THE SIAMESE QUESTION. T HE wisdom of guarding our Indian frontiers
by " buffer " States is not a matter which we have any desire to discuss on the present occasion. But even granting that the policy we pursue is a wise one, and that the balance of convenience is in favour of "buffer" States, it must be admitted that there are certain inconveniences attaching to it. Of these inconveniences we are just now enjoying an example. We are all in confusion as to whether Siam is strictly in the position of a " buffer " State, and if so, whether we have a right to forbid France to attack her, and generally as to what are our rights and interests. If France marched with us in Eastern Asia, we should know exactly where we stood. A foot across the border would mean war at once. As it is, we are per- plexed by not knowing exactly how we stand, or exactly what we ought to do.
The answer to the French ultimatum will probably not be published until these pages are in our readers hands. In any case, it cannot be received in time to be commented on here. We can, however, review the situation as a whole, and point out (1) what it is that the French want, (2) what appear to be our interests and rights in die matter. The French have desired, ever since they were seized by the longing for founding an Indo-Chinese Empire, to connect their possessions in Cochin-China, and Anam. In Cochin-China and Cambodia, France possesses the delta and lower waters of the Mekong river. Further up the coast, in the direction of China, is her colony of Tonquin. A glance at the map will show that the valley of the Mekong river, which runs up the blunted peninsula in which Siam and Cambodia are situated, makes an ex- cellent connecting-link between Tonquin and Cochin-China, and that it is, in fact, the only available link if they are ever to be united. and made into a continuous dominion. Under these circumstances, it is only natural that the men who dream of, and scheme for, a great French Empire in the Far East, should have come to the conclusion that the left bank of the Mekong river must be taken by France, and the whole waterway placed under French control. At last the forward party have convinced the Government, and France is now in process of acquiring the left bank of the Mekong from the Siamese, who are in actual possession. When nations mean to annex territory, they seldom fail to find good reasons. In this case, the French have adopted a plan which was first invented by Louis XIV. but has since been much imitated,—the plan of hunting-up the old territorial claims of any country of which you may become possessed, and of pressing them if convenient. The theory is that when a piece of territory passes to a new owner, that new owner stands exactly in the old owner's shoes, and has all his rights and claims. Now, France annexed Cambodia. But Cambodia once possessed the whole of the left bank of the middle and upper waters of the Mekong. There- fore, all that territory ought to belong to France. It is true that Siam conquered it from Cambodia sixty years before the French took Cambodia, and have held it ever since. That, however, makes no difference. Nullum tempus occurrit Cambodia ; and Siam's sixty years of adverse possession is of no account. It is on this theoretical claim that France based her recent action in driving the Siamese out of the territories that lie on the left bank of the Mekong river. During these opera- tions occurred the " murder " of a French official ; and out of this occurrence has again arisen the French action at Bangkok, and the ultimatum under which is demanded an indemnity of about three millions (francs P), special indemnities for Inspector Grosginin's family for the owners of the ship burnt by the Siamese, and for other outrages, and the abandonment of the left bank of the Mekong, including the islands.
Such is the situation. It remains to be considered how far the interests of England are involved. Let us first get rid of the problem of what we may call our immediate material interests. If the French go to war with Siam they will probably bring the whole fabric of Government to the ground with a run, and introduce, for the time at any rate, complete anarchy. Unquestionably, this would be a serious matter for us. Though France has practically no material interest in Bangkok, we have very large interests there. Mr. Curzon, in his article in the July Nineteenth Century, gives a striking account of the way in which the trade of the country has slid into our hands.
Of the great ships lying off Bangkok there is hardly one which is not owned by British subjects, while 88 per cent. of the total trade of the port is in British hands.
The internal commerce is also 'largely in British hands, British engineers and contractors are laying the railway to Horst, and the Siamese mines are in the hands of British concessionaires. T no English newspapers are published in Bangkok, and English "may be justly described as the second language of Bangkok." That being so, it is not un- natural that the notion of Bangkok being either plunged in anarchy, or else absorbed by France, is unpleasant to those who are interested in the trade of Siam. At the same time, it must be remembered that the importance of these olaims may easily be exaggerated, and that the French have again and again said that they have no desire to interfere with the independence of the Siamese King- dom. The next and more important point is,—Will the surrender of the left bank of the Mekong imperil the existence of Siam as a " buffer " State; and if so, do the interests of India make it imperative that we should pro- test against the French demand F Mr. Curzon, in a letter to Thursday's Times, argues that the proposed annexation will destroy the value of Siam as a " buffer " State. If France takes the whole left bank of the Mekong from the Chinese frontier to the sea, she will come into "absolute juxtaposition with the British-protected Shan States that fell to this country as part of the heri- tage of Upper Burmah, and which extend not merely up to but across the Mekong." "Such a transfer of ownership," says Mr. Curzon, "would therefore not merely bisect Siam, but it would entail the very result which the British and French Governments alike deprecate—viz., a common frontier between the two European Powers in Indo-China—whilst it would effec- tively close the door to the trade of South-West China, which it has been the consistent and legitimate ambition of British diplomacy to keep open to our English and Indian merchants." Unquestionably, it would be exceedingly dan- gerous to have States like the Shan States, for whose con- duct we should be held responsible, in direct contact with France. A feudatory " buffer " would be a certain souroe of danger and anxiety. Possibly, however, the Foreign Office have some means for providing against this diffi- culty. It is to be noted that Lord Rosebery, in the first memorandum which he read out in the Lords, carefully stated that we considered the claim to the left bank of the Mekong as not concerning us, provided it was kept within proper limits, and did not assume such proportions as to affect the independence and integrity of Siam. This we hold to be the reasonable view ; and we feel confident that Lord Rosebery may be trusted to deal with the matter on prudent lines. We may note, however, before we leave the subject, that it is possible that his hands are pretty closely tied by agreements entered into by his predecessor. According to the Bombay Gazette, quoted by the editor of the Asiatic Quarterly in the July number, Lord Salis- bury, three years ago, came to an understanding with M. Waddington, by which India was to occupy the Shan States between Burmah and the north-east frontier of Siam, though claimed by the latter country, while France was to have all the left bank of the Mekong. If that is the truth, all we can do is to see that the independence of Siam is respected, and that the new frontiers are clearly stated. "Buffer" States with ragged edges are the curses of diplomacy.
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