MARGINAL COMMENT
By HAROLD NICOLSON
IWROTE last week about the mysticism of the Russians, attri- buting buting their ill-manners, not to any unkindness of heart, but to the moral arrogance which they derive from a sense of mission. I illustrated what I said by extracts from political articles written by Dostoievsky more than eighty years ago. A Central European friend of mine, being enraged by what I wrote, has reminded me (a) that Dostoievsky was an epileptic and (b) that imperialism remains imperialism whether you call it " a sense of mission " or " the white man's burden" or "our responsibility towards the native popula- tions." I told him that his was an empty criticism. True it was that Dostoievsky was subject to fits, but this disability did not render him any less representative of the Slav temperament, since all nervous and highly imaginative races are slightly mad ; fantasy is a com- ponent part of their genius. Nor did I agree that " imperialism "'- whatever may be meant by that thoughtless word—is absolutely bad. Nobody who knows the facts could seriously contend that our administration, let us say of Uganda or the Sudan, had not contri- buted enormously to the health, happiness and self-development of the Bantu and the Sudanese. The purpose of my article, I explained, had been to indicate that it was a mistake to judge the actions and statements of the U.S.S.R. according to customary diplomatic con- ventions. Viewed in terms of ordinary European intercourse the attitude adopted by the Soviet Delegation was so provocative as to suggest all manner of hidden and alarming motives. Yet when one realised that their attitude was based upon the conviction that, whereas the British, the French, the Greeks and the Dutch were very wicked, the Russians, the Ukrainians, and even the Poles, were very very good, then one could understand that a sense of mission might dominate all other motives. Self-righteousness, when once it it allowed to assume extreme forms, always induces a lack of proportion.
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What is distressing about the logic of the Russians is that they are so unswervingly certain that their premises are correct. They assume that if we or the French or the Dutch intervene in order to prevent anarchy and murder we do so with the intention of establishing a government which will thereafter be permanently subservient to our policy and instructions. They assume that, since we live under the remains of a capitalist system, we are anxious to establish that system in every country which comes under our influence, and that therefore any group, party or coalition which we support must necessarily be Fascist and reactionary. And they conclude from these false premises that any intervention on our part must inevitably be opposed, not to Communism only, but to all independence, liberty and progress. Thus whereas Russian intervention must always be virtuous and humanitarian, any non-Russian intervention must in its essence and purpose be repressive, selfish and inhumane. They have managed, for instance, to convince themselves and their sympathisers abroad that our intervention in Greece was undertaken for the purpose of creating a government of the extreme right. It is true that Greece is situated geographically at a vital point in our communications and that she is as important to our security as is the Panama zone to that of the United States or the Aland Islands to that of Russia. But whereas any annexations made by Russia, or any areas of influence she may create, are regarded as justified and noble ; the mild preoccupation which we ourselves display from time to time regarding our own security is considered menacing and wrong..
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Had we desired to place a right wing Government in Power in Greece we could certainly have done so at any moment between the troubles of December, 1944, and the present day. The terror inspired by the violence of E.L.A.S. had obscured in Greek eyes any merits which E.A.M. might have possessed ; had the elections been held six months ago there is little doubt that the Populists or right wing would have obtained an authentic majority. It was the Left wing parties themselves who were so anxious that the elections should be postponed, and even now it is not at all certain that if elections are held next month there will not be a swing to the right. Tt may be that our policy of excluding the extremes both of the left and the right and our wish to support a Government of the centre was a mistaken policy. It may be that the liberal and centre parties did not possess the organisation or power to impose on the country the sacrifices and discipline which the economic situation demanded. It may be that the right-wing organisations, profiting by the weakness of the central government, and by the sympathy shown by the officers of the gendarmerie, are in certain localities exercising indefensible pressure on the electors. One thing alone is certain in a most confused situation, and it is this: Had we wished to establish a reactionary government in Greece we could have done so with wide popular approval ; the fact that we sought only to establish a liberal government of the left centre was based upon the belief, perhaps mistaken but certainly honourable, that the Greek people must be allowed time to recover from the shock of occupation and revolution. Our ideas may have been too optimistic ; but they were not reactionary. To describe the present Greek Government as "Fascist" is to abandon the meaning of words.
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It is useful, moreover, to compare our intervention in Greece with the Russian intervention in Persia. It is impossible to contend that the latter country, even if she were exploited by a Great Power, could constitute a menace to Russian security. It is difficult to resist the impression that the Soviet conception of security is more elastic, extensible and imaginative than our own. For if indeed the Russians desire, as some assert, to obtain control over the Caspian-Gulf railway and to secure access to a harbour in the vicinity of the refineries at Abadan, then the theory of defensive precautions is assuredly being pressed very far. From a friend who has this week returned from Persia I have obtained a somewhat gloomy view of the present situa- tion. The Persians believe that the British troops in the south will be withdrawn, as agreed, on March 2 ; they do not believe that the Russian armies in the north will simultaneously be withdrawn. They are well aware that Persia herself is not strong enough to resist Russian infiltration and they face the future with what my friend described as " despairing expectancy." They know that the Shah does not feel himself able to adopt an attitude of stern resistance ; they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Prime Minister, Qawam-es- Sultaneh, who possesses large properties in the Russian zone, will not prove a very forcible champion of Persian independence ; and they are fully conscious that the Majlis contains many politicians who are neither respect-worthy nor courageous. They foresee; therefore, that the Tudeh party, which is financed and organised under Russian direction, will extend its activities throughout the central and southern provinces ; and they fear that sooner or later the ancient Empire of Iran will become another of the Russian satellites. They are delighted by Mr. Bevin's brave words ; but they do not feel that words, however outspoken, will suffice to save them.
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There is a further, and perhaps more fundamental, distinction between the two forms of intervention. Even if it were true, as it is not, that we desired to impose on Greece a form of government corresponding to our own political principles, then we should be obliged, on the strength of those very principles, to allow the Greek people to change that government if and when they desired. Con- versely, even if it were true, as it is not true, that the majority of the Persian people desired to be governed by the Tudeh party, then it would be impossible, once that party was established in power, for any opposition party to contest its supremacy. Since whereas under our theory the essence of democracy is that the people should elect the government they want, under the Russian theory democracy means that all neighbouring countries must accept the type of government which the Kremlin thinks they ought to have. Thus even if the two interventions were identical in intention and method, the effect of ours could only be transitory, whereas the effect of the Russian might be permanent
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