from the Alliance. France is also affected, and unfavourably, by the Alliance. She knows she cannot desert Russia in the Far East without running the risk of Russia deserting her in Europe. She may, of course, be able to avoid war even if Russia gets involved; but she is bound to reckon on the possibility and to take her precautions. Therefore Russia in a high, and France in a lesser, degree are injuriously affected by the Treaty, and placed in a position of antagonism towards us thereby. That our intention was not to injure either is quite im- material. The man struck, not the striker, claims to interpret his feelings as to the action.
But having thus placed these Powers in a position of antagonism, it would be criminal folly not to begin to make every possible " preparation that will ensure succesc in war should the war, contemplated and provided against in the Treaty unhappily come to pass,—i.e., war with two European Powers. We know only too well the results of ignoring the true consequences of a political act and relying on our high motives and good intentions to preserve us from injury. The Jameson Raid, whatever its origin, was, as far as the Boers were concerned, a great. event,—an act, a thing done, which must have conse- quences. But we shut our eyes to this obvious fact. The Government relied on their own good intentions, pure motives, and, as we have always admitted, perfectly clear conscience. They had not organised or planned the Raid, and they were absolutely sincere in their determination not to follow it up. They did not mean to pick a quarrel with the Boers, and therefore they thought it would be perfectly safe to go to sleep wrapt up in the cloak of their blind integrity. Accordingly they made no preparations to meet any results that might ensue from the Raid. They did not even think it worth while to find out in what parts of the world horses could be most easily bought in a hurry! But the Boers were most naturally not content to rely on our good intentions. They saw the plain fact of the Jameson Raid. They realised that it was a fad and must have consequences. They therefore began to prepare with ceaseless activity, and on the first sign of what they believed, quite erroneously, but, from their point of view, not un- naturally, was the continuation of the Jameson Raid, they sprang at our throat. Surely that is a lesson to us. It is sheer nonsense to pretend that nothing is altered by our Alliance with Japan, that we can and shall re- main just as good friends with Russia as ever, and that her ally is not in the least affected. The Alliance is a great fact, and its consequences must and do dominate the whole situation. We may be prepared to go to sleep with the comfortable belief that our intentions towards Russia and France are so kindly and. beneficent that they have nothing to fear unless they insist on precipitating war. But though this is of course perfectly true, is " it likely that either Russia or France will believe it? Russia, at any rate, is almost certain to hold that the Alliance means that a collision will in all probability take place in the future between us and herself, and will at once prepare for the attack which she will believe we are likely to make upon her as soon as we shall find it convenient. Depend upon it, all the old plans for a counter. stroke against us in India are being revived in St. Petersburg. The possibilities of stirring up internal dissensions among the native popula- tion are, of course, being carefully considered, as is also the best way of bringing onan anti-British crisis in Afghanistan, and of placing us in the hateful dilemma either of con- quering and holding the whole country, or of tolerating a pro-Russian Ameer. The Russians, that is, believing that we shall some day be obliged to attack them, are most wisely, from their point of view, planning how best to attack us. France, too, in view of her obligations in regard to Russia, is also most probably considering, though no doubt with less anxiety and care, what stroke will be most effective against us provided her ally calls on her for aid.
This being so, it seems to us that it would be little short of madness not to make every possible preparation. We know under the Treaty exactly the kind of war in which we shall be involved,—granted that war comes, which, of course, we readily admit, is by no means certain, but which is much too serious a matter to be disregarded merely because it is unlikely, or because we have no intention of doing anything hostile or provocative if we can possibly avoid. it. It is one of the special features of an alliance for a specific object that it makes it clear what will be the exact nature of the war if war does take place. Given war, we know whom we slidl have to fight. But in planning even a war of defence it is madness to contem- plate standing on the defensive. You cannot effectively plan defensive measures, because to do so would mean a knowledge of the enemy's plans. We must, therefore, as the best and surest way of guaranteeing ourselves against the risks involved in the Alliance with Japan, think out and prepare for a method of attack. As the Boers, again, have shown us, a sharp attack is the best of all possible forms of defence. When they planned their defence against what they believed was our policy of conquest, they planned it as art attack upon us in Natal, on the Bechuanaland border, on Kimberley, and in the Colesberg region. Their strategy of aggressive defence was (as it was certain to be) most effective, and enabled them for nearly six months to keep command of the military situation.
Needless to say. it is with anything but satisfaction that we insist upon the necessity for making preparations to meet the obligations we have undertaken owing to the A.11iance But if we get involved in war with two Powers, it will be no satisfaction to us to know that we are at a disadvantage because those who disapproved of the Treaty failed to urge on the Government the absolute necessity of preparation to meet the consequences it in- volved. If the Treaty is bad as it stands, it will be made infinitely worse by want of preparations. It may be foolish to challenge a man with whom you have no cause of quarrel, but having done so it is only common-sense to make sure that if the unnecessary fight takes place you shall win. To hurl a defiance at Russia is, in our view, most foolish. To defy Russia and not to make ready to meet her answer to our defiance is sheer idiocy. The Alliance having been made, and the obligations to help Japan undertaken, we feel, then, that we must do all in our power to awaken the country to the need of making preparations of a kind adequate to meet its new Etna tremendous responsibilities. We feel the more willing to do so because we are convinced that per se preparations to meet the risk of war never tend to cause war, but instead always have the opposite effect. If Russia knows we are ready she will be less, not more, inclined to come to blows with us. The greatest possible incentive to war is for a Power to publish its enmity to another Power and then not prepare for the consequences. The Power threatened cannot resist the temptation to strike at £0 good an opportunity. Its action is inevitably governed by the consideration: We know that they are our enemies, for they have practically told us so ; let us then fight while they are not ready and not expecting attack.' If, on the other hand, you show enmity, but also show strength, the threatened Power is sure to argue:—' No doubt they are enemies, but they are so strong that to attack them now would be foolish. If they will keep quiet, so will we. We could not choose a worse time for attack, whereas if we wait a little they may grow slack and weaker, and give us an opportunity.' We are clear, then, that if we must have an alliance such as that with Japan, the only path of safety is to make every, possible preparation that will give us the advantage in case of war. The process is costly, but not nearly so costly as war. Even those who dislike the Alliance, and consider it dangerous and. unnecessary, should give their voice for adequate preparations in order to meet the potential consequences of the Treaty. To draw the enmity of Russia upon us is foolish. To draw that enmity, and yet make no preparations to meet it, which is what we fear the Government are only too likely to do, is the height of folly. If we cannot have a wise foreign policy, let us at least have the strength to neutralise our blunders, and so preserve ourselves from the worst consequences of a false conception of our international interests.
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