THE WAR SURVEYED : POSSIBILITIES IN THE EAST
By STRATEGICUS
THERE is in some quarters a disposition to overrate the results of the Finnish capitulation. We are still ignorant of many of the factors that led up to it ; but at worst it did not rob us of the initiative. That we never had ; and it is unreasonable to expect us to exercise it yet. The war began when Hitler felt confident that he had reached the peak of his war potential. When this is borne in mind, the course of the war can be foreseen. There must be a period of unknown extent in which the Allies are mobilising their resources with constantly increasing acceleration, until their armed force at first equals and then surpasses that of the enemy. While it remains in a condition of inferiority the initiative must rest with Germany. Impatience and repining will not affect a governing condition which derives from our unpreparedness. Even if we had had an army of the Continental order we should still be at a disadvantage until our mobilisation was complete. The initiative always rests with the law-breaker.
We are bad starters, and we have a very high flash-point. If the war had only followed the expected lines, with bomb- ing raids and all the threatened horrors, by this time we should probably have the power to seize and maintain the initiative. The public would have compelled the Govern- ment to quicken the tempo of production. But war potential is not the sole factor in initiative. It depends also upon position. The enemy lies within a girdle of neutrals and " friends," except at one point which is covered by a defen- sive in depth, developed with characteristic skill and assiduity from French ideas. It is true, as we have just seen demon- strated, that with appropriate tactics of infiltration and full co-operation of all arms, even this belt could be penetrated, at a cost ; and we shall do well to bear the fact in mind. But, short of that, no island has ever been so secure as insulated Germany. On the other hand, she has the further advantage that what keeps us out does not necessarily keep her in. The Allies regard neutrality as conferring an immunity which neither Germany nor Russia recognise. Hence, based on interior lines, with her power much more completely mobilised than ours, Germany is free to strike north, south-east or west at countries which our respect for international law closes to us. She retains the initiative.
We have a great and growing army on the Western front. We have a formidable force in the Near East. In both directions there are objectives which attract German desires. An attack in the West, against Dutch Limburg and Belgium, may yet take place ; and it would find the Allies ready. But we should, at best, meet the enemy on equal terms. An attack against Rumania would be a greater hazard for Ger- many. If she is to proceed with it, the objective will be the Rumanian oil. But it would seem an ill-judged opera- tion. If Germany secured the whole of the oil she would not have half as much as a year of active warfare would consume. The gamble may, however, be necessary, since Russia's campaign in Finland must have consumed a con- siderable proportion, if not all, of her reserve. Russian altruism is not so strongly marked that one can easily imagine her pouring her oil into German tanks before she has satisfied her own needs. The day when Germany secures from Russia supplies of oil of the order she needs may, therefore, be distant ; and hence she may be driven to snatch at the Rumanian wells. But her danger is that she will not reach the wells before they are destroyed with a completeness far surpassing that of 1916.
The Allies' interest in such a campaign is obvious. Rumania holds our guarantee ; and for the first time during the present war we are in a position to implement it. The Allied army in the Near East is not only a well-found modem force ; it includes some of the best shock troops in the world. It is, moreover, capable of reinforcement from the East and could operate in almost complete independence of the West. In conjunction with a highly efficient Rumanian army the Allies could defend the country comfortably, cut off all supplies from that quarter, and waste Germany's strength. If such are the chances, it will be asked, why should Ger- many be so ill-advised as to attack? Apart from the necessity to secure supplies, the spur to action might come from over- confidence. An attack from Poland, down the main railway line from Lwow, must seem attractive to the German com- mand, since it would follow the river valleys instead of being forced to cross them. Moreover, there can be little doubt that the operation would not be carried out by Germany alone. Russia, who has never forgotten Bessarabia, would probably be invited to recover the province ; perhaps she would insist on so doing. Few alliances have seen so little confidence between the allies.
But if Germany were to launch such an attack, hardly anything could make up for her wastage, except a victory secured as quickly as that over Poland. Her railways are in a parlous state, and though great efforts are now being made to restore them to a reasonably useful condition, it is common experience that when once a railway system has begun to show signs of strain no perfunctory repair will put it right again. If the campaign, therefore, were to last even a few months the wear-and-tear would more than counter- balance the value of the oil and cereals even if the wells were intact and the harvest available. The tendency would be to pour more and more troops and munitions into Rumania and thereby strain the railways still more and immobilise the army far from the Western front.
There would, however, be a greater prize within our reach. If Russia joined Germany, she would clearly do so in the hope of recovering Bessarabia at the lowest possible cost ; and if Germany could make a rapid advance down the Sereth and the Pruth, Russia would have something like a promenade. But if the advance were checked, the crossing of the Dneister would consume all Russia's available resources. Such a view of the campaign assumes, of course, that both Bulgaria and Hungary would remain neutral ; and it also ignores Turkey's reaction to an invasion of Rumania. It seems probable that, if Turkey did not go to Rumania's assistance, she would at least prevail on that country's other neighbours to remain neutral.
Russia would help Germany little, directly. Germany's hope would be that, by involving her in military operations, she would secure her complete co-operation. But once Russia became a belligerent the Black Sea ends of the pipe- line from Baku would be legitimate objects of attack ; and if Germany could be cut off from both the Russian and Rumanian oil supplies she would not have sufficient even for her peace-time consumption. In this war of fats and oil that glittering prize would be within our grasp if Germany and Russia attacked Rumania No very elaborate operations against Russia would be needed to injure her vitally, and with her Germany. Will Russia enter a campaign which promises her so little and risks so much? Will Germany strike at such a peril of losing absolutely necessary supplies? We do not know. It seems certain that Germany's need is as great as her confidence. But if she should remain behind her defensive screen of neutrals, what then? Sooner or later, it may be that the Allies will be compelled to reconsider the case of a country which is providing the enemy with military supplies so vital that without them the blockade would be decisive.
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