22 JANUARY 1943, Page 10

MARGINAL COMMENT

By HAROLD NICOLSON

IN the House of Commons, on Tuesday, Mr. Dugdale asked the Secretary of State for War why the War Office with- drew from circulation the pamphlet on his own Report which Sir William Beveridge had written for the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (A.B.C.A.). This strange episode has already formed the theme of an admirable article by Mr. J. Mackay-Mure in The Spectator of January 8th, an article which provoked two interesting letters in last week's issue. I may perhaps be forgiven for recurring to the subject, since it goes beyond the area of a merely departmental incident and raises considerations regarding the morale of the Army, the training and education of the citizen soldier and the relations between the junior officer and his men. The official explanation of the withdrawal of this pamphlet is, it would seem, that it was written and circulated without the knowledge of the Secretary of State ; that it represented the opinion of Sir William Beveridge upon the Beveridge Report ; that this Report had not A yet been discussed in Parliament or received, even in principle, the approbation of the Government ; that, on the contrary, it is a document of a highly controversial nature, to many of the recom- mendations of which strong objection is felt both in Conservative and Labour quarters ; that therefore it was a mistake to issue under the aegis, and t.trefore with the applied approval, of the War Office an explanatory pamphlet on a matter which is still sub judice ; and that in any case the A.B.C.A. discussions assume the form of a " compulsory parade," and are therefore unsuited to the elucidation of any important question. As a general rule it is no doubt desirable that Government Departments should not, even by impli- cation, express approval of measures upon which neither Parliament nor the Government have come to a decision. But the Beveridge Report was not a usual event: it was an exceptional event ; and the pamphlet which Sir William drafted was written not in advocacy, but in objective explanation. It did no more than provide the Army, in a summary and very lucid form, with the recommendations which had already been published. It did not, and could not, prejudice the main issue.

* * * Even those purists, however, who may regret the issue of the pamphlet as representing some slight divergence from established convention, would agree that to withdraw it from circulation after it had been issued was an ill-considered action. It was an action which suggests to ignorant observers that the Secretary of State and Lord Croft have not fully understood either the function or the achievements of A.B.C.A. Let me first explain the purpose and working of that admirable innovation. The Army Bureau of Current Affairs is a section of the Welfare and Education Directorate which works under the Adjutant-General. Every week it circulates to all units throughout the Army a red or blue pamphlet in which simple information is given, either regarding current military issues or regarding such wider problems as are known to be engaging the interest, and sometimes confusing the minds, of the ordinary soldier. The idea is that these pamphlets should be placed in the hands of junior officers who should use them as the basis for discussion with the men of their platoons. The purpose of this system is threefold. In the first place, it provides junior officers with information upon a variety of subjects, and to that extent it enlarges the range of their interests. In the second place, it enables them, through the medium of these discussions, to establish with their men an intelligent understanding upon a plane remote from ordinary military routine. And in the third place it provides the men themselves with the opportunity of learning that great problems are not as simple as at first they may appear. It does more than this. It goes some way to mitigate among the men the deadening sense that they are no longer individuals,' but a mere number on the list ; that the orders to which they are subjected bear little relation to the outlines of the war as a whole ; and that a civilian, when lost in a military mass, ceases to be of any personal importance. If properly carried out the A.B.C.A. discussion groups should encourage some sense of solidarity between the private soldier and " The Army," and assure the ordinary conscript that those who hold his life in their hands do not underestimate his intelligence, and are prepared to take him into their confidence, and to listen to his opinion. * * * *

These are admirable purposes. It is not suggested that every young platoon-commander is capable of giving to them the effect which is desired. But the intelligent officer is by this method provided with a salutary opportunity, and in many cases this opportunity is grasped to the great benefit of all concerned. Now all those whose special business it is to consider the welfare of a citizen army are aware that there are certain constant preoccupations by which the morale of the ordinary soldier is apt to be lowered and his zest decreased. There is, in the first place, anxiety regarding his own position in the post-war world, and the dread of unem- ployment and indigence when victory comes. There is in the second place acute anxiety about the fate of his wife and family should he be killed or maimed. And there is in the third place an incessant and gnawing doubt whether " They " (by which is meant all those in authority, from the War Cabinet down to the regimental sergeant-major) are genuinely concerned with the interests of the private soldier and his dependants. At times of depression these doubts amount to a feeling that great sacrifices are being demanded of him for the ultimate benefit of someone else. Inevit- ably the young soldier, pestered by these worries and suspicions (having sufficient education to distrust the judgement of others, and not sufficient education to ,reach firm conclusions( of his own), slides away from reality, and even reason, into a day-dream world in which the pinnacles of Moscow glimmer as the dream-city in which " They " are always " We." To these confusions of the mind A.B.C.A. should offer a useful antidote ; but it is an antidote which can only soothe and comfort if confidence is acquired and retained.

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It is for this reason that many regret the withdrawal of the Beveridge pamphlet Here was a scheme, which in simple terms offered to the individual. some hope of future security. Here was a scheme which, in firm outlines, did, in fact, suggest that " They" were aware of the immense importance attached to economic security by the ordinary man. Here was a scheme which provided some ultimate purpose, and raised the hope that Great Britain, which in the nineteenth century had achieved political liberty without revolution, might in the twentieth secure economic freedom without tyranny. It is not to be supposed that I wish to prejudge future discussion by asserting that the Beveridge report is practicable in every detail ; I am merely contending that it has, rightly or wrongly, come to symbolise for the ordinary citize.n some alternative to extreme fantasies. The withdrawal of the pamphlet, however reason- able it niay scem to those trained in departmental or legislative procedure, will produce upon the citizen soldiers the impression that " They " are hostile to the Beveridge Report, and desire to limit the discussion of all subjects which do not meet with their sympathy or approval. Such an impression will tend to diminish the credit of A.B.C.A., to negative much of the work already accomplished, and to throw a shadow of suspicion over its future activities. The War Office has tmfortunately been forced by this episode, and much against its will, into the appearance of taking sides in an econotnic controversy. It is rumoured that the blame for this ill-considered action does not rest with the military chiefs in Whitehall ; and that Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant-General has, in fact, from the first been one of the most ardent and imagina- tive of A.B.C.A.'s supperters. It is suggested rather that such influence as was brought to bear was exercised by men who have had littk recent or direct experience. of the thoughts and feelings of the modem soldier. It is, of course, easy to magnify the im- portance and effect of an incident which may be shortly forgotten ; but it is sad that the efficacy of a valuable experiment, such a3 A.B.CA., shoukl be hampered by errOrs not ill own.