LIFE OF SIR JOHN MOORE.

EXCEPTING in his last campaign, Sir JOHN MOORE was a fortu- nate man : fortunate in his parents, his connexions, his promo- tion, his undertakings; and still more fortunate in himself—in an amiable and affectionate disposition, chastened desires, rational ex- pectations, and a strong constitution. His closing scene might have afforded an illustration to the great satirist, yet few men possesed more of the qualities which JUVENAL enumerates as the sole objects of desire. Not only had he in perfection the " mens sana in corpore sane," and the " fortem animum terrore mortis carentem," but be pos3essed the " virtue" necessary to " a tran- quil life," though the repose was missed. The father of JOHN MOORE was the celebrated author of Ze- luco ; his mother e as an ANDERSON " of Dovehill." The subject of the memoir was born at Glasgow, in November 1761. When eleven years old, he accompanied his father, and his father's pupil, the Duke of HAMILTON, in a Continental tour ; during which his military propensities were first developed. At fifteen, he was ap- pointed an Ensign in the Fifty-first Regiment, by the interest of the Duke of ARGYLE; and sent to Minorca, on garrison-duty. In less than two years, his boyish companion, the Duke of HAMIL- TON, raised a regiment, and obtained a Lieutenancy for him. Soon after, he made his first campaign, in the American War ; where his conduct procured him much credit, and a Captaincy. On the return of peace, he was "elected a representative of four Scottish boroughs, through the influence of the Duke of HAMILTON." His attendance in Parliament was constant ; and his independent sup- port (for in this ease "independent" was something more than a phrase) was generally given to PITT. After four years of sena- torial practice, he was appointed (in 1787) a Major in the Sixtieth Regiment ; whence he was removed to his old acquaintance the Fifty-first. He found it, like most others of that day, in a very disorderly state. His private studies, his practical experience, and his love for the profession, had already made him far superior to most officers of the time ; and be endeavoured to restore the discipline of the regiment. In this, however, he was constantly thwarted, by the jealousy of the Lieutenant-Colonel. But some rumours of wars inducing that worthy to "retire," MOORE SRC- ceeded him, by purchase; and was soon after ordered to Gibraltar, and thence to Corsica, where the military forces of England and Revolutionary France were contending. He was .present at the sieges of Bastia and Calvi ; and at Calvi he led on a storming party. Soon after the pacification of the island, be was recalled, on Sir GILBERT ELLIOTT'S representa- tions, in consequence of his influence with the Corsicans, and his presumed disapproval of Sir GILBERT'S projects of government. But out of evil cometh good: the Ministry could not but admit that MOORE was innocent ; it would have been unpleasant, per- Imps inconvenient, to censure Sir GILBERT ; they therefore pro- moted the Lieutenant-Colonel to the rank of Brigadier-General, and employed him in the expedition then (1796) fitting out for the West Indies, under the command of ABERCROMBIE.

Up to this time, luck or interest had some share in MOORE'S advancement ; henceforth his position was sufficiently marked to enable him to carve his way. Hitherto his biography was that of a private man; hereafter his life belongs to history. He was pre- sent at the attack of St. Lucia, and greatly contributed to its suc- cess. Subsequently appointed Governor, he displayed his adminis- trative talents, by the way in which he reconciled the French inha- bitants to their new yoke; his military skill was exhibited by the successful war which he waged against the Maroons or revolted Negroes, in an uncleared country with an unhealthy climate and un- der a tropical sun. Compelled, by the shattered state of his health, to resign his post, he returned to England. He was scarcely reco- vered before be was employed in Ireland, during the "Rebellion." On its termination, be was ordered to Holland. He next accompa- nied Sir RALPH ABERCROMBIE 10 Egypt; commanded one of the wings at the battle of Aboukir, and was wounded in the action. His next destination was Sicily ; where his employment was to detect and foil the corrupt intrigues of the wicked Neapolitan Court. His next dealings were with the mad King of Sweden. He was then commanded, for a short period (and, as he thought, improperly), by Sir HEW DALRYMPLE and Sir HARRY BURRARD,, in Portugal. His last service was to conduct the unlucky expe- dition to Spain.

