BOOKS.
KAYE'S HISTORY OF TETE WAR IN AFGICANDSTAN.* IT was remarked by Voltaire, that the advantage of the ancient over the modern historians consisted in this—the ancients confined themselves to the most important oircumstances the moderns wrote history in the style of a gazette. The accumulation of what is called " materials," mechanical facilities, and the fashion of the age, have tended further to deteriorate historical oomposition since the time of Voltaire. There is now a tendency to turn history into a " blue book."
This is what Mr. Kaye rather does in the volumes before us. He interrupts the broad march of events by episodes or subordinate incidents • he crowds the canvass with portraits of unknown or inferior persons, on the same size and scale as the principal actors ; he overlays the greater actions with minute circumstances, and tells trifles in the same way ; and he too frequently substitutes discussion for narrative. The historian should only deal with con- clusions; in his text his word must be taken; if he wants to prove or argue, it must be done in a separate form. Mr. Kayo's entire work is a constant violation of this rule. If he affirms any- thing, he supports it by several copious extracts from documents which it is the historian's business to read but hardly the reader's. In pronouncing his opinion, he does not judge but argues, and that in an exuberant manner. The book is a gigantic pamphlet or ar- ticle, in its style as well as its treatment. The style, however, is vivacious, and often pointed; but often it is point and vivacity out of place.
The cause of the non-historical manner and treatment is to be found in the genius and literary habits of the author. The over- crowding of his pages with extracts originates in his literary for- tune. Ile has been allowed the use of a vast mass of unpublished documents, some apparently official, others evidently private. He quotes from the private letters of Lord Auekland, Sir William Macnaghten, Sir Alexander Burnes, and numerous other less dis- tinguished men. He has had before him the journals or memo- randums of General Elphinstone, Brigadier Skelton, and other offi- cers engaged in the disasters of Caubul, as well asilocuments of a more public and official character ; garbled extracts of which, and often, shame to say, falsified versions, have appeared in the blue books. The documents, indeed, do not lead to absolutely new conclusions on the subject of the war. The Duke of Wellington and other public men best acquainted with the East censured the policy as soon as it was announced, and predicted an unfortunate conclusion; the false pretexts on which it was based—the utter want of public honesty, or rather the downright wickedness of the measure—were palpable on the face of it and our older readers may remember, that both before Shah Soojah had reached Caubul, and again in the very moment of success, the Spectator denounced the whole project, and predicted the evils which event- ually happened. A fuller and a more inward light is thrown upon the subject by Mr. Kaye's original matter. The plain, unaffected, and amiable pricate character of many of the men engaged, is well brought out in these letters, and some of them possess a biogra- phical value. The public phase is of a graver and sadder cast. The absence of all idea of justice, right, or human feeling, in Lord Auckland's confidential and irresponsible advisers—the man- ner in which they regarded life and possession but as 'counters with which to play a game—are distinctly exhibited. The new documents, moreover, show their ignorance of the game they had undertaken, and the wild dreams they indulged in; for some of them projected the occupation of Herat, and a great movement, a sort of propaganda in Central Asia, extending to Bokhara and lihiva. The impulsive character of Macnaghten—without per- ception of facts, without foresight, the slave of every incident and even of every rep xt—with the " satis loquenthe sapientite parum " of all the men, is plainly legible. But two volumesof thirteen hundred pages are too much for the heightening of opinions al- ready established, especially in a manner contrary -to the nature of the ostensible book. A skilful selection from the unpublished and inedited, or rather officially edited manuscripts, with appropriate introductions and notes, would have formed a. useful book for the Anglo-Indian politician and the student of Eastern history : but Studies on the Afghan War" might not have "paid." If the temptation of his materials was too strong for his judgment, Mr. Kaye should have avoided encumbering his main subjett, the secret political history of the war, with extraneous nr incidental, and to the public at large uninteresting matters. He gives a long account of our Persian diplomacy throughout the century, onkel' the political state of the region beyond the Indus; a long story about the siege of Herat by the rersians, with the doings and cha- racters of its rulers; detailed descriptions of small affairs, and a fall narrative of the military history, very well composed, and interesting from its nature, but of which the public was already informed by the newspapers of the day and the various military memoirs published afterwards.
