TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE COMING DEBATE ON THE ZULU WAR.
THE amended Resolution on the Zulu War, which will be debated next week in both Lords and Commons, is very skilfully drawn. It runs,—" That this House, while willing to support her Majesty's Government in all necessary measures for defending the possessions of her Majesty in South Africa, regrets that the ultimatum which was calculated to produce immediate war should have been presented to the Zulu King without authority from the responsible advisers of the Crown, and that an offensive war should have been commenced with- out imperative and pressing necessity, or adequate preparation." These words, it will be seen, while admitting the necessity of defeating Cetewayo, raise fully the issue upon which we imagine no Liberal of any shade can feel uncertain, namely, that Sir Bartle Frere, in declaring war without permission from the Home Government, took upon himself a responsibility which he had no right to take. It is this point which we trust, in the interests of good government and of the future of the Empire, will be pressed home; and which, we presume, the Ministry, as they intend to defend their High Commissioner, will endeavour to hide from view, amid a cloud of irrelevant argu- ments. They cannot deny that they were set aside, and will try only to find good motives for their supersession. They will, we have little doubt, make the very most they can of the danger to her Majesty's colonies involved in the very existence of a force like the Zulu army, organised just beyond our territory, and at the devotion of a chief certainly not less capricious, or bloodthirsty, or hostile to white influence than other chieftains of his stamp ; and upon this point they must have some success. Sir Bartle Frere, it is true, seems recently to have been learning Telegraphese, and writes egregious nonsense about Cetewayo's army of " celibate, man-destroying gladiators," as if all soldiers in all countries, except the Madras Presidency, were not celibates, and trained to destroy men, and gladiators, so far as they fight without reasoning on the wherefore of the fighting ; but still it is futile to deny that Cetewayo was dangerous. He settled that dispute by destroying her Majesty's Twenty-Fourth. It is perfectly clear that he was just as able to sweep Natal as the Emperor of Germany is to sweep Switzerland, while it is not clear that he was restrained from using his power by any considerations upon which a Governor with women and children and quiet farmers to pro- tect, could fearlessly rely. It was necessary either to ask him to reduce his force, or to garrison the colony effectually and permanently, and Sir Bartle Frere, in pressing those two alternatives upon the Home Government, did not exceed his duty. But that fact did not in the least justify him in super- seding her Majesty's Government, and by declaring war, de- priving it of its right to decide as it saw fit. He was in no danger. He had received, on his own showing, a sufficient garrison for defence. His colonies had not to pay for that garrison, nor had he the smallest right to assume that the Imperial Government would withdraw its soldiers before the colony was safe. His business, Natal being secure, was to press his own policy on the Cabinet, not by a war of invasion to reduce that Cabinet to powerlessness, to force its hand, and compel it to do what it had not decided on doing. There had been no unreasonable delay. He did not intend to wait for more troops, or to ask for any elaborate preparations. All he had to do was to await orders, which must arrive in six weeks, and did arrive in about six days after he had begun the war ; and this he refused to do, assum- ing in the refusal a power which, as it seems to us, must, if it be granted to the Queen's great agents, in the end prove fatal to the Empire. He decided for himself without orders, and as it proved, against orders, that an offensive war was necessary, and declared it, leaving to his superiors, according to the practice of all States, no option whatever. That is an assumption of authority which makes of a Governor an independent power, which does not belong even to the Viceroy of India, whose position in the Empire is, in many respects, exceptional, and which cannot be conceded without the gravest risk to the future of Great Britain. The Government must go on with the war, but in condoning the conduct of its author, they vir- tually hand over the Royal prerogative to every Governor who sees, or thinks he sees, reason to believe that he knows what the Empire requires better than the Imperial Government. Half the Governors in the Empire think so now ; and Sir Bartle Freres immunity 18 for them a direct incitement in similar circumstances to go and do likewise, and enjoy the highest of luxuries to an ambitious man,—the privilege of acting in a first-class matter on his own unsubordinated judgment. We
the danger from Cetewayo, assuming it fully to exist, was no justification for Sir Bartle Frere, who had, when he. acted, no emergency to face.
