M. GAMBETTA'S POLICY.
THE grand subject of speculation just now among political Frenchmen is the probable action of M. Gambetta, who appears, except M. Thiers, to be the only "personage" left in France. It appears to be clear that as far as the "old parties" are concerned, the Administration is left compara- tively unfettered. The Legitimists have collapsed. The Clericals, though still so influential that M. Thiers has raised an Ultrarnontane to the Archbishopric of Paris and makes vague promises to the Pope, do not succeed in seating their nominees. The Orleanists are waiting patiently and a little hopelessly for events which may again give them the chance, forfeited by the want of "go " in their natural leaders, and the ultra-Reds aro still suffering from their defeat upon the field. No serious opposition is possible unless Gambetta assumes its lead, and creates within the Assembly a party of which the Left would be the nucleus, but which would attract recruits from all sides, which would be strengthened by every now election, and which would put in a distinct claim to the ultimate possession of power. This course, to head an opposition strong enough to keep the Government Republican, or if necessary to succeed it, is clearly that upon which M. Gambetta had decided when the famous placard recommending him as leader of the Republican " Whigs " was posted upon the walls of Paris, and this would for many reasons be the one most acceptable to Constitutionalists. They desire to see the Assembly rule, which it cannot do while the Chief of the Executive can reduce the members to obedience by a mere threat of resigning. There is as yet nobody in the Assembly to replace M. Thiors, and although he is liable de jure to dismissal, still as he can- not be dismissed his re'ginze is but an extension of the old system of personal government. If he desires a new Act he must have it, and he seldom desires one, the old machinery of which he is now in full possession conferring upon him all but absolute powers. He can give any order he pleases to the army of officials, arrest anybody he suspects, and accept any proposal he favours, and there is no one to call him to account except an Assembly which has repeatedly shrunk by enormous majorities from appearing to disagree with him. With M. Gambetta as an alternative Premier it need not shrink, would be, in fact as well as theory, replaced in its independence, now limited by the impossibility of replacing a man it yet dislikes.
This result, which would be the establishment of the English system in France under very different forms, is of course the one most English Liberals would approve, but it is quite possible that it does not on consideration commend itself to M. Gambetta. He may prefer a policy which would lead a little more quickly to power. The sovereignty of the Assembly is, of course, his dogma, but it is by no means cer- tain that he considers this Assembly the one best fitted either by its origin or its composition to exercise that sovereign right. He may argue that it was not elected for any such purpose, but only to make peace ; that it contains men out of whom it is difficult if not impossible for sincere Republicans to form a working majority, and that it stands condemned by the result of the recent elections, which were for a moderate Republic tempered by M. Gambetta., instead of an Interregnum tempered by M. Thiers. A new election might possibly result in a heavy Republican majority and the return of M. Gambetta by half the cities and departments of France. That would be a much quicker road to power than the gradual construction of a Radical party in a Conservative Assembly, and in the circumstances of the country time must seem to M. Gambetta all-important. Moderate as he is—and his recent speeches show that the possession of power has moderated his enthusiasms,—he still believes in himself, is still ambitious, and still entertains some views which must make it most difficult for him to watch M. Thiers with Parliamentary patience. No powerful man of M. Gambetta's temperament likes waiting, and it would not sur- prise us in the least if he made the dissolution of this Assembly his first object, and with that view addressed the Provinces to put pressure on their representatives. The Assembly is sovereign, but if pressed by its own electors, by the Left, and by opinion within the Army, which will take its cue from the man it has elected, the Assembly—which, it must be remembered, is led by men sure of re-election—may be induced to Beek " a renewal of its mandate." This would, like the other, be a perfectly constitutional course, and it would, as we read the temper of Prance, result in the elevation of M. Gambetta to the head of affairs, or at least to such a position that he could dictate terms to M. Thiers. So strongly is this believed by some of his oppo- nents, that they whisper insinuations of his design to employ his popularity with the Army and dissolve the Assembly by a coup d'e'tat, a suggestion which could only seem probable to men familiarized for a generation with the spectacle of suc- cessful violence. The Assembly could be made to dissolve itself, if needful, without the interference of soldiers, and it is not M. Gaixtbetta's cue to depend on, but to reform the Army. He desires probably to be master of France, but he knows only too well that Prince Schwartzenberg was right, and that "you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them."
There is a third and still quicker course which M. Gambetta might pursue, and which Frenchmen are eagerly discussing. He might join M. Thiers in his old post as Minister at War. Once admitted within the Cabinet, and with the Army at his back, his old talent for reducing his colleagues to clerks might manifest itself again, and France would, in fact, though not in name, be guided or governed by a two-headed Presidency, the reversion of sole command remaining, of course, with the younger man. Such a Government, it seems clear, might be excessively strong, for it would combine all parties except the pure Monarchists, the Clericals, and the Communists ; would be no more resisted than M. Gain- betta was when seated at Bordeaux, and might venture on the strongest measures of reorganization within the Army itself, measures from which M. Thiers appears as yet to have shrunk. We cannot discover that he has ordered one, while the Commission on recruiting has as yet only decided that it would be better to adhere to conscription without substitutes, and shorten the term of service without adopting the Prussian system in its integrity. But the difficulties in the way of such a junction are very great indeed, probably insuperable. M. Thiers dislikes and fears M. Gambetta, whom he oven described with unpardonable violence as " that maniac at Bordeaux," while M. Gambetta could not enter the Ministry without insisting on serious conditions. He certainly would reorganize the Army his own way, and M. Thiers believes that he himself is a reorganizer of genius. His relation towards the Church is, we imagine, somewhat misunderstood, he, though of course no Catholic, having interfered most decisively to forbid the desecrations to which some of the - Garibaldians were given, but he would insist on the abandon- ment of any measures for the restoration of the Temporal Power, and, indeed, of any measures whatever against Italy not essential• to the interests or to the honour of France. He would insist on a great scheme of education as one of the first duties of the State, and on the complete abandonment of the policy of petty repressions to which M. Thiers lends himself far too readily. He is, too, a strong free-trader, and though he probably, like most Frenchmen, refuses to consider fiscal questions matters of principle, he certainly would resist a return to a purely Protectionist system of taxation. It is hardly possible that differences like these, differences which 'cover almost the whole ground of politics, can be compromised or removed ; but still it must not be forgotten that M. Thiers is not an Intramontane or oven a strong Catholic, and that M. Gambetta has protected the Church ; that fiscal differences do not divide Cabinets in France ; and that M. Thiers and M. Gambetta have two strong points of attraction. Both are centralists, M. Thiers from belief in the system, M. Gambetta from belief that it cannot be safely given up until the people have been educated, and both in their different ways are devoted to the greatness of France. The coalition is possible therefore though improbable, and if it arrives France will have one of the strongest governments she has ever known.
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