Mr. Kaye is of the school of Macaulay; and though he wants Maaoulay's finished brilliancy and tone, he exhibits a good deal, of vigour and sustained power. Although the essential property of the hook—the quality in which it differs from other books on the Afghan war—is argument and exposition of causes ' • and although Mr. Kaye was not present at any part of it, his description of History of the War in Afghanistan. Flom the Thipnblished Letters and Stair- nala of Political sad Military Officers employed in Afghanistan throughout tit e en- tire period of British Connexion with that Country. By John.WWiam 1,Layet ilk* volumes. Publbiked by Begtley..
what he has not seen is quite as good as what is more peculiarly the function of the intellect—the arrangement of written materials, and the impression of the conclusions to be drawn from them. An officer of artillery in the Indian Army, he has more sympathy with action than with desk-work, and looks upon courage, capacity, and exertion, with respect, not only in an enemy, but when accom- panied by vices which in a less bold spirit would excite his con- tempt or indignation. Boat Mahomed is his hero, and he paints him con amore on all occasions. This is a picture of the chieftain at two eventful stages—his last attempt to defend his capital, and his surrender when Fortune had played him false in all directions.
"All hope of negotiation was now at an end ; and Bost Mahomed, with resolution worthy of a better fate, marched out to dispute the progress of the invaders. At the head of an army in which the seeds of dissolution had already been sown, he moved down upon Urghundeh. There he drew up his troops and parked his guns. But it was not on this ground that he had determined to give the Feringhees battle. The last stand was to have been made at Idaidan, on the Caulaul river—a spot the natural advantages of which would have been greatly in his favour. But the battle was never fought. At Urghundeh it became too manifest that there was treachery in his camp. The venal Kuzzilbashes were fast deserting his standard. There was scarcely a true man left in his ranks. Hadjee Khan, Khaukur, on whom he had placed great reliance, had gone over to the enemy, and others were fast following his example. This was the crisis of his fate. He looked around him, and saw only perfidy on the right hand and on the left. Equal , to the occasion, but basely deserted, what could the Amer do ? Never had the nobility of his nature shone forth more truly and more lustrously. In the hour of adversity, when all were false, he was true to his own manhood. Into the midst of his own perfidious troops he rode, with the Koran in his hand, and there called upon his followers, in the names of God and the Prophet not to forget that they were true Mahomedans—not to disgrace their names and to dishonour their religion, by rushing into the arms of one who had filled the country with infidels and blasphemers. He besought them to make one stand, like brave men and true believers ; to rally round the standard of the commander of the faithful ; to beat back the invading Fe- ringhees or die in the glorious attempt. He then reminded them of his own claims on their fidelity. You have eaten my salt, he said, these thirteen years. If, as is too plain, you are resolved to seek a new master, grant me kit one favour in requital for that long period of maintenance and kindness —enable mato die with honour. Stand by the brother of Futteh Khan, whilst he executes one last charge against the cavalry of these Feringhee dogs ; in that onset he will fall ; then go and make your own terms with Shah Soojah.' The noble spirit-stirring appeal was vainly uttered ; few responded to it. There was scarcely a true heart left. With despairing eyes he looked around upon his recreant followers. He saw that there was no hope of winning them back to their old allegiance ; he felt that he was surrounded by traitors and cowards, who were willing to abandon him to his fate. It was idle to struggle against his destiny. The first bitter pang was over ; he reassumed his serenity of demeanour, and, addressing himself to the Kuzzilbashes, for- mally gave them their discharge. Ile then dismissed all who were inclined to purchase safety by tendering allegiance to the Shah; and with a small handful of followers, leaving his guns still in position, turned his horse's Lead towards the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh."
Dust Mahomed may be said to have triumphed at the affair of Purwandurrah ; but he knew the success was but an expiring flash, and he determined to surrender.
