THE ARAB WORLD
py NEVILL BARBOUR THE five Power conference requested by General de Gaulle, representing Great Britain,`the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., France and China, was to be one that would consider the affairs of the Near East as a whole. The context of his remarks in his Press conference on June z and the specific mention of Iraq, Egypt and Palestine, indicated that in using the phrase Near East he was not referring to such countries as Turkey, Persia or Abyssinia, but exclusively to the States and peoples which compose what we have become accustomed to describe as the Eastern Arab world.
The suggestion was interesting. The formation of an Arab League which includes some 3o million people is a development which undoubtedly calls for a readjustment of our ideas. The establish- ment of general lines of approach, agreed between the great Powers on the one hand and the Arabic-speaking peoples on the other, would conduce more than anything else to the peaceful development of this vast and potentially populous and rich area of the world's surface. It is therefore. certainly worth while considering what problems would have to be faced if such a conference were to assemble.
Let us consider first what the objectives of the Arab peoples, or, as they like to be called, the Arab Nation, are. They can be defined as the creation, through the unifying influence of the Arab language and culture, of a commonwealth of Arab states. The ultimate aim may in fact be said to be the revival of the Arab Califate—in a form adapted to modern times and, probably, without a Calif. While this commonwealth would be predominantly Muslim in inspiration, an essential element of the project is the elimination, under the influence of a common Arab patriotism, of the sectional, racial and religious differences which have for so long been a, source of internal and external difficulties: This policy has already achieved an outstand- ing success in winning the whole-hearted adherence of the Christian Lebanon to the Arab League.
What are the conditions necessary to ensure that the development of this commonwealth should take place in harmony with that of x the great Powers and particularly of those whose interests are primarily affected? The need which gave rise to the proposal was a the settlement of the Syro-Lebanese question. Closely connected
to with this is the provision of some method, alternative to that stipu- lated in the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian treaties, for maintaining in the Middle East, the bases necessary for securing world order until such time as die task can be entrusted to the local authorities. Equally urgent is the, stabilisation of the Jewish position in Palestine. The question of the future status of the Sudan is a matter which cannot be overlooked. , Important, too, is the avoidance of conflict- ing policies towards the Arab world on the part of the great Powers on account of rivalry -for oil ; this is, however, in the first place a matter for agreement amongst the great Powers themselves and deed
e not be discussed here. Less urgent problems are the ultimate frontier between Turkey and the Arab world, notably in the matter of the province of Alexandretta, and 'the future of the lesser Arab principalities and sheikhdoms. These matters, however, had probably better be left for consideration later.
r Let us then briefly consider what measures a five Power confer- ence might recommend on the major issues, taking into account the declared principles of the United Nations. The Syro-Lebanese
s trouble was certainly due primarily to the fact that the leaders of the Levant States did not believe that the French Government ever intended to grant them independence in any real sense of the word. The ensuing dispute concerning _ the grant of strategic bases destroyed any hope of agreement being reached on cultur:al and economic matters; In the corresponding case of the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian treaties, it was simply the greater confidence felt by Arabs in British sincerity in this respect that gave the treaties the solidity which enabled them to stand the test of war. This con- fidence moreover is the real guarantee that Anglo-Arab relations will not some day be as overcast as Franco-Arab relations to-day. With these considerations in mind, the five Powers, after reaffirm- ing the achievement of independence as the goal of mandated States, might well suggest the internationalisation of foreign military bases in the Arab world. Suppose that it has been decided that, in order to ensure the maintenance of security, X air and Y naval bases with a force of Z troops will be required in any particular world zone. Such forces would presumably be international in composition and include contingents from the local States ; their employment would be dependent upon a decision of the Security Council. In the Eastern Arab world, where British interests are far more deeply involved than those of any other country, the bulk of the forces and the commander-in-chief would be British, possibly with seconds-in- command from other Powers according to their regional interests. Within such a framework it might be possible, when passions have cooled, to negotiate a suitable settlement of any cultural and economic questions whin remain over from the time of the French Mandatory regime in the Levant States.
