BOOKS OF THE DAY
Russia and the Bomb
Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy. By P. M. S. Blackest. (Turnstile Press. 12s. 6d.) THIS book is in essence a defence of the Russian attitude on the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. An analysis of the military effectiveness of atomic bombs occupies the first third of the book, and is an essential part of the argument as showing that they are not an altogether different order of weapon from those in use before, and so do not demand a drastically new political treat- ment. It has, however, also considerable importance from the purely military point of view. As might be expected in any writing from Professor Blackett's pen, the argument is. put forward with great force and clarity of expression. It runs roughly as follows : The bombing of Germany and Japan in the last war had only a limited effect ; the atomic bombs are, of course, more- destructive and easier to apply than ordinary ones, but not so much as to be decisive against a huge country like Russia. Hence the American offer to share the secrets of their construction, and ultimately to destroy her own, was not so generous as it looked. In return the U.S. demanded a degree of free inspection which would seriously affect Russian security by showing where her munition factories are located and so make bombing of any kind easier.
Further, Russia, unlike the U.S., is a country which has much to gain from the use of atomic energy for power production ; an inter- national authority with the powers proposed in the Baruch (American) plan might seriously interfere with this development. There was no guarantee how the stages by which the Baruch plan was to be brought into force would be adjusted, and the later stages involving the disposal of the U.S. stock of bombs might be indefinitely postponed. Professor Blackett maintains that the Baruch plan was proposed with the object of either putting Russia in the wrong in the eyes of the world, or obtaining a military advantage. The Baruch plan insisted that the veto on the Security Council should not apply to- sanctions for offences connected with atomic energy. Professor Blacken claims that this is unrealistic, since sanctions against a great Power can only lead to war and a break up of the U.N. Organisation. There is much to be said for this view, though Professor Blackett somewhat weakens it by pointing out that, if no veto is applied, the smaller nations would be legally bound to allow their territories to be used as bases against the nation indicted'; so it seems that there is some substance to the question after all.
The author is almost certainly right in deprecating the extremer claims made for military effectiveness of atomic bombs. A few bombs will not end a war against a major Power unless that Power is already badly shaken, nor will they enable a small Power to conquer a great one, but it seems to the present writer that the author much overestimates the number of bombs needed for military significance. If the Germans had been known to possess even two or three bombs it is very doubtful if we should ever have dared to make the landing in Normandy, having regard to the dependence which the expedition was bound to have on a single small area for landing its stores. This is important from the point of view of control. If nothing less than some hundreds of bombs matters, as Professor Blackett seems to imply, precautions against their clandes- tine manufacture by an aggressive Power can be laxer than if a few units matter acutely.
In the present writer's opinion the use of the word " decisive " is responsible for much confusion of thought. What is a " decisive weapon "? Is it one by the use of which, unsupported by any other,
one country can conquer another of approximately equal size and technical efficiency ? If so, there probably never has been and
perhaps never will be such a weapon—unless indeed you count as one weapon all the forms into which the gun has developed in the course of centuries. But if you count as a decisive weapon one which will be reasonably sure to tip the scales as between two roughly equal contestants, then the atomic bomb has a strong claim to the name—better than has any other weapon known at present. Certainly those who heard the-Russians' rhetoric in favour of their own proposal for the destruction of boriths would not suppose they rated them low as weapons against themselves.
In fact, the strength of Russia in a major war lies in her abity to use her immense size to force her enemies to fight at a disadvan- tage. It is a commonplace that invaders who have tried to over- run Russia have come to a bad end. It is equally true that Russia has generally lost those wars such as the Crimean, the Russo-Japanese and the 1914 war, when her opponents„from wisdom or necessity, have made her exhaust herself by fighting at or near the periphery of her vast domains. A wise Russia will avoid distant campaigns
and try to induce her enemy to invade her. If she sits tight, she is safe—except against bombing. If the bombing is bad, she must do something, which means she must fight at a distance and at a disadvantage.
But to return to the main political argument. The essence of the whole controversy has been inspection. The need for this was explicitly stated in the original resolution of the United Nations, which set up the Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch pro- posals extended it to include management and even ownership in some cases, and the final report of the Commission follows this view. It is hard to blame the U.S. for insisting that in return for losing, not only her monopoly of the most important weapon now known, but also the virtual certainty of being able to keep well ahead in it both in quality and quantity for many years to come, she should have at least a few months' warning before it can ke used against her. The control necessary to secure even this is undoubtedly an interference with sovereignty. With the exception of Poland and the Ukraine, all the other nations whose representa- tives have discussed the matter are in agreement that this inter- ference must be accepted, and in considering that the Russian proposals are inadequate to give the necessary control.
With the Russians ,on the Atomic Energy Commission it has been a case of too little and too late. Their first proposals in 1946 con-
centrated on the destruction of bombs and made only the vaguest reference to inspection. In 1947 they put forward fresh proposals which had they appeared. in 1946, would have been greeted with joy. Inspection was conceded, but only of declared plants, nor were the inspectors to be resident—this savoured too much of manage- ment. But by then the careful study of the rest of the Commission had shown that certainly management and possibly ownership of some plants was essential for control, and with the exceptions mentioned all agreed that -inspectors free to roam the countryside were necessary to detect clandestine operations. Since the book was written, Russia has conceded that the agreement to destroy bombs should be concluded simultaneously with that for control.
Professor Blacken insists on the Russian fear of being in a permanent minority on any control body set up, and the point is real enough. It is, in fact, the root of the whole matter. Funda- mentally the U.N. Organisation rests on the assumption that most, at least, of its members are decent. If a majority of ten to two on a matter in which the only interest of the majority of the ten is that of preserving peace is not sufficient, if it is a .legitimate excuse for refusing to co-operate that you expect to be in a minority, what use is U.N.°. ? The dramatic explosion of the first atomic bombs gave the best chance that this generation has seen, or is ever likely to see, of jerking the world out of the rut of competitive armament. The attempt failed, but it is doing an ill service to humanity to ascribe unworthy motives to the states-
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