TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ENGLISH IN EGYPT.
E greatly regret that when Lord Charles Beresford asked the Government to declare openly that we intended to stop in Egypt they judged it expedient to return an evasive answer. No doubt there were many apparently strong reasons for not making a candid declara- tion. To have done so would have wounded the suscepti- bilities of France, might have greatly annoyed the Sultan, and generally would, for the moment, have awakened many of the sleeping lions of diplomacy. But though we can see and appreciate these arguments, we hold that the balance of good policy was decidedly in favour of a frank declaration that we made a grave mistake when we sup- posed that we could occupy Egypt temporarily and then evacuate it, and that the influence of a civilised on an uncivilised Power was a thing which could be exercised one day and withdrawn the next. In our opinion, what Mr. Balfour should have said was not that the present situation did not "seem to call for any declaration of policy beyond those which have already been made," but that Lord Charles Beresford's question gave an oppor- tunity which he was glad to seize for the purpose of making a statement which had been too long delayed. We should have liked him to have faced the problem fairly and squarely, and to have told the House and the nation how we came to make several declarations of our intention to evacuate after certain conditions had been fulfilled ; how these conditions have not been fulfilled ; and how every year it has appeared more and more clear that they will not be fulfilled ; and how, in fact, it has become evident that evacuation is a moral and physical impossi- bility. Then he should have gone on,—When once a man finds he has blundered into a declaration as to future acts, which it is clear he cannot carry out, the honourable thing for him to do is to state publicly that he finds he will be unable to act upon his declarations. Men have constantly to admit to such mistakes, and no reasonable person can accuse them of faithlessness, if they do not conceal their mistake after they have themselves become aware of it. We cannot, we find, act upon our declara- tions as to evacuation without ruining Egypt ; therefore, we take an early opportunity of withdrawing those declarations once and for all. That