THE FUTURE OF ITALY.
WHEN the King of Italy found himself unable to accept the resignation of Signor Salandra at the end of last week the intervention of Italy on the side of the Allies became almost certain. The cause of the neutralist party had flared up for a moment, but had suc- ceeded only in illuminating the strong reserves of the interventionists which were waiting in the background. The dramatic attempt of Signor Giolitti to keep Italy neutral—and, if possible, in an attitude of benevolence towards Germany—was but the affair of a few hours. Public opinion would have nothing to do with it. As we write we do not know when war will be declared, but we can say with confidence that the course of Italy is irre- vocably marked out. Her future lies where her sympathy lies, with the Powers of the Triple Entente. She knows that much more than the possession of this or that piece of territory is at stake. Honour, sentiment, affection, are greater and more abiding things than territory. The country which has to its credit one of the most glorious fights for freedom in the history of man cannot consent to the strangling of Belgium, to the tearing up of treaties which are the charter of freedom of small peoples, to being bound to the chariot wheels of a prancing military despotism. We shall not even try to describe the gladness and pride with which we have learned that the country of Garibaldi has come to this decision. Them has been no attempt here to force Italy to inter- vene. She is doing it of her own judgment because events have proved to her that she cannot do her duty to the world and to herself in any other way. She knows that the course she has chosen means sacrifices, mourning, privations ; but though the Italians have had their fill of war lately they have shouted in their streets for war. Here was not a war-lust or a popular madness ; it was the strong and fine sentiment of a people bursting forth in support of the right things, and in detestation of the wrong. Nor is the name of Italy sullied in this devotion of herself to a cause by any false- ness to the pledges she gave to her former allies. The attack of the Central Powers on Serbia did not bring the Treaty of the Triple Alliance into operation. Even if Germany had once misread the plain language of that Treaty, she had no excuse for doing so again. The Italian Government had warned her long before the present war that an attack on Serbia could not be regarded as putting Italy under an obligation to help the other members of the Triple Alliance.
Signor Giolitti. has been for more than twenty years the moat sinister figure in Italian politics. When he was Premier for the first time he squandered the national resources, provoked insurrection, and left the country to face an almost empty Treasury and a bunch of flagrant financial scandals. He sheltered himself in Germany, and returned when the storm had abated to regain his position and once more produce chaos. Diet year he again left the country, but his characteristic return has this time failed to reinstal him in power. His type is not unknown in other Latin countries—the type of man who is magnetized by the commercial grandeur of Germany, and places financial deals with her above the natural sentiments of his countrymen —but it is a type which both Italy and France have now finished with. At the moment of the crisis Signor Giolitti controlled the majority in the Chamber. He had twice previously voted confidence in the Government, but at the end of last week he thought he saw his opportunity to spring with success. No doubt a certain number of Italians argued that the concessions Austria was willing to make to keep Italy neutral would be a bird in the hand, whereas everything that war offered them would be birds in the bush. But would the Austrian concessions be a bird in the hand P The promisee might remain promises. After all, they would only be "scrape of paper," to be redeemed or not as Austria—or we should rather say Germany—thought fit. Our own belief is that the Austrian offer could not be made good, even though Austria may have proposed it with sincerity. When the settlement comes the Austrian concessions would be found to be a fairy gift that would vanish into air as the claimant stepped forward to touch it. The nature of the Austrian offer was made known by the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on Tuesday. The proposed concessions were : (1) The part of Tirol inhabited by Italians, the western bank of the Isonzo, where the popu- lation is Italian, and the town of Gradisca to be handed over to Italy ; (2) Trieste to be an Imperial free city, with an administration "of an Italian character" and an Italian University ; (3) Italy to have Valens ; (4) Austria- Hungary to declare "political disinterestedness" in Albania ; (5) the rights of Italians in Austria-Hungary to be specially respected ; (6) Austria-Hungary to grant an amnesty to political and military criminals in the ceded territories ; (7) Italy's further wishes to receive every consideration; (8) Austria-Hungary to make a "solemn declaration " concerning the concessions ; (9) mixed Com- mittees to be appointed to carry out the concessions ; (10) when the agreement is concluded Austro-Hungarian soldiers who are natives of the ceded territories shall not take further part in the war. The magnificent vagueness and empty pretentiousness of some of those promises cannot escape the eye. As though to insult the "solemn declaration" of Austria, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg stated in the Reichstag that Germany, "with the full consent of the Vienna Cabinet," had given a guarantee to Italy that the offers would be fulfilled. The Chancellor would not have made the terms of the offer public if be had not thought it advisable to justify German diplomacy, and thus sharpen the resolution of Germany against Italy. In other words, though he expressed a pious hope that Italy would remain at peace, he could not have had the least hope that she would do so.
We cannot help saying a word in admiration of Italian diplomacy. We believe that its Fabianism has concealed much wisdom. When Prince Billow was despatched on his mission to Rome the Germans hoped that he would bring off some kind of diplomatic coup. It was the part of Baron Sonnino, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to flatter these hopes. For during the negotiations time was being gained. If Italy meant to come into the war, it was essential that she should have time to prepare. When war broke out she was by no means ready ; probably she could not have sustained a winter campaign. If she should intervene in the next few days or weeks, one will be able to say that she could not have come in at a better moment. We are reminded of the phrase of the Italian diplomatist La Marmora, who, having carried out some minor negotiations with Bismarck at Berlin, was recalled to Rome. He replied to hie Government in some such words as these: "If you think fit to allow me to remain a few weeks longer, you may see the serpent bite the conjurer." No doubt Bismarck was just as confident as a conjurer in playing with a fangleas serpent, but the Italian diplomatist was alert and watchful, and had more in his head than the conjurer dreamed of. Very much the same relation has existed, we suspect, between conjurer Prince Billow and the Italian Foreign Office. The Germans have been congratulating themselves in keeping Italy out of the war so long. Italy, for the reason we have men- tioned, was quite ready to seem to be kept out against her will.
Those who undervalue the Italian Army make a great mistake. It should be remembered that the difference in quality between the German and Austrian Armies and the Italian Army is not the same now as it was at the begin- ning of the war. Italy cannot be met now by first-line troops. And even if it were not so, the menace on the Austrian flank would not be a thing to be disregarded by the German and Austrian General Staffs. If Italy has, say, a million men at her disposal she will be able to put half a million into the fighting line, and at the very least these will neutralize an equal number of Austrians. The strategic possibilities of the inter- vention of Italy, attractive though they are, must not be discussed. But the broad fact is more than ever plain that Germany and Austria are now besieged countries. The circle round them, except for the email stripe of the Netherlands and Denmark (and even these are almost sea frontiers), will be complete. The political possibilities are as considerable as the strategic. Every Balkan State has been waiting for the word of Italy ; and the word of Italy is once more for freedom—for the banner that "streams like the thunderstorm against the wind."
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