INTERNAL DEFENCE OF ENGLAND.

TO THE EDITOR OF ME SPECTATOR.

Sin—I have read with much pleasure the article on "National Defence" in your publication of the 15th instant. It relates to a subject which has often occupied my thoughts, and which, as it appears to me, merits the attention of every re._ tive man.

Protection is, perhaps, the first duty which government owes to its subjects-- the first advantage which the members of a society, organized in the shape of a nation, have a right to expect as a repayment for the sacrifices they are compelled to make for the common good. Without protection of person andproperty against external aggression or internal riot, most social blessings must be destroyed, or become precarious. Thus far we should probably agree; and I am fully of your opinion in thinking, that in consequence of the introduction of steam, " the Channel has become merely a great river, and that it can no longer rest for defence on a moveable force going up and down: its bank must be fortified." But you seem to think that to fortify our coasts is not enough—that we require men to occupy the fortifications, and moreover a force sufficient to defeat an enemy should be succeed in penetrating through them. Here, too, I agree with you. But at this point a divergence in our views commences; and I will proceed to point out in what the divergence consists; and baying done so, will state succinctly, so as not to occupy an unreasonable portion of your pages, my own opinion on the question between us. You appear to think that our danger would be removed, or at least most ma- terially mitigated, were our whole population practised in athletic sports and the use of arms. I do not deny that some advantage would arise in case of war from a state of things analagous to that which existed, when among the city appren- tices, the peasants, and yeomen, a large proportion was to be found equally skilled in the use of the national weapon with those who conquered at Crecy, Poitiers,

and Agincourt. Other advantages would arise if the present age could borrow from the past somewhat of its independent and out-door character; upon which I

forbear to enlarge, as being beside my present object. At any rate, I think that, under actual circumstances, little could be gained with a view to defence against foreign aggression, or internal revolt, from any change in the habits of our population.

My opinion upon the matter in dispute shortly stated is this—

That regular troops, under ordinary circumstances, can be successfully opposed only by regular troops possessing something like an equality in numbers. All recent history, and ancient history too, well understood, supports the above maxim. It would be tedious to multiply instances in proof of it. It may suffice to point out the example which France exhibited in 1792, 1793, 1794, 1814, and

1815. The French are the most military people in Europe. From the breaking out of the Revolutionary war, they possessed an immense National Guard, as well or-

ganized as such a force can be: yet during this long course of hostilities no in- stance can be found in which the National Guards defeated a hostile army, or defended a town, or opposed an efficient resistance to an invading enemy. Yet this enemy was, generally speaking, ill commanded, feeble, and unenergetsc in its enterprises.

But even supposing that, under favourable circumstances, a levy en masse or National Guard may form an efficient instrument of national defence, I sin prepared to maintain, that, in the whole of Europe, no country can be effinted oat where a popular resistance would be less efficacious than in the case of England. England labours under several special disadvantages with respect to the object in view. I will only enumerate a few— First, The small extent of her territory.

Second, The want of forests, mountains, or large rivers. Third, The absence of walled towns. Fourth, The extreme productiveness of the territory; which would thus furnish to an enemy the means of support, and to the inhabitants a motive for submission. Fifth, The excellence of the roads and other means of communication. From what precedes you will readily perceive, that in my view the chief danger to England, so far as respects the national defence, arises from the trifling amount of the regular army. This army, in the Three Kingdoms, including the Marines, does not exceed fifty thousand men, and and is not supported by any reserve except-. tag a few pensioners; the Militia being merely a name.

Supposing an outbreak in Ireland—an event highly probable,. if not sooner or later certain—the twenty thousand men stationed on the other side of St George's Channel could do little more than furnish .garrisons for a few of the great towns, so as to obviate fears for the effect of a rising of the Catholic populace. Supposing such an outbreak,. supported by ten thousand French troops, em- barked at Brest or St. Malo, and landed in twenty-four hours from a dozen steam- boats.

Suppose, again, two or three expeditions of a similar amount thrown simulta- neously or successively on different points of the English coast: bow or where could they be resisted, with the existing force of our army? They would doubt- less be overpowered at last: but what would be the alarm, the loss of property, the interruption to all peaceful occupation, which this nation would previously be called upon to undergo!

But I must hasten to a conclusion; being prepared to explain and enforce what has preceded hereafter, should it appear necessary so to do. Taking all things into account, it seems to me that the amount of the regular army stationed within the British Islands ought not, with any regard to the na- tional safety, to fall short of one hundred thousand men; and this force should be supported by a trained reserve equally numerous, and so organized that a few days might range it in battle array against an invading foe.

The increase of the regular army should consist mainly in Infantry and .Artil- lery; with a view to the superior utility of both in an enclosed country, and for purposes of defence; and also because an Artillery soldier requires a proportion- ably longer period of training before be becomes efficient While England, of all the countries of Europe, is perhaps the least fitted for a popular resistance , it possesses peculiar advantages in the maintenance of a re- gular army, from the warlike character of its inhabitants, who, when properly disciplined, never yet met a foe who would stand before them, and from its vast financial resources.

Perhaps some of your readers may consider me over-confident when I say that I should be satisfied with one hundred thousand men in time of peace, consider- ing that France has three hundred and fifty thousand, besides an immense re- serve. In fixing this amount, I have reference to the Channel ditch, to our in- vincible marine, and to the diversion of force in Algiers, and perhaps in Morocco and Madagascar. The only argument which I can anticipate as likely to be brought against me, is the greatly increased taxation which my proposal would necessitate. -That this is an objection I allow—that it is a valid one I respectfully deny: England is not so poor, in purse or spirit, that an additional expenditure of (say) three millions per annum could not be readily afforded, when the national honour—perhaps, indeed, the security of all we hold dear as men and citizens—demands the sacrifice. If you should honour me by giving place in your columns to this communicatiett, I may venture to trouble you again on the same important subject. lain, Sir, your moat ob.thent servant, Z.