But, the Ministry will say, defensive war may involve art offensive movement, and Sir Bartle Frere may have held Lord. Chelmsford's forward march to be the easiest method of de- fence. Very true ; and if Cetewayo had declared wan, there would be little to be said, except that Sir Bartle Frere was wrong. But he had not declared war, or threatened to de- clare it. That lie would declare it at some time or other was possible, or it may be even certain ; but the time might have been counted by years, and as the Zulu harvest had to be gathered in, was certain to be counted by a period sufficient for full communication with the Home Government, and the pre- paration, if not the despatch, of reserve forces. No emergency- was upon the High Commissioner, and this argument becomes a mere excuse, fatally vitiated by the evidence that an offensive movement, involving as it did excessive difficulty in preparing and guarding convoys, was the worst way possible of defending Natal. If the object was only to defend, a long, forward march through an unknown country, under every con- ceivable difficulty of transport, could not be the easiest method of defence, not to mention that it had never been sanctioned by the Government responsible for the supply of means. The excuse, indeed, is abandoned both by Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford, for both agreed after the slaughter at Isandlana on a purely defensive line of action. That is to say,. both agreed that to stand on the defensive within Natal re- quired less troops than to advance into Zululand,—was, in fact, the best and easiest method of defence. To prove Sir Bartle Frere right before Isandlana, is to prove him wrong after it. If he must advance while he had only 8,000 men at his dis- posal, the obligation to advance when he had only 7,000 was indefinitely greater ; but he did not advance.
We do not imagine that the argument mentioned in some quarters, that the destruction of Cetewayo was indispensable to the scheme of Confederation, will be employed, for apart from its immorality, it does not meet the case involved in the Resolution, which is that the Home Government should have been allowed to decide. The Home Government, at all events,. was the Government to decide on confederation, which, again,. would not have been rendered more difficult, or less difficult,. by the delay necessary to obtain final orders. There is, how- ever, another argument which is certain to be used, and which well deserves a reply. It will be said that even if Sir Bartle Frere was wrong, still his action was of that bold and decided. character which every wise Government desires in its great agents, and that to punish him merely for ill-success is to take the heart out of all Governors throughout the Empire. They will see that courage, energy, fearlessness of responsibility bring them merely discredit, and that a timid adherence to routine, a far-sighted waiting for disaster, is the only course really safe for the agents of a Parliamentary Government to. pursue. They must not meet danger full in the face, because their superiors will blame them, and the people will not understand. That is an argument of weight, and one which strongly attracts many able minds, but the answer to it seems to be irresistible. Boldness, energy, fearless- ness of responsibility, are all valuable qualities in their place,. but they are out of place when they lead to grave breaches of discipline at important crises. The officer who charges with his regiment when ordered to stand fast may be a very bold man, or a very brave one ; but he ought to be cashiered even if he suc- ceeds, and nothing but success can save him from that penalty,. which would be still more certain if he had possessed and neglected timely means of communication with his superiors.. The duty of a Governor-General, or Governor, or High Com- missioner, in an Empire like this, is not to be bold and decisive and fearless of responsibility, but to exhibit those qualities so far as they help on the general policy of the central Govern- ment. If such personages go farther, their great qualities do not help, but only embarrass the machine' and become as injurious as great deficiencies. Parliament has not to decide upon the character of Sir Bartle Frere, but upon his conduct. His biographer may hereafter defend him very ably, as misled by his own abounding virtues, but the politician cannot accept that excuse for conduct which, at the very best, was grievously in excess of duty. A Judge who sen- tenced blasphemers to death because blasphemy seemed to him rebellion, might be actuat$ by the highest motives, but he
could not remain upon the Bench. Sir Bartle Frere's duty was not to supply a policy for the Home Government, or to guide it in the right way, or to relieve it of responsibility, but to act in subordination to it, and to that end to suppress the tempta- tion offered by his own qualities, as well as the temptation offered by his own defects. The lesson to be taught to men in his position is to do their duty, not to forget their duty, because that may be a brave or even a self-sacrificing thing to do. To pardon Sir Bartle Frere pour encourager lee autres, is is not merely to cherish self-reliance and audacity, but to teach some five-and-thirty agents, scattered all over the world, and entrusted with many independent powers, that in self-reliance and audacity they will find ample compensation for absence of wisdom, patience, and subordination. That is not a healthy lesson to teach to a class quite self-conceited enough, at least in an Empire which can be held together only by the nicest adjustment of inadequate means to enormous ends, which requires beyond all Empires to have all its strength devoted to one object at one time. Imagine the five-and-thirty Governors, all bold, energetic, fearless of responsibility, at one and the same time, and then imagine the position of the Exchequer and the Ministry of War !
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