Into that campaign it is not our intention to enter. To describe

the ignorance and rashness with which it was planned—to de- velop the boastful deceptions of Spanish assemblies, and the treachery of individuals—to do justice to the follies of FRERE (if, indeed, the term should be confined to folly)—would be a melan- choly task, and require too large a space. Never, perhaps, was a general so grossly misled by those whose duty it was to have truly informed him ; never was one placed in a situation of such difficulty, without any error of his own. After the historical facts which NAPIER has given to the world, and the arguments by which he has accompanied them, no vindication of MOORE is ne- cessary. Yet even before the publication of the peninsula War, the chief charge of vacillation amounted to nothing. The seem- ing infirmity of purpose arose from his chivalrous sense of duty, and from his struggles between a knowledge of what was right in war and what was desirable for the character of the English army ; his changes of plan proceeded from the constant arrival of fresh in- formation, and from the daily discoveries of the inconceivable false- hoods of the Spaniards, confirmed as they had been by the British agents. If any oversight were committed, it would seem to have been the one mentioned by the Duke of WELLINGTON— th a want of timely preparation for his retreat.* All that could have been attained, however, by such preparation, would have been, occasion- ally, somewhat better quarters for the troops, and more regula- rity in their distribution. It would not have prevented the re- treat; it would scarcely have rendered speed less necessary; it would not have procured provisions or baggage-cattle which were the great desiderata, and both of which the Spaniards carried off. After all, it may be doubted whether it would have prevented any of the disorders and distresses which occurred. The supposed abuse of the lash—the "cold shade of the Aristocracy," which forbids pro- motion from the ranks—swells in war time the English army with brutal and ignorant profligates, who, restrained by fear alone, break forth into the grossest excesses the moment any reverse of fortune prevents the enforcement of the strictest discipline. Our retreats, like our storms, have generally been remarkable for their horrors. It may be observed in confirmation of this opinion, that the rear scarcely suffered so much as the other divisions of the army, though it had the same distance to pass over, and often with more rapidity, and if it fared as well, had certainly not the same choice of quarters, whilst it was constantly exposed to attack. But then, the General himself was present, and the proximity of the enemy preserved discipline.

In private life, Sir Joursi MOORE'S character was without re- proach: a dutiful son, a most affectionate brother, a kind master, a firm friend, temperate in his habits, indifferent to lucre, superior to the pomps and vanities of the world. As an officer, he was dis- tinguished for his practical knowledge, for regularity without se- verity, or even undue strictness : and be possessed the art of train- ing and disciplining men without vexation,—a consequence, in fact, of his knowledge, which enabled him to regard essentials only. In a civil capacity, he was discreet and persuasive, or rather, he swayed without persuasion, by the weight and influence of his manners and character. As a general, he was considerate, careful, and coura- geous. Prudence and forethought were indeed such distinguish- ing characteristics of his mind, that we should 'conceive any one acquainted with him would d priori decide, that the failure of a plan intrusted to him must be traced to any other source than his errors. To attain brilliant success—to accomplish striking and wonderful achievements—he was probably not so well qualified ; for his genius seems not to have been of the most daring and cotn- prehensive order. But his qualities were so equally balanced—he was so free from the vices which degrade or the weaknesses which throw a ridicule over greatness—the humbler and milder virtues were so rife and so prominent—that they may perhaps by their magnitude have the effect of diminishing the more shining qua- lities; and he may seem to be less great than some other heroes, merely because he was much more amiable.

The literary merits of this Life are very slight : sometimes, es- pecially in the reflections and digressions, the composition is pure twaddling. The most interesting, the most characteristic, and in every way the most pleasing passages, are the letters of the war- rior himself. Some of these are scattered up and down the work ; a good many are inserted in the appendix. As all his epistles were religiously preserved by his family, and as he kept a regular jour- nal of his transactions, it would have been better to have made him the hero of his own tale ; connecting his autobiography by such narratives as were necessary to preserve the continuity, or enrich- ing it by such anecdotes as would illustrate the man. On one point, however, too much approbation cannot be expressed—the spirit of fairness and impartiality which pervades the work.

The volumes are not well adapted for extracts; but We will pick out a few passages from the General's letters. Here is one, which he wrote to his father from St. Lucia, soon after the capture, to which he has previously been alluding.

