THE POSITION OF NEW ZEALAND.
[The following is an extract from a very thoughtful private letter which will probably be interesting to some of our readers. It was not written for publication, but comes from a thoroughly trustworthy political source.—En. Spectator:—] May 12, 1865.
. . . . I am full of anxiety about our future. The questions all resolve themselves into finance, but they are perplexing here, and must be more so at a distance. The hope of settling our diffi- culties by British bayonets has long since gone. Not that the soldiers are worse here than elsewhere, but that it must be con- fessed that glory or loot, or both, are very important and common motives, and New Zealand offers neither of these. The officers hate the service. There is no romance about the country, not population enough to offer large societies to every one's taste, there is no sport, no amusements, and forced sojourners among us become blasé. General Cameron sees more to lose than to gain in the way of reputation. He has changed his tune completely in regard both to politics and war. When he cause he was for summary action of all kinds. The natives he declared to be politically incurable, and native fortifications were made to be taken by assault. This was when Sir G. Grey was bent on the "institution" cure, and Cameron was condemned to inaction. Now he has had enough of New Zealand campaigns, and says he wants more men to carry them on, and that they are not necessary but planned for the pleasure and profit of the settlers. It matters not that the necessities of the Government are seriously pinching commerce and industry. A soldier feels and knows nothing of this, he does not try to trace the Bank deposits that should feed ordinary enterprise into the hands of the Government, and then into those of contractors, many of them outside the colony, and all of them within narrow limits, where their profits very little profit the community at large. He is tired and disgusted, and talks accord- ingly, and he becomes useless in his own business. We would submit to the ridiculous pretensions of the military officers readily enough if they were efficient. But they are inefficient, and the colony is bleeding to death while they loiter along at the rate of fifty miles of easy country (for an uncultivated country) in three months.
I can see nothing for it but the removal of the troops who have cost us and England so much, and I suppose that it is by this time a settled thing. Our last sessions' resolutions are by this time discussed in the British Parliament, and, I presume, acted upon. But if we are bleeding to death with the costly help of British troops, I fear the haemorrhage will not be stopped by removing them. You will see the memoranda which the colonial Government have published, setting forth their financial position and plans. They (the Government) are too sanguine. Even on their own confession they are sailing terribly near the wind on a destructive lee shore. They propose to replace the 10,000 troops by 1,500 men raised in the colony, and they estimate the cost of these and a necessary steamer at 187,0001 a year. Now I believe the state of the country requires a much larger force for a time. There is really no trustworthy sign of peaceful dispositions on the Maori side. They are weary and dispirited, I believe, and their losses by war, disease, and want must have been very great. Several formidable tribes are practically extinguished. But this melancholy state of things has left many of them rancorous and dogged. What is the Pai- marire fanaticism? Its life-blood is animosity against the Euro- pean intruders. It is a forlorn hope. The Maoris are cool and sceptical in their intellects. It is their passions that are the strength of Pad-marire. Misery may have given them a turn towards higher unseen powers, but usually there can hardly be
conceived a less spiritually inclined man than the Maori, and I do not believe the madness arose out of the ghost of a spiritual want.
It began in literal insanity, and it lives through bitter unwilling- ness to submit to external rule. Well, if this is right, and such a spirit prevails to any great extent, we must look for a revival of aggression as soon as the removal of a large constraining force gives encouragement. The troops of course are an important defensive power. We in the colony know that a small, thoroughly
organized corps, handled energetically, will be more fatal to resistance than the slow, unwilling mass we have. But the natives will be encouraged to try this—how should they know it? It will take some time to organize our men well, and it is of the utmost importance that they should not be called on to act before they are in perfect organization. In any case, I think, we should for some time have double Mr. Weld's number of men. I trust that War-Office principles will admit of our enlisting from the regiments about to be withdrawn. There can be no doubt that there is an immense advantage in a strong infusion of old, trained, and orderly men, and there will be many willing to take service if allowed. I think, however, that the cost per head of maintaining our force, even supposing we arc allowed to enlist from the troops, will exceed our Minister's estimate. The con- stant seething motion of population in these colonies ought to be seen to be well understood. Without railways, and with costly and long sea voyages, the travelling of the working classes is enormous. There are likely to be for some years to come, quite as long as our problem will take to solve, fresh gold discoveries, and although rushes are, on the average, bad speculations, lotteries will always be attractive. To keep our force efficient it must be out of reach of such attractions. It must be well paid, well found, everything imaginable done to raise and keep up esprit de corps. It ought to be equal to the very finest forces in Europe in every respect, and superior in some. The contingent ex- penses of huts, camp equipage, commissariat, &c., must be very heavy. I guess the actual cost of such a force at 1251. per head per annum, and I think for a year or two we want two to three