Political Commentary

More level than others

John Grigg

All our leading politicians will have their intelligence and adroitness severely tested during the coming months, and this may be particularly true of Mr Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary for Energy. But he is likely to survive the test, because he is one of the most intelligent and adroit of them all.

In the demonology of Right and Centre Mr Benn has the status almost of a wouldbe Castro or Chairman Mao. But the reality is very different. He is far from being a dedicated, inflexible left-winger. One characteristic of the true left-winger is a certain taste for tife in the wilderness; another is indifference to what the majority of people actually wants. Neither characteristic is to be found in Mr Benn. He is a born insider, and he is also very responsive to popular moods, more especially to the movement of opinion among trade unionists.

It would be fair to describe him as a traditional British politician of the Left-Centre with a strong, but honourable, ambition to be Prime Minister. Labour leaders on their way to the top have before now been identified, temporarily, with the party's left wing. Mr Semi's supposed place in the Labour spectrum was formerly occupied by that well-known revolutionary, Sir Harold Wilson, KG.

In his first incarnation as a Minister Mr Benn was very much the eager technocrat, reflecting Sir Harold's view that socialism could be redefined as applied science, and that a Labour government could act as honest broker between the laboratory and the boardroom.

But when Labour went into opposition in 1970, after trying in vain to reform the trade unions, he soon emerged as a champion of worker power and as an eloquent advocate of participation, in industry no less than in politics. When the miners set out to destroy the Heath government towards the end of 1973, he exploited the conflict with great skill.

Earlier, when Mr Heath was pushing his Common Market legislation through Parliament, Mr Benn forced his referendum idea upon the Shadow Cabinet. This was a major coup, both for himself and, as it turned out, for his party. During Labour's attempt to get into the Common Market he had favoured the policy of entry, and as late as 1974 he was still privately reminding any one who assumed him to be anti-EEC that he had never, in fact, made an anti-EEC speech, but merely wanted the people to be free to decide.

It was only at the New Year of 1975 that he committed himself to opposing British membership (in an encyclical to his constituents). But it was the measure of his talents as debater and popular orator that he was soon accepted as de facto leader of the antiEuropeans. Veteran Market-bashers such as Mr Michael Foot and Mr Peter Shore were — doubtless to their considerable annoyance — upstaged.

Yet he was careful to state that he would bow to the people's verdict, whatever it might be. Not for him the reckless idealism of Ms Shirley Williams, who said that she would go right out of politics if Britain voted itself out of Europe. The referendum campaign gave him immense publicity and enabled him to keep in line with most of the trade unions, while proving to his critics that he was a good democrat who would abide by majority decisions.

Recently, the Government's economic policies have made his position increasingly ambiguous. While ostensibly like-minded Ministers have been losing or resigning their jobs, he has stayed on in the Cabinet fighting the Left's battles, as it were, to the last Heifer. On several key issues he has managed to advertise his dissent, but without carrying it to the point of resignation.

Like Sir Harold Wilson before him, Mr Callaghan has no desire to drive Mr Benn out, knowing too well what a nuisance he could be on the back benches, and also knowing very well that he is not what so many people believe him to be. At last week's meeting of the National Executive there was unmistakable evidence of collusion between him and the Prime Minister, with the result that Mr Callaghan was able to reassure the world about future Labour policy without provoking the sort of row that would have stultified his efforts.

Will Mr Benn ever lead a left-wing crusade against deflation and the mixed economy? Will he try to be Disraeli to Mr Callaghan's Peel ?

The odds are very much against it. Disraeli in 1846 was nearly ten years younger than Mr Benn is now. He was also a disappointed office-seeker, whereas Mr Benn is a Cabinet Minister. Disraeli had nothing to lose by attacking the leadership of his party, but Mr Benn would have everything to lose, because he is already one of the leaders.

Besides, there is very little chance of Mr Callaghan putting himself in the position of Peel—or of Ramsay MacDonald. He will not carry out a policy which most of his sup porters reject. If the national interest requires things to be done which he cannot do without alienating the big battalions of his party, he will surely either resign or go to the country.

Only if the Labour movement were to split into two powerful factions, with big

trade unions on either side and the prospect that each would become a broadly-based, responsible party of government, would it be anything but folly for Mr Benn to cut adrift. The country might then in due course be governed alternately by two social democratic parties, one of which he would lead. But that is an improbable contingency. The only split that seems at all likely is one in which Mr Callaghan would separate the bulk of the party, including most trade unions, from a revolutionary Marxist fringe whose insignificance would "then swiftly he demonstrated. In such a split Mr Benn could be expected to remain with Mr Callaghan, though it is important from his point of view that the Prime Minister should never beguile sure that he would do so.

The moral of the Bevanite schism which helped to keep Labour out of office for thirteen years—is that a Labour Prime Minister should be careful not to antagonise a talented crypto-moderate in his Cabinet, and that the crypto-moderate should he careful not to resign unless he can be sure of substantial trade union support. Mr Callaghan seems to have digested the moral. He has not promoted Mr Benn t° one of the top offices—that would be prema: ture—but he has given him full responsiblr ity for negotiating with the oil companies' which before was invidiously withheld from him. (And the Financial Times's energy or' respondent, reporting the change, noted that the oil industry had found Mr Benn 'less of a thorn in the flesh than they might have al' ginally feared'.)

Mr Benn, for his part, has so far show

no inclination to resign on any of the leftwing issues that have arisen, and so long as the unions, under stress of circumstances, continue to recoil from ideological militall; cy, there will be no temptation for him t" play the red card. But he will naturally try t° maintain his reputation on the Left, and l%11.r Callaghan can afford to give him some law' tude in the way of empty gestures and artfn rhetoric.

Refusal to pay an official visit to Bra-,,, would not be an empty gesture. Apparent'', he has yet to decide whether or not to acceP:i the Brazilian Government's invitation, aa.5 the Prime Minister should insist upon acceptance of it. As Secretary for Energy 11, has a job to do and he must do it. what' the political cost to himself.

But the Levellers' memorial service at i Ll Ll

Burford was a perfect occasion for art f ,5 rhetoric, and one passage from Mr Bentlei, sermon deserves special notice: The Lev a lers were ... bridge-builders, constructing.0 bridge that connects Christian teaching wise humanism and democratic socialism. Ill°10 Who crossed that bridge did not blow it hi behind them as converts to atheismfrigny, have done. That bridge is still there far one who wishes to cross in either direchor.

(My italics.) , ,aart

'Atheism' is clearly a code word for P...00 ism, and the whole passage implies that 1_5, democracy change should not be irrevo ible. 'Atheism' is clearly a code word for P...00 ism, and the whole passage implies that 1_5, democracy change should not be irrevo ible.