"My usual good fortune attended me; I escaped; and though now the sick- ness at this place is perfectly alarming, I have not once had a headache. Many of the Blacks, previous to the surrender, escaped with their arms into the wood's and interior of this island. For some time they remained quiet; but since, encouraged by White people attached to the Republic, and who were very impro- perly allowed to remain in the island, they began burning houses and villages, murdering people of all ages and both sexes: so that it became highly necessary., not only from humanity, but for the safety of our posts and the colony, to march against them. They were joined by numbers of Blacks from the plantations; all of that colour are attached to them. I have not only these Brigands to subdue, but the coast to guard from succours which may be thrown in, in small boats, from Guadeloupe; and I have unfortunately very few officers upon whom I can depend. The regiments are ill-commanded, the composition of the inferior officers bad. Under these circumstances, I saw the necessity of my presence in • After quoting the favourable opinions of Soma- and NAPOLEON. NAPIER presents us with that of the Great Captain. " In Sir JOHN MOORE'S campaign," said the Duke of WELLI ROTOR, I Call see but one error: when he advanced to Saliagun, he should have considered it as a movement in retreat, and sent officers to the rear, to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade. But this opinion I have formed after long experience of wat, and especially of the peculiarities of Spanish war, which must have been seen to be understood : finally, it is an opinion funned after the event." every quarter. These last six weeks have been employed in eternal movement round the island ; visiting the different posts, and attacking the Brigand's, wherever I could get intelligence of their being assembled. The difficulty of this country is prodigious—mountains, deep and rugged ravines, and woods. These are extremely favourable to such an enemy. The country, particularly the interior, abounds in ground provisions ; upon which the Negroes, who are ex- tremely temperate, live, and are satisfied. It was my wish to have governed the colony with mildness; but I have been forced to adopt the most violent measures from the perverseness and bad composition of those I have to deal with After being out six weeks, I returned here a few days ago. In that time I have undergone more fatigue and inconvenience than most officers suffer in as many

campaigns; yet it agrees with me, for I never was better. • * *

" What I have to fear is the succours front Guadeloupe, of arms, ammunition, and a few officers. If I were obliged to withdraw the troops front the country and outpost, I should be instantly besieged in a had post, where troops are beyond conception unhealthy. By keeping them out, I not only protect the inhabitants, but preserve the soldiers. The inconveniences I have to combat are great. The representations I made to Sir Ralph, before his departure, inade him angry ; and I was so provoked, I requested to be relieved from the command. this answer was not very gracious; but before his departure, perhaps lie repented, for he wrote to me a very kind letter. I am now become used to difficulties. If I extricate myself from this comitiand with credit, I shall

be easy the rest of my life. If I am besieged, do not fear the event. It will rather be a relief to me ; every thing will then be concentred, and I do riot think they can take me. But this is a horrid war, which, together with, the

had manner every thing is conducted, the degeneracy of the troops, &c., makes me think that the sooner it is over the better. • • " The army we had last campaign is, or will be, entirely knocked up before the end of the hurricane weather. If Guadeloupe is intended to be attacked, the army must come from home. It is not the climate alone that kills the troops in this country ; it is bad management. We seem as ignorant as if we had never before made war in it. A Roman army woithl have gone through their military exercises in the West Indies and have been healthy: I differ from most people I meet with on this subject ; but I am sure I am nett. As for my-self, I rise at daylight, go to bed at nine, and am during the day in eternal action. I have- not tame to be ill ; I wish my mother and you but saw me, to be perfectly at ease on that score. If you wish for any thing, wish the hurricane months over, and that the reputation of my activity may deter Citoyen Victor Hughes from molesting St. Lucia. It may be said, how well 1 should have defended it were lie to land ; and that reputation will satisfy me. Farewell. I hope every body continues well in Clifford Street ; in their well-being ill' my happiness concentred."

The following is part of another to ABERCROMBIE, written from the same place.

" Dear General—Your letter of the 17th July made me very uneasy. I was not conscious of having deserved, and I was extremely sorry to find, I had in.. curried your displeasure. I can assure you, that my exertions to fulfil the duties- of my station were unremitting : it was my ambition to execute your orders, and to restore tranquillity to the island you haul intrusted to my care. But front the little attention which I thought was paid to my representations, the shameful ignorance and want of real in the principal officers under my com- mand, of which fresh instances provoked me daily, made me despair of success, and was perhaps the cause of that impatience which appeared in my letters,

and of which von complain. • a

0 Many of the brigands have lately had communication with that island ( Gun.- &loupe). I do what I can to guard the coast with troops; but it is too exten- sive and too rugged to be guarded effectually by other means than shipping.

Every representation has been made to the Admiral, but hitherto the Windward coast has been completely open. The brigands have been so driven, and must be so much distressed for provisions, that I am convinced, could all com- munication be intercepted for three weeks, the business would be over, and tranquillity restored to the island ; but any succours from Guadeloupe will throw every thing back, and may be attended with serious consequences, from the dispersed and sickly condition of the troops. • • "As far as my abilities go, I have, and shall continue to exert them. I have- undergone a degree of personal inconvenience and fatigue, which circumstances rendered necessary, but which few constitutions are equal to; mine has hitherto resisted, and I am perfectly well. I wish I could say as much for the officers and men under my command. These have suffered severely. The sickness is

so much greater upon Monte Fortuni and its immediate dependencies than at the other posts, that I detain upon it a number only sufficient fur the daily duties.. The troops, I observe, which have been most active, are the most healthy; a proof that the sun is not the cause of the sickness. There are local situations in these islands (1%lorne Fortune is unfortunately one of them) which are iso unhealthy, that perhaps no care or management could totally counteract. Bt in genera), the greater part of the sickness proceeds from the want of interior discipline and economy in the regiments.