" Ile quitted the field in no mood of exultation ; with no bright visions of the future before him. He had won the last throw, but the final issue had ceased to be a matter of speculation. The hour in which, with dignity and grace, he might throw himself upon the protection of his enemies, now seemed to have arrived. He had met the British troops in the field, and, at the head of a little band of horsemen, had driven back the cavalry of the Feringhees. His last charge had been a noble one; he might now retire from the contest without a blot upon his name. "So thought the Ameer; as was his wont, taking counsel of his saddle. None knew in the British camp the direction he had taken ; none guessed the character of his thoughts. On the day after the victory of Purwandur- rah he was under the walls of Caubul. He had been four-and-twenty hours in the saddle ; but betrayed little symptoms of fatigue. A single horseman attended him. As they approached the residence of the British Envoy, they saw an English gentleman returning from his evening ride. The attendant galloped forward to satisfy-himself of the identity of the rider, and being as- sured that the Envoy was before him, said that the Amer was at hand. .‘ What Ameer?' asked Macnip-hten. Host Mahomed Khan,' was the an- swer; and presently the Ameer himself stood before him. Throwing him- self from his horse, Host Mahomed saluted the Envoy, and said he was come to claim his protection. Ile surrendered his sword to the British chief; but Maenag,hten, returning it to him, desired the Ameer to remount. They then rode together into the Mission compound ; Bost Mahorned asking many eager questions about his family as they went. A tent having been pitched for hisnecommodation, he wrote letters to his sons, exhorting theni to fol- low his example and seek the protection of the British Government. "He seemed to have become reconciled to his fate. He had no wish, he said, to escape. Force, indeed, would not drive him to abandon the refuge he had voluntarily sought. With Macnag,hten he conversed freely of his past history, and raised, by the recital alike of his doings and his suihrings, the strongest feelings of admiration and compassion iu the Envoy's breast. Every effort was made to soothe the Ameer' s feelings; and he soon became serene and cheerful. A report that it was the design of our Government to banish him to London, disturbed his equanimity for a time; but he was soon reassured by the promises of the Envoy, and began to look forward with hopefulness to a life of repose and security in the British dominions. " Aprisoner, but an honoured one, in the British camp, Dost Maliomed remained some ten days at Caubul ; during which time all the leading officers of the garrison paid him the most marked attention. Men who kept aloof from Shah Soojali, as one to be religiously avoided, were eager to present themselves before the unfortunate Amur, and to show that they respected him in his fallen fortunes. He received his visitors with courtesy, and con- versed a ith them with freedom. Seated on the ground, he desired them to be seated ; and seemed to take pleasure in the society of the brave men who did him honour."
A feature which distinguishes Mr. Kaye's work from its pre- decessors, is scene and portrait painting. The writers who have treated of the Afghan war hitherto have rarely been authors by profession. They confined themselves to that which fell under their observation, and were indebted to the interest of their plain narratives for the interest which was inherent in their subjects. This, indeed, was quite sufficient in the advance upon Candahar, 'through the terrible {leserts.and mountain-passes between that city Ind theinans,iii the pliant capture of Ghuenee and the trannip
at Caubul, and above all, in the sickening niiiconduct which led to the withdrawal and destruction of the army in its convulsive struggles to reach Jellalabad. Mr. Kaye looks upon his subject with the eye of a craftsman. He sees there was a scene of barbaric splendour when Runjeet Singh and Lord Auckland met, a de- lusive show of popularity when Shah Soojah made his triumpha entry into Candahar, and a portent of what was to follow in the sullen indifference of his reception at Caubul ; and he elaborates these and similar things into pictures. He known C.Eet. all men of any mark have a character, as many men have a at: engly-marked physiognomy, and that if there is not a preexisting interest as re- gards the men, a painter may perhaps inspire some interest in his work ; and he produces a whole gallery of portraits or " characters," sometimes of barbarian chieftains beyond the Indus, sometimes of Indians or Anglo-Indians in public service. The war was not the work of the Council at Calcutta ; in fact it was proclaimed without their knowledge. This circumstance is the apparent inducement, as it is the best reason, for. Mr. Kaye introducing the domestic es- tablishment, the irresponsible advisers of Lord Auckland, and the real authors of the war, who held at the time no distinguished public office, and whose names, however familiar to the gossips of Anglo-Indian society, are unknown to the English public, except Macnaghten, whose celebrity was afterwards achieved. The most striking feature in Mr. Kaye's book is the manner in which he points the fate which seemed to dog the whole of the unjust proceedings, and finally overwhelmed their authors. This lesson, indeed, is contained in the very story itself; but Mr. Kayo misses no fair opportunity of impressing it. Never was groundless and unprovoked injustice accompanied by such harassing successes and overtaken by such prompt destruction. " For the kimg,'s offence the people died" is an old story ; but in this ease, punish- ment, even if inadequate, overtook the responsible author. 'This is Mr. Kaye's description of the Oovernor, probably from authen- tic private information, when the news of the insurrection first reached Calcutta.
