TOPICS OF THE DAY.
GERMANY AND MOROCCO.
WE should not be doing our duty to our readers if we were to underestimate the apprehension created by Germany's action at Agadir. It is causing the very gravest anxiety throughout Europe. We do not want to provoke controversy by hard words. All we want to do is to point out to Germany what a huge mistake she will be making, and how terrible are the risks she will be running, if she persists in acting on the notion that the present Govern- ment and their followers in the country are no longer supporters of the entente with France, and that if the entente is only tested and tried with sufficient boldness it can be broken down. Unhappily there seems only too much reason to believe that this is what Germany is thinking and what Germany is trying to do. So serious is the clanger that arises from her false conception of opinion here that we mean to speak perfectly frankly as to what is happening. The German Emperor came over here for the unveiling of the Memorial to the Queen. He was received, as he was sure to be received, not only with perfect courtesy, but with friendliness by the British people of all classes. Not only is the mood of our crowds always one of good fellowship to visitors—whatever foreigners may think, ours is essentially a kindly people but the nation in its Coronation humour was particularly anxious to show, goodwill all round and to prove its peaceful intentions. The same good feeling was shown to the Heir of the German Empire when he visited us at the Coronation. He is a young man of great personal charm, and his recent visit to India and his love of sport made him a specially welcome guest.
Unfortunately the men who have the conduct of foreign affairs in Germany appear to have been entirely misled by these events. They have been unwise enough to draw from them the sinister conclusion that our fickle population is tired of the entente with France, and quite willing to abandon it for a flirtation with Germany. They read into the popular cheers for the Emperor, the friendliness of Ministers, and the naive, if well-meant, expressions of the Liberal Press a readiness to desert France. The next step for the controllers of German policy seems to have been to argue that now was the time to drive a wedge between France and Britain and break down that entente which has done so much for the peace of the world, and has prevented restless and aggressive action on the part of Germany, as we should put it, or, as the Germans would put it, has prevented Germany from getting her place in the aim. Filled with the idea that the Liberal Government and the Liberal Party were too much in love with peace and with Germany to quarrel with her, even if French interests were attacked, the Germans sent their warship to Agadir.
Englishmen who constitutionally find it difficult to under- stand acts of subtle diplomacy will be inclined to declare that our explanation of German action must be "the merest moonshine.' They will argue that nobody could be so foolish or so wicked as to take the line which we are ascribing to the German Government. "Remember," they will say, "you are accusing German statesmen of meeting our goodwill with an almost instant slap in the face. It is absolutely incredible that Germany should meet our advances towards friendli- ness by action which she must know would be, to put it at the least and lowest, very embarrassing to us. It can only be a coincidence that the Agadir incident has followed so close upon the friendliness shown by us during the Emperor's visit and the visit of the Crown Prince. It is unfortunate, no doubt, and rather blundering that the Germans should have felt obliged by their special interests to act as they have acted, but to pretend that the two things have any connection is lunacy. All we can say to those who argue thus is that they do not understand how keen, how persistent, and how self-conscious, is German State policy. A German diplomatist would consider himself dishonoured for all time if he failed to seize what he thought was an opportunity for pushing his country's interests merely because it might be disagreeable or un- grateful. Granted his premises, that the time has come for splitting France and England, he would not hesitate for a moment. Therefore we say that most unfortunately our expressions of good. feeling towards Germany have resulted in Germany's provocative act towards France, and have made her statesmen entertain the idea of showing France what is the value of English friendship. It is hardly necessary for us to say that if our interpre- tation of German action is correct the conductors of German foreign policy will have a rude awakening. Not only the present Government but the vast majority of the Liberal Party are, we are sure, absolutely determined to keep faith with France and not to allow her to be bullied by Germany. Whatever happens, we shall maintain to the full the obligations of the entente. Our people are not a faithless or a timid people, and even if nothing but the obligation of honour bound us to France, that obligation would be maintained even though it were to our own hurt. Possibly the Germans, infected by the traditional slanders of Frederick the Great as to English perfidy, will not believe this, true as it is. We would ask them, however, as sensible men to consider for a moment whether they think it possible that Englishmen, Liberals or Unionists, Radicals or Conservatives, could be so idiotic, so utterly lost to their own interests, as to leave France in the lurch. If war were to arise between France and Germany owing to Germany's aggressive action, we must from motives of self-interest, if not on any other ground, side with France. Even if Liberals are not very keen students of foreign affairs, they know enough to recognize the danger of being taken in detail. The lesson given by Prussia when she fell first upon Austria and then, four years after, upon France was not given in vain. If Ger- many were now to go to war with France alone and to beat her we all know well enough that our turn would come next. We are not going to be so mad as to run the risk of fighting at a disadvantage when we might fight at an advantage—of fighting without an ally instead of fighting with one. The very desire to maintain the peace of the world would draw u8 this way.
If we stand by France loyally and. firmly there will be no war. If we do not stand by her the risk of war is multiplied by ten. But perhaps a cynic might say, "The French will have to give way if we do not encourage them to stand out." Depend upon it our statesmen will not be taken in by such talk as this. They know perfectly well that if peace were secured by France being beaten to her knees, because we refused her assistance, the peace of the world would be in deadly. jeopardy. Germany would become at once the arbiter of Europe, with France disheartened and humiliated, and filled, moreover, with the most burning sense of indigna- tion in regard to this country. We should be in the position of a climber in the Alps who has been discovered cutting the rope. Perhaps the rope would have been cut in such a way and at such a time as to prevent anybody instantly going over a precipice, but the man to whom you have been roped is not inclined to thank you for much in such circumstances. His feelings are those of one who has been betrayed. He feels that he can never trust you again, and so owes you the deadliest of grudges. For this, if for no other reason, we are not going to cut the rope.