thousand, besides keeping the militia in an available state. I can hardly conceive there will be any balance left of our three million loan at the end of next summer, i. e., a year hence, and as the customs revenue is strained to the last point, and makes no very rapid advance, as immigration is nearly at a stand-still I do not see where we are to raise more means. I have been taking the supposition of a united colony, and a Government strong in the confidence of the country, if not in cash. But that is not the true state of the case. There is much disunion. The Auckland settlers are on the average an inferior set of men. They are frantic at the removal of Government to Wellington, and at the prospect of losing the troops and the accompanying expenditure of British money. Their prospects are really gloomy in the immediate future. The town has far outgrown the rural popula- tion. The military-settlers scheme started by Mr. Domett has been bungled by the late Ministry, whilst Governor Grey and they were engaged in their absurd war of memoranda. It will be a very hard task to keep the men together, even to the end of their term of service, not to name the future. And if they are scattered the area of insecurity spreads again close to the centre of the settlement. Auckland is crying out for separation into an independent, or rather a dependent colony, "leaning on the arm that has so long supported us," as they say, in their blubber- ing affection. At Otago, at the other end of the islands, a party of some influence are also perpetually crying for sepa- ration. At first the idea was to escape from the liabili- ties that were evidently thickening on the northern island. This idea has been abandoned. The colony is too deep in for that, and I suppose the desire lives on because it has begun to live—it is a habit. Moreover, it is not easy now to see where the end of the difficulties is to be, and prudent men in the South say, we dare not undertake to navigate with such burdens through such seas. Let the Imperial Government take charge, that is the only way oat, and let us be free to manage our affairs, with our share out of the wreck. These two parties from North and South, with a few malcontents, among them Mr. Stafford, who has for some time past been throw- ing his abilities away in a splenetic temper, make together the ele- ments of an opposition that may at any time upset the Government. You can hardly conceive how unstable our political equilibrium is. Not that men change their views. But politics and the Govern- ment are not the objects of interest and ambition they are at home. Men go into public life half reluctantly, from a sense of duty, and soon quit it again. The pursuit of wealth is the great occupation, and the number of wealthy men is not enough to furnish a class of able men with leisure for public work. Our House of Representa- tives changes a large per-tentage of members annually, and so languid are the electors in many constituencies that it is a toss up who and what party prevail in any particular session. This insta- bility is of course most unfavourable for carrying out any plans reaching far into the future. I believe Mr. Weld's Government will outlive next session, which begins in a month. Weld belongs to the old Lulworth family, and is a fine, sensible, honourable man, worthy of the English aristocracy,--not brilliant, but with a keen scent for humbug and dishonesty. Mr. Fitzherbert, of Wellington, is the fox of the Ministry, very wily and clever, a highly edu- cated man and a good speaker. Major Richardson is an impetu-
ous, chivalrous soldier. H. A. Atkinson, the War Minister, is born to organize an army. He has both military genius and adminis- trative talent. Mr. Mantel', the Native Minister, is a son of Dr. Gideon "Iguanodon" Mantel, and a manof great senseand humour. I am afraid he will not persevere to do us much good, but other- wise he might do something to " outbid " Pai-marire among the natives, whom he loves as much as he can love anything. The team is on the whole a good one, all gentlemen, and bent, I believe, on doing their duty by the country. I do not not know why Great Britain should not trust them with the spending some of her money as freely as she does Sir G. Grey or General Cameron. They are subjects of the Empire, and quite as well known in reality to the authorities in Downing Street as either the General or the Governor, when first they were in places of trust. What we really want is that Great Britain should help us liberally for a few years, and trust us at the same time. We ask this not as a right, but as a course which it is most politic and dignified in Britain to take towards us. We have shown ourselves prudent and patriotic enough to be trusted, and we are much better acquainted with our difficulties and resources, and much more interested in an early return of prosperity, than any chance governor or colonel in the Empire. We do not wish to be freed from supervision. Give us a governor to watch, but in- structed to co-operate, not either to dandle or to thwart us, with a veto to be used in that spirit. The simplest way would be for England to give us a lump sum once for all to help us out of the mire, and leave us to our resources. This would relieve tender consciences of the necessity of continually canvassing what they cannot understand without some labour—the vote once given, there would be an end. Unless such a course as this is taken, I believe Great Britain will see the most disastrous failure in New Zealand that has been witnessed in one of her colonies for centuries. It is all but impossible for her, distant and ignorant of our affairs in detail, to manage the business unless by resolving at once to ex- terminate the Maori—an impossible supposition. It is equally impossible for the colony to do so, but for a much simpler cause, and one that can be removed—want of money. If the old system goes on the colony will be bankrupt. If we are simply turned adrift we shall equally be bankrupt, and some of the north island settlements will be abandoned, or become the seat of a war of
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