TOPICS OF THE DAY.
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THE GERMAN DANGER.
THE question which underlies all Dano- German difficulties has risen this week to the top, and the result of its emer- gence is, on the whole, pacific. The two great German Houses are, or think they are, exposed to two permanent dangers, the fear of which affects their policy much more than any possible action, or failure to act, in Denmark. The first is the realiza- tion Of the idea of unity. Germany they feel may, under certain circumstances, be seized with a passion for unity strong enough to affect the troops, and then all Governments now existing will shrivel up like the petty tyrannies of Italy, the Hohenzollerns be as powerless as the Archdukes, the Haps- burgs as the Bourbons of Naples. This danger is always present, and should Germany once be involved in a great popular war, and be at first defeated would become almost certain, the nation, unable to accept defeat, following the first leader who offered it military success. The experience of 1848, during which the monarchies went down like houses of cards, and in which one regular army fought for unity on the field, has sapped the great Princes' confidence, and their first care now is to anticipate the German revolution. The second fear is of a third German State, a confederation within the Confederation, able to hold its own in Europe, ending the Austrian and Prussian leadership, and perhaps uniting in close alliance with the Emperor of the French. That seems to Englishmen, accustomed to regard Germany as at once inactive and patriotic, a somewhat dreamy fear; but it was realized in 1812 and in every tenth-rate German town one may hear to- day the ominous words a " Confederation of the Rhine." The question of Schleswig-Holstein, the sudden furor among the people, the willing or frightened submission of the inferior Courts, the mobility of the Saxon and Hanoverian armies, the determined resolutions passed at Stuttgardt, Dresden, Munich, and Frankfort have made both these dangers real. It is understood in Germany that, with Holstein free, the National-verein will have one State upon which it can depend, and one State, however small, can keep the Revolution alive. A chief pledged to unity and in possession of Kiel might be- come to Germany what Victor Emanuel has been to Italy—a flag or beacon fire. The revolt in the Diet, moreover, has sufficed almost of itself to create the dreaded third Power. The main idea of Austria and Prussia in consenting to the Confederation was that, united, they would rule it, or disunited, paralyze its action. That idea was correct, as the experience of forty years has proved ; but they neglected to secure for themselves a distinct majority of votes. They relied on their long-tried influence in the minor Courts, and forgot that those Courts, powerful as they were, were powerful only through the obedience of fragments of a nation. The moment, therefore, that a ferment arose strong enough to coerce the Princes, Austria and Prussia found that, though united, they were still in a minority. The petty Courts firs combined to outvote their representatives, and then combined again to secure themselves from punishment. The Diet could act independently of the great States, and the third German Power was not only formed, but so formed as at once to assume the lead.
The crisis came on the vote for the invasion of Schleswig. Up to this time the Diet had acted as an internal power, and as an internal power its rights were understood. But in rejecting the Austro-Prussian proposal, with the intention, as Count Rechberg says, of declaring war for itself, the Diet was placing itself at the head, not of a defensive league, but of a nationality. The precedent once established and suc- cessful, all political power would gravitate to Frankfort, and Berlin and Vienna would be reduced- to mere provincial capitals. German unity would, in fact, be for all great pur- poses real. Face to face with the long expected danger, the Kaiser and King resolved to act with unexpected decision. They refused point blank to acknowledge the last vote of the Diet, and announced that they had taken the direction of affairs into their own hands. Simply to refuse to move at all might, however, have provoked a revolution, and they consequently declared themselves ready to enter on a war with the popular foe but not for the popular end. They would not declare the treaty of 1852 at an end, because that might bring England and France into the field, and so make the unity of Germany ultimately certain. They would not occupy Schleswig for the benefit of the Diet, because that would be to give that body a claim on the military leadership of the nation complete. But they would call on the King of Denmark to fulfil the promise made to them as great Powers, that Schleswig should not be incorporated, and failing that fnlfilment, would seize the province as a material guarantee. By this adroit announce- ment they hoped to satisfy the German crave for inter- ference for Schleswig while bringing the question fairly down within the range of international law, and the effect of the decision, if not peaceful, is at least pacific, for in the first place it enables all parties to evade the Euro- pean bond, the treaty of 1852, and so localizes the war, and secondly, it enables the Danes or their King to re-open nego- tiations. Even if Schleswig is invaded it is simply invaded, and does not cease to be Danish until the negotiations which must precede any international transfer have been com- pleted.
England, therefore, at all events, is out of the technical scrape. The Danes really did promise not to incorporate Schleswig, and so long as they are only asked to keep that promise, England has a very indifferent case for overt interfer- ence. On the other hand, Denmark not losing her province may be induced to consent to hold it on the terms—annoying as they may be—on which she through her King consented it should be held. The Act of Union may be dissolved, but the depend- ence of Schleswig upon the Danish King still remains intact, and the integrity of the monarchy, such as it is, is so far pre- served. It is a most unsatisfactory arrangement, but in view of the difficulty her allies will feel in supporting so poor a. " case " of her excessive disproportion of force, and of the ruin defeat might entail, Denmark may yield as Holland did in a nearly similar juncture. From the instant France announced her resolve to defend the revolted Belgians, the King of the- Netherlands ceased to struggle, refused to slaughter his sub- jects in a hopeless fight, and submitted avowedly to "force majeure." Denmark may see fit to follow that example. The effect, as we have said, of the recent moves is distinctly pacific, but it would be idle to deny that the danger is still extreme. Of the three parties to the contest two at least are madly excited, and will regard any compromise whatever as a humiliation. The Danes, as a nation, are decided that their course is to defend the Eider, and perish, if they must perish, with their arms in their hands. In an address to the King, submitted by the Rigsraad, they inform him, with ill-concealed hauteur, that though the nation be small it is fully developed, and intends to live and die free and indepen- dent. On the very first symptom of hesitation to sign the com- mon constitution, King Christian was assailed by Copenhagen with shouts of "Long live Charles the Fifteenth !" and should he yield at last the islands may carry out that threat. They, at least, are beyond all fear of German arms, and a very large partyin them believes that the union of Scandinavia, ultimately inevitable, may as well arrive at once. Should this be the resolve of the capital, it is more than probable that it will be that of the army also, and Denmark, resolved on the worst, may risk a war which can do no more than make her a Swedish province. One charge of bayonets across the Eider bridge, the advance of a single regiment into Hol- stein, would very soon bring the matter to the arbitration of the sword. On the other hand, the Diet though awed shows a stubborn disinclination to surrender its prey. Saxony openly refused to allow Austrian troops a passage. The King of Hanover could barely be persuaded not to resist Austria by force. The Diet of Wurtemburg has ordered the army to be placed on a war footing, avowedly to resist dictation from Prussia as well as Denmark. The Grand Duke of Baden offers the Holsteiners a refuge in his dominions, and the Bavarian representative asks by what right the Diet is set aside. The combined troops, moreover, so far from evacuating Holstein have gone northward, and it is in the power of Saxony, a little State but one which happens to have a man at its head, at any moment to end diplomacy by a raid across the frontier. German blood once shed, the Princes will be helpless in the face of popular wrath, and must support the nationality they so dearly crave to rale. German action, however, is slow, the minor Princes are not altogether at one with their States, the two Powers have immense prestige and strength ready for use, and their action admitting as it does of discussion is, on the whole, pacific.
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