"Great attention should be paid in this country to the cleanliness, and even neatness of the soldier' S person, and the regularity of his diet ; an addition to-

the eating part of the ration, instead of runt ; sea or river bathing, constant activity and movement. In short, General (excuse the pedantry of the expres- sion), but with a Roman instead of modern exercise and discipline, the troops in the West Indies might, I am convinced, be kept healthy. A parade twice a. day, onsisting of a mere inspection and exercise of arms, is easy for officers ; it leaves them what they call more time ; but it leaves the soldier also to lounge- the whole day in a barrack, where the air cannot be good ; and where, from in-• dolence, his body becomes enervated and liable to disorder. " The army you left in this country is almost entirely melted away. The offi- cers and men are dispirited ; the former thinking only of getting borne, and: framing excuses, in many instances the most shameful, to bring it about. "I fear the same fate (should the war continue) will attend whatever troops are sent out, unless serious attention is paid to get proper officers to put at the head of regiments, who will reestablish discipline, and inspire those under them with some of that zeal and ardour, which I um not too young to have seen, but which you must recollect so much better to have existed in the service. Such officers, I am sure, still exist in the British army, though they are not to be found exclusively amongst those who have most money, or most political interest. "In this country, much may be made of Black corps. I have had occasion to them of late. They possess, I think, many excellent qualities as sol- diers, and may, with proper attention, become equal to any thing ; even at pre- sent, as they are, for the West Indies they are invaluable."

The biography of MOORE, like the lives of NELSON, COLLING- WOOD, HOSTS, and almost every other public man, throws a strong light upon the incapacity, corruption, and imbecility (for any good purposes) of a Boroughmongering Government. A despotism like Russia may oppress the people ; an aristocracy like that of Venice may deprive them of' political power, and severely punish political offences: but in their internal administration or their fo- reign affairs, such governments carefully adapt their means to the desired end, husband the public treasure, require from -their tools the requisite temper for the granted pay, and fail in their undertakings (when they do fail) not from want of forethought or care. The reverse of all this was the distinguishing cha- racteristic of the English Oligarchy. So insatiable was their lust after public money, that they could bear no rival fingers; so blindly profuse, that they lavished wealth and sacrificed life provided the expenditure would only facilitate the grand game of distribution ; so ignorant or so cureless, that they could • not or would not take even mechanical means to insure success in their undertakings. Every officer, no matter what his politics, is always complaining of the power of interest—of the insuf- ficiency of merit—of the incapables which the Admiralty or the Horse Guards thrust upon him—of their continual disregard of his recommendations or demands—and of the disorderly state of the troops (for the Navy, being self-trained, was in a much better state, at least as regards discipline). Whenever Mom:a was moved, the first thing he had to do was to train the soldiers ; whenever an ex- pedition was ordered, it was generally found that some element of success was wanting. The arrangement was bad; the troops were too few, or the different branches were not in due proportions ; or conveyances, or provisions, or maps were deficient. Something, in short, was always lacking; and though skill and courage gene- rally averted failure, they were unable to improve success. So careless was the Government, or so incapable were its agents, that even information was wanting, or it was false. ABERCROMBIE went to Egypt to fight thirteen or fourteen thousand men : when he got there, he had to contend with upwards of thirty thousand. MOORE went to Spain to be joined by thousands of "patriots:" the first and only troops lie ever saw, was the disorganized band of ROMANA, which crossed his army during the retreat, and infected it with the typhus fever. And even as regarded Ireland, where no difficulties could have intervened, the information was false. After all the Tory boasts of success, the victories of our Army and Navy were obtained in despite, not in consequence of their plans; and the eventual triumph of Legitimacy was the act of Fortune, not of PITT and JENKINSON.

It is not out of' place to add, that the author of the Life, Mr. JAMES CARRICK MOORE, is the gentleman who not long since voluntarily resigned his pension. When the List comes to be examined (as it doubtless will be before long), very, very many will be found upon it who have far less claims upon the country than the brother of JOHN MOORE.