What of the Jewish settlement in the Near East? It is reasonably certain that a Jewish National Home in Palestine could be fitted into the framework of an Arab commonwealth provided that its leaders showed the same willingness to co-operate with the Arab world that the Maronite leaders have done in the Lebanon. It is too often forgotten that in the minds of such men as Sir Mark Sykes and Colonel Lawrence the consideration which the Arabs were to receive in return for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was assistance on the part of world Jewry in support of Arab aspirations in general. Now that Arab independence has been largely secured and an Arab League formed in the face of bitter Zionist-Jewish hostility, the bargaining value of Jewish support hip been reduced to very little ; on the other hand Arabs might well grant generous terms to the existing Jewish community in Palestine as part of a general international settlement dealing with the Arab world as a whole. A Jewish State, on the other hand, differentiated from the environment by language, religion and political orientation, would be quite incompatible with the Arab idea and could only be set up by the prolonged use of force. Seeing that the establishment of such a State, if not actually debarred by the terms of the Balfour Declaration, was certainly not promised or even implicit in it, and most certainly was not envisaged regardless of the general political conditions of the Near East, the five Power conference could hardly do other than approve the formation of a Palestinian State on the general lines suggested in the White Paper of 1939. They would no doubt add a stipulation that regulations discriminating against Jewish settlement and immigration should be withdrawn as soon as the discriminatory stipulations of the Mandate in favour of Jewish settle- ment and immigration had themselves been abolished.
The question of the Sudan is less pressing and of more local interest. A five Power conference could not be expected to do more than make some recommendations as to the general lines of a future. settlement. It might, for example, approve the steady development of Sudanese self-government and suggest that an eventual Sudanese parliament should, at an appropriate moment, be free to determine the future international status of the country, and to vote, if it so wished, for assimilation or federation with Egypt or for participation in the Arab League as an independent unit. In either case the settlement would no doubt be accompanied by the drawing up of special cultural and economic agreements with Great Britain, Egypt and possibly Abyssinia. The ventilation of the subject at this level, even if it resulted only in some such rather nebulohs recommenda- tions, might assist in obviating future difficulties arising from unilateral action on the part of one or more of the Powers concerned.
If it be granted that some such recommendations as these would mark the most successful issue that could be anticipated of a five Power conference on the Arab world, is there in fact the least prospect that such agreement would be reached? It would certainly require much preliminary work and months of negotiation. As a long term plan, then, there may be much to be said for the sugges- lion. But for the immediate settlertent of the Syro-Lebanese question its value is problematic ; indeed it may be suggested that General de Gaulle, in putting the idea forward, intended politely to reject the conference proposed by Mr. Churchill rather than to put forward a practical alternative. The time for such a conference may come, but hardly while statesmen are so fully occupied with questions of greater urgency or indeed until the outlines of the general security organisation are very much clearer.
There remains, moreover, one other issue which cannot be passed over. The links of history, language, religion and culture which bind the Eastern Arab world to North Africa are so close that the problems of the two regions cannot long be kept separate. Nothing is more certain than that the Arab League once formally established in the East will be compelled by popular feeling to take up the cause of the Western Arabs, who form another group of 16,000,000 people. Any comprehensive settlement for the Arab world should therefore lay down some guidance on the future affairs of those regions also. Here the least that would be likely to satisfy Arab feeling would be an undertaking on the part of the French Govern- ment to make self-government within a stated period the objective of their policy in the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and in the meanwhile to push on vigorously with educational and social reforms. (It would no doubt be expected that Spanish policy in the Spanish zone of Morocco and Allied policy in Libya would follow the same general lines.) Having achieved self-government, 'Tunisia and Morocco would no doubt wish to enter the Arab League ; in this case, security bases under French command might be set up analogous to those in the Eastern Arab world. Some such under- taking on the part of the French Government, followed by evidence of a determination to implement it, would be the surest method of restoring French prestige in the Arab world, and winning back Arab friendship and respect. It is, however, hardly to be expected that the existing French Government, with its extreme conservatism in matters affecting the French Empire and its natural but excessive sensitiveness in the international field, would admit the subject to dis- cussion. The very suggestion of treating the Arab world as a whole might indeed result in converting General de Gaulle from being the chief supporter of the project for a five Power con- ference into its most active opponent. Yet the question will have to be faced one day, probably sooner rather than later, and its settle- ment on lines internationally agreed would be one of the happiest possible auguries for future world organisation, and set an example whose influence might be of great value in other regions of the world.
Previous page
