ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

THE new year opened with a discussion on the efficiency of our national defences, especially of our Navy. It has been smartly continued, and is still in progress in harmony with the summer lightning from distant but approaching war clouds now lurking below the horizon. Mr. Reed, Sir Charles Napier, the New York

Times, the Journal des Debats, have given us their views on the relative state of preparation and efficiency of the Navies of Eng- land and France, the capabilities of the two countries to sustain a war, and the chances of one country's burglariously invading the other. But the Army has been almost lost sight of. Except one letter in the Times by "J. 0.," and another by Sir John Tre- lawny, touching purchase and promotion, vital elements of efficiency, and a warning voice from Sir Robert Gardiner ;* we have heard little of the Army. Yet it would be a great error to leave the land force out of the account, and pay all our attention to the Navy. It should be an axiom of statesmanship that England, the heart and brain of the British empire, should be always prepared to meet not merely probabilities, but possibilities. No matter how serene the horizon, we should be always ready to start up an armed nation. International politics are like the weather, fitful ; both obey laws as yet not understood. But History teaches certain broad lessons of infinite yet practical application. One of these is that a nation which neglects the military element of its national life is sure to be the prey of another nation which has better understood the essential conditions of national existence. Hence it is that wise nations set store by armies and fleets; for military preparation is only an insurance against the unforeseen. Fore- sight, in the present state of continental politics, becomes every day more difficult ; its substitute, forearming, proportionately needful. Imperative at all times, military preparation is doubly imperative now upon a nation like our own which has so much to defend.

No country could be defended so easily as England. If we had nothing but the defence of this island to look to, if we had not colonies and commerce to protect, if we had not naval dominion to maintain, we could easily defend ourselves with a tithe of the force we possess. But those are not the conditions, that is not the burden imposed upon us. We have colonies and commerce and naval dominion. With the sea around us with plenty of men, abundance of material, and unsurpassed national spirit, the defence of England, the pro- tection of commerce and colonies, the maintenance of naval do- minion ought not to be difficult. Nor is it, if the right thing be done, and done at once. Still, with all our advantages, we should understand, once for all, that Invasion though improbable is not impossible ; and our preparations should be commensurate with the limits of possibility. How far, then should they extend ? We have partizans of the Navy who put their trust in our "wooden walls," and sing-

" Britannia needs no bulwark

No towers along the steep."

But to trust alone to our Navy, superior as it is to the Navy of our ambitious nei,ghbour, would be to act like a general who should form his order of battle in a single line without support and without a reserve. The French Navy has been augmented with a rapidity that has compelled us to make an equally rapid augmentation ; a process our Government is continuing. lhe French Emperor has increased his naval force, as Mr. Reed con- jectures with great probability, not solely with the view to an in- vasion of England, but with a view to contend with us for mas- tery, if occasion serve, on the open sea. This conjecture, con- sidered by the light of Nelson's adventures in pursuit of Ville- neuve, is alone sufficient to make us averse from putting our sole trust in the Navy. We can only, therefore, regard the Navy as our first line. - Another set of partizans, who find an able exponent in Major-Ge-

* Letter to the Earl of Derby on the state of our Artillery, and Obser- vations on "Legislative Military Economy and Responsibility:" Published by Byfield, Hawksworth, and Co.

neral Lewis* would have us erect forts in the Southern counties; and construct a series of entrenched camps in the vicinity of Lon- don. One gentleman has gone so far as to propose that a railway with thousands of embrasures for guns should be set up in a circle round the metropolis! With all due deference for scientific opin- ion, a great respect for judiciously placed fortresses on open frontiers, and a greater for entrenched camps, we conceive that the Navy is our line of fortresses, moveable to boot, and that we should have on land a minimum quantity of those expensive works ; because we have, or ought to have a better description of defences—Men.

Our second line, our reserve, should in fact be the Army. Now in case of a foreseen attack we are not so badly prepared as some would have us believe. We have a respectable regular force well posted, especially in the Southern counties, from Dover to Portsmouth. Our rivers and harbours are tolerably well-de- fended, though not so well as we could wish. The Militia could be readily embodied, armed, and posted. Our Yeomanry could muster more than 10,000 sabres, a force that could be rapidly augmented. We have no doubt but that even now a compara- tively strong force could in a very short time be concentrated or placed in easy communication in the Southern counties to dispute the shore with an invading enemy which had evaded our fleet.

All this is very well ; but, observe' the danger does not lie in an invasion that could be foreseen. The danger lies in a sudden and unforeseen attempt at a landing. This is what we have to provide against. To meet it our present means are inadequate. If made adequate out of existing material—namely, the Army and Militia—it would prove more costly than the nation would bear or ought to bear. We do not want a huge standing Army in England. We do not want a Militia permanently embodied, and thus withdrawn from the agricultural labour market. Yet we do want an armed force, trained and disciplined, that would run to the alarm posts, and inundate London or the Southern counties from all quarters, at the first signal. Such a force would serve as the complement of the Line and the Militia, and present an array from which no invading force could ever escape. Can such a force be obtained?

The kind of body best adapted to meet a sudden and unfore- seen danger would be a force of National Volunteers. Such a force would not impose on the country that vast expense which is involved in the permanent embodiment of the Militia ; while it

i would exceed it n number, and we humbly think would surpass it in efficiency and discipline. Our proposal is that volunteer re- giments should be raised all over the country where men can be found willing to volunteer on these conditions :-

That they should find their own arms, clothing and accoutre- ments, Government finding practice ammunition • that they should never be moved out of the country, never embodied for ser- vice, exeept during a given period in each year, say twenty-eight

i days, and n ease of invasion; and that during the period of em- bodiment they should be paid like other troops. Take the ease of London. Could not at least 20,000 young men be found, forming material for twenty regiments, who would willingly find their arms and clothing, and submit to drill and discipline ? They should be armed with the best rifles ; trained whenever it best suited their convenience, say on Saturday after- noons; and not harrassed and worried with too much red tape and regulation. They should be taught to manouvre steadily in independent order on open ground ; to throw up and defend earthworks ; to fire deliberately and with recision, just like regular soldiers; but not be subjected to the caprices of the martinet. Their exercise and discipline would be beneficial both to body and mind ; and in a short time such a corps, intelligent, high-spirited, and steadfast, would equal any Line regiment in fighting power and endurance. All they would need would be simple manceuvres, the best weapons, a soldierly and serviceable uniform, and ample practice. Surely these are attainable. An army of volunteers raised on these principles, especially if the yeomanry were encouraged and extended, would, conjointly with the Line and Militia, make it physically impossible for any invading army that might give our fleets the slip to march many miles from the place of debarkation. They would form our se- cond line and reserve. With such a complement to the regular force we should not need fortresses and hardly earthworks, except,

par precaution, in the vicinity of London. L'Angleterre," says an eminent Swiss officer quoted by General Lewis, "a raison d'avoir foi dans son etoile et dens sa suprematie maritime quo de longues luttes lui ont acquise ; mais il serait sage i elle do ne pas en conclure qu'elle eat invulnerable." True ; but to make her so, she only requires those best of fortresses—walls of trained and disciplined men ; and these a National Volunteer Force would give her.

• Papers on the Defence of London. By Major-General Lewis. Pub- lished by Parker and Son, West Strand.