23 JULY 1842, Page 11

TOPICS OF THE DAY.. : „ r ,,,„, ASPECT OF FRENCH AFFAIRS. - 7 THE: who

regard the death of the Duke of ORLEANSi.'116 endanger- ing the permanence of the present dynasty of France overlook that family's position. The constitutional monarchy itc more firmly rooted than persons imagine who look only to thk ymmentary bursts of. popular excitement which succeed each othb-k,so rapidly in Francoilfettill %I Only eight years had elapsed from the subversion of thefficlachy, by the deposition and execution of Louis the Sixteenth, when the French again subjected themselves to the sway of a single ruler; and only four years more were required to induce them to make his title hereditary. The Government of NAPOLEON retained as much as was possible of the old constitution. The Code Napoleon enacted no new law : it was merely a more concise and better- arranged declaration of what was law than had previously existed. The organization of the Courts of Justice and the Code de Pro- cedure Civile were borrowed from projects of reform found in the archives of the monarchy. NAPOLEON reorganized the army, Tax,- LEYRAND the diplomatic service, and GAUDIN the finances, in ac- cordance with the principles of the old system. The Empire was a tacit declaration on the part of the French people in favour of the monarchical portion of the old constitution.

In 1814 and 1815, the temper of the nation, quite as much as the representations of TALLEYRAND, prevailed upon the Allied Sovereigns to strike a compromise—to concede to the body of the nation an elective legislature, and to recognize the principle of legitimacy as the source of the Sovereign's claim to the throne. By the Revolution of 1830, the elective legislature and its outwork the free press were defended against the arbitrary will of the

Sovereign. The elder branch of the Bourbons was dethroned on

account of its experienced incapacity to act constitutionally; but its claims being rejected, those of the branch next in the order of succession were de facto recognized. The practical rule established by the French Revolution of 1830 was in the main the same as that recognized by the English Revolution of 1688,—namely, that hereditary succession is the rule of the monarchy, but that there are exceptional cases in which it may be broken through.

The question is not what is the best form of government for the French nation, but what is the form which the French nation, byt series of acts consistent with each other, has adopted. A heredi- tary monarchy, held in check by an elective legislature, was the ob- ject of those who set the first French Revolution in motion, and of the majority of the educated middle classes. The recent atrocities of the Reign of Terror made this party acquiesce in the want of the elective legislature under the Empire in 1804; but the desire for it revived when the events of 1814 afforded an opportunity of modify- ing the constitution. This mixed form of government has proved itself strong enough to weather the storms of the Revolution of 1830: there are therefore grounds for believing that the national mind has become sufficiently accustomed and attached to it to in- sure its permanence. The mass of active and influential French politicians have had their opinions formed, their faculties developed, by working this constitution : it has become a part of the atmo- sphere in and by which they live : they could not get on with a new form of government, and even if a revolution were to take place, would naturally gravitate back into the present system. Add to this, that there is not at present in France such a general pressure as to render the people impatient of established order ; that there is no privileged aristocracy ; and that political power is confined to the hands of the timid, long-suffering, change-fearing middle class.

There is no likelihood of such a revolution in France as would

bring about a change in the constitution ; and if the nation is to have a limited hereditary monarchy, it has no choice but to retain the present family. The elder branch of the Bourbons is identified with a principle—with the claim of the Monarch to be a "free king," in the sense in which our First JAMES used the phrase, a king relying upon and governing by a hereditary privileged nobility. There will be no recall of the elder branch ; and no other family but that which occupies the throne combines in a sufficient degree the claims of hereditary title and popular choice to insure stability to the constitution. The existing dynasty of France is identified with the existing form of government ; and that is supported by the industrial interests and the public opinion of the nation. One member of the present family will do as well as another to make a keystone for the constitutional arch.

The death of the Duke of ORLEANS would have been pregnant with danger both to France and to Europe, had intriguing politi- cians been able to introduce discord into the family of LOUIS PHILIPPE and to induce its members to become the nominal leaders of opposing factions. In the French Legislature parties are nearly balanced, undistinguished by any broad general principles, and wanting the cohesion which hereditary ties have given to parties in England. Had the Dutchess of ORLEANS been persuaded to be- come a rival claimant for the Regency, the popular prejudices of the French—above all, their unreflecting love of military glory— would have been flattered and stimulated, and the whole danger of the consequences it is not easy to calculate. It requires all the wary, vigilant, and dexterous tactics of the present King of the French, to prevent his people from plunging into wars, hurtful to thdmselves and the whole civilized world. Next to the life of Louis PHILIPPE, the best guarantee of general peace will be found in the harmony and union of his family, and the nomination of the Duke of Nastonas as Regent.