In writing thus we do not mean to suggest for one moment that it is either our business or our interest to take an aggressive or provocative line during the negotiations which are now going on. If France in the course of the conversations makes a compromise with Germany of her own free will and provides her with compensation well and good. We shall not stand in the way of any such arrangement What, however, we shall not do is to say to the French, either directly or indirectly : " You had better make the best terms you can with Germany, for if it came to war we should not be in a position to help you." On the contrary, we shall tell France that, though the last thing we desire to do is to stir up further ill-feeling between her and Germany, we shall stand by her if any attempt is made to victimize her and if terms are proposed to her which are inconsistent with her true interests. To put the matter more specifically. We can quite understand that France, in order to get the Moroccan question settled once and for all and to obtain a perfectly free band in Morocco, might think it worth her while to make con- cessions to Germany elsewhere. If France were to be allowed by Germany, and therefore by the rest of the world, to occupy towards the whole of Morocco, except that portion already assigned to Spanish influence, the position which she occupies in Tunis, or which we occupy in Egypt, she would gain no doubt very greatly. Indeed, if we were Frenchmen we can quite well conceive that the adding of Morocco to Algiers and Tunis, and the consequent construc- tion of a great conterminous North African empire, would appear worth a great deal of sacrifice. We cannot, how- ever, profess to judge as to what terms France should or should not make with Germany. All we can say is that we ought not to prevent any such bargaining so long as France acts with a view to her own interests and not under compulsion. If France comes to us and says, "We have arranged things with Germany," we shall be glad. If, on the other hand, France tells us that Germany is making impossible suggestions, and following her quite unprovoked aggression in Morocco by what are in fact blackmailing demands, then we must tell France that we shall stand by her to the end.
Timid people will, perhaps, be inclined to say to us, How terrible! This will mean war." As a matter of act it will mean nothing of the kind. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that Russia will stick firmly to her ally, and if we do the same, and show ourselves willing to take all the consequences, there will be no war. Germany will at once in a businesslike way set herself to the work of getting out of the unpleasant situation she has created for herself in Agadir and of suffer- ing as little loss of face as possible. Needless to say we shall be quite willing to help her in every way to do this, and to advise France also to make things easy for a diplo- matic retreat. To put the matter quite plainly, Germany is not yet ready for a great war by land and sea, and if she feels that there is a serious risk of war she will give way. No doubt she may use the necessity for giving way as an argument to the German people for larger funds for war- ships, but that is an inconvenience which we need not trouble ourselves about, for we may be sure that if one excuse is not available some other will be found. The enlargement of the naval programme and the provision of extra battleships will take place whatever happens. As long, then, as France, Russia, and Britain stand firmly together there will be no war. The only real danger of war would come from weak or divided counsels here. Curiously enough, too, it will be actually easier for France to make some minor concession to Germany to save Germany's face if we have shown unmistakably that we shall stand by her to our last ship, our last man, and our last shilling. The result of such standing together of the three Powers will be to raise immensely the prestige of France, and, incidentally of Russia, and so to make those Powers feel easier. There is no fear of France becoming aggressive in view of a diplomatic success. On the contrary, it is far more likely to steady her, for her people are essentially pacific. Another incidental result of firm- ness on our part may be noticed. At present Austria and Italy are doing very little or nothing, but we may be perfectly sure that if there were any real danger of war both these Powers would put the greatest possible amount of pressure on their ally to prevent it. If Germany had. a fleet strong enough to protect Italian shores it is con- ceivable that Italy, though reluctantly, might feel that her national interests obliged her to make war on Britain. When Germany can give her no protection of that kind Italy is certainly not going to take a step which she would in any case deeply regret as a breach of her historic friendship with England. She would have a perfectly good excuse for standing out against a war provoked by German action in Agadir, and we may be sure that she would take it. At the same time Austria is not going to forget what must be the result of war just now upon her Adriatic ports and upon her aims and aspirations, not only on the Albanian coast, but at Salonika. At this moment matters of great importance are trembling in the balance in the Balkan Pen- insula, and Austria knows that at any moment she may find it necessary to mobilize her army and march it through the Sanjak of Novi-bazar down to the waters of the lgean, and so make good her claims to play the predominant role in the readjustment of the Balkans. An instant's reflection will show that at such a moment Austria is not going to run the risk of finding a British squadron at Salonika and a French squadron at Trieste and Ragusa.
In our opinion the best way out of the imbroglio for everyone would be for France to save the face of Germany by making some minor concession to Germany which would be amply paid for by Germany's final recog- Aition that France is to stand towards Morocco in the position in which she stands towards Tunis. Germany must be warned, however, that if she presses France unduly, and makes her action at Agadir a ground for what is in fact diplomatic blackmail, Russia and Britain will come to her assistance, and not merely with diplomatic Notes. We shall be loyal to France whatever happens. That is the way of honour, of self-interest, and of peace.
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