"The blow fell heavily upon Lord Auckland. Anamiable gentleman and and a well-intentioned statesman, he had made for himself many friends; perhaps there was not in all Calcutta at that time, even amongst the most strenuous opponents of the policy which had resulted in so much misery and disgrace, one who did not now grieve for the sufferings of him whose errors had been so severely visited. Had it fallen at any other time, it would not have been so acutely felt. But it came upon him at the close of his reign, when he could do nothing to restore the brilliancy of his tar- nished reputation. He had expected to embark for England a happy man and a successful ruler. Ile had, as he thonght, conquered and tranquillized Afghanistan. For the former exploit he had been created an earl ; and the latter would have entitled him to the honour. It is true that he had drained the treasury of India ; but he believed that he was about to hand over no embryo war to his successor, and that, therefore, the treasury would man replenish itself. The prospect was sufficiently cheering, and le was eager to depart : but the old year wore to a close, and found Lord Auckland pacing, with a troubled countenance, the spacious apartments of Government House —found him the most luckless of rulers and the most miserable of men.
"Never was statesman so cast down—never was statesman so perplexed and bewildered. The month of December was one of painful anxiety—of boding fear—of embarrassing uncertainty. There WSJ RD official informa- tion from Caubul. The private accounts received from Jellalabad and Peshawur, always brief, often vague and conflicting, excited the worst appre- hensions without dispelling much of the public ignorance. In this con- juncture. Government were helpless. The Caubul force, cut off from all sup- port, could by no possibility be rescued. The utmost vigour and determina- tion—the highest wisdom and sagacity—could avail nothing at such a time. The scales had fallen from the eyes of the Governor-General, only to show him the utter hopelessness of the case. In this terrible emergency, he ammo to have perceived, for the first time, the madness of posting a detached foroeiin a foreign country, hundreds of miles from our own frontier, cut off from all support by rugged mountains and impenetrable defiles. Before a singlebri- gade could be pushed on to the relief of the beleaguered force, the whole army might be annihilated. Clearly Lord Auckland now beheld the inhe- rent viciousness of the original policy of the war, and, in sorrow and humi- liation, began to bethink himself of the propriety of abandoning it."
' As time brought with it disaster upon disaster, though the fatal end was not yet reached, Lord Auckland is described as sinking into despondency, even to the extent of yielding to the disgrace of withdrawal under defeat.
"And suoh a confession of weakness Lord Auckland was inclined to make. He seemed to reel and stagger under the blow—to be paralyzed and en- feebled by the disasters that had overtaken him. His correspondencre atthis time betokened such painful prostration, that some to whom lie wrote de- stroyed, in pity, all traces of these humiliating revelations. It was vaguely rumoured, too, how, in bitterness of spirit, be spent long hours fleeing by day the spacious verandahs of Government House, or by night cooling his fever- ed brow on the grass-plots in front of it, accompanied by some member of his household endeared to him by ties of blood: The curse brooded over him, as it was brooding-over Elphinstone and'hititnaghten darkening his vision, clouding his judgment, prostrating his energies-2turniug everything to feebleness and folly. New tidings of disaater—misfortime treading ea the heels of misfortune—came flooding in frwaPheyond the Indus ; and the chief ruler of the land, with a great army at hip,eall thought only of extrication and retreat—thought of bringing baolunstea'd of pushing , forward, our troops ; of abandoning, instead of regai ; our position. Fascinated, as it were, by the great calamity, his eyes were riveted on the little hue of coun- try between Caubul and Peshawur ; mid he did not see, in his easernem to rescue small detachments freed danger, and to escape the immediate recur- rence of new disasters in Afghanistan, that the question now to be solved was one of far greaterseope and significance—that it was not so much whether Afghanistan were to be occupied, as whether India were to be retained.'" The final end, the abandonment of Afghanistan, must have been reached under any circumstances ; but the disgrace and destruction was undoubtedly owing to the appointment of General Elphinstone by Lord Auckland, in opposition to advice ; and this, as Mr. Kaye observes, was needful to that great lesson which Nemesis was on the watch to teach. The more limited and obvious part we have probably profited by ; it will be some time before we volunteer an armed interference in the desert countries beyond the Indus. Whether the general political conclusion 'lad been reached—that
the public should not permit diplomatists and ministers to involve the nation in unjust wars with impunity—may be doubted. We fear that this larger lesson which the war contains is altogether lost—that responsible civil or military servants are not justified in voluntarily permitting their opinions to be overruled for their own purposes, and should not willingly allow themselves to be made instruments for carrying out criminal actions, of which they disapprove and of whose injustice they are convinced. Impolicy, imprudence, incapacity, were all conspicuous in the Afghan war ; but never was the proverb touching the best policy better illus- trated—common honesty would have prevented all.
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