The Man Who Killed the TSR2?
AVIATION
By PETER THORNEYCROFT
WHETHER or not one accepts the blurb on the dust-cover of Mr Worcester's book,* it is expressed with greater clarity than Mr Worcester manages to achieve in some parts of the book itself. 'Major aspects of civil, military and space policy,' it is said, 'are analysed in the new book by Richard Worcester, the aviation consultant whose views influenced the Labour government in the dramatic re-setting of broad air objectives in 1964 and 1965.'
The precise meaning of 'broad air objectives' is doubtful. Presumably in the context they refer to the cancelling of all three major projects being undertaken by the British aircraft industry and abortive attempts to abandon co-operative pro- grammes with Europe in the development of a supersonic air transport and launchers for heavy satellites. Earlier and clearly well-informed press reports suggested that Mr Worcester's book would reveal the true facts concerning the nature and timing of decisions by the Labour party on aviation policy. Certainly on pages 14 and 15 of his book Mr Worcester claims that in February 1964 he came to the conclusion, for reasons which he does not confide to us in any detail, that the major aircraft planned 'could not suit the country.'
He also claims to have attended meetings of leaders of the Labour party—one in Lune and one later in the summer. 'I had the impression,' he says, 'that the leadership agreed with the reasoning and the policy that they would fashion would be close to the policy I was urging them to adopt.' He further claims that 'for the 1964 election the main thrust of my report was that efforts should be concentrated on the F111 for combat and an American transport—specifically the C141."
Assuming these statements to be accurate, they would appear to be in striking contrast to what the Labour leadership have persistently claimed to have been their thinking at the time of the October 1964 general election. It is particularly difficult to reconcile all this with Socialist allega- tions that it was the Conservatives who were contemplating the cancellation of the TSR2 and either—to the workers of Preston—that they would keep it going, or—as a Wilsonian hedge— that they had not decided to cancel but would be guided by the price.
These no doubt are matters which the Labour leadership will be asked to explain. Certainly Mr Wilson seems to have impressed Mr Worcester. He claims that since Lloyd George 'nobody, until Harold Wilson atrived in October 1964, had a real grasp of aviation.' Those who know our Prime Minister better may wonder whether Mr Worcester really had any clearer idea of Mr Wilson's true intentions than the workers of Preston, the aircraft industry, or for that matter, the Labour party itself.
The book must, however, be judged on wider considerations. It bears the resounding title of Roots of British Air Policy. There is no doubt that rightly or wrongly Mr Worcester now regards himself as the tap root of Government aircraft policy. He refers throughout to what appear to
* ROOTS OF BRITISH Am POLICY. By R. Worcester. (Hodder and Stoughton, 30s.)
have been an endless spate of aviation reports on every aspect of aerial and space activity. It may indeed well be true that by now there is just nothing that Mr Worcester has not said and no position which he has not taken up on aviation matters. In this he may even resemble somewhat the situation of his idol, Mr Wilson. 'As we said,' they both can claim, selecting some suitable quotation to suit the transient requirements of the moment—and always a suitable quote can be produced. One thing at least is certain—that Mr Worcester has no use whatsoever for British aircraft, British Ministries, Conservative Ministers or the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farn- borough, which admirable institution comes in for the most bitter criticism.
In the contemporary scene the sick joke has been the forerunner of what can only be des- cribed as the sick analysis. Obviously faults can be found in the British aircraft industry and in the organisation and administration of the Ministry which for the time being governs it. Much benefit could be derived from a balanced criticism of these faults, but in any such balanced criticism one would expect to find the credits as well as the debits, and Mr Worcester awards virtually no credits anywhere in this country. He is, however, an ardent admirer of the methods pursued in the United States. This, too, is a position which could have been argued and sup- ported with facts.
Mr Worcester seems, however, to adopt a somewhat naive and unquestioning admiration for things American. The truth is that the Ameri- cans, whose general competence no one need deny, have themselves been in grave difficulties and like all of us are capable of grave error. Any analysis of their management techniques would be far more credible if this situation were freely accepted. Mr Worcester understands the benefit derived from contacts with distinguished Americans such as Mr Hitch, but finds it hard to credit the fact that such benefits are to be derived from both sides in the discussion. A man who admires all countries but his own does not make a very convincing case. The book, again accord- ing to the dust-cover, urges 'more concentration of facilities and resources on a narrower front— a more astute policy-making technique and a greater readiness to share an exciting and chal- lenging future with other countries.' If it did this with any clarity there might indeed be much to commend it.
It is, however, extremely difficult to distil this theme from the tangled story which roams from the TSR2, through the effects of aviation upon the Church, to a quite incomprehensible attribu- tion of a decision not to order an American weapon called Hound Dog because of some alleged but undescribed effect on Blue Streak. And yet Mr Worcester must have worked very hard to put together this complicated story. He does say at the end of it that 'air policy must be evolved with judgment, intuition, psychology, reasoning, logic, assessment and evaluation, and that when decided, it must be relevant, artidulate, comprehensive, durable, timely and consistent.' Alas, these admirable theories are not a substitute for the hard task of assessing what we should do in aviation policy nor for that of carrying these plans into effect.
We are, after all, dealing here with matters which are often upon the frontiers of existing knowledge. Mr Worcester is right when he says that estimates have sometimes become guessti- mates. He is right in saying that new management techniques are needed—but so are faith and cour- age and the brilliant skills which until now have been available in industry and Government establishments alike. If Mr Worcester is still being consulted by anybody, one hopes that these aspects of aviation will play a part in the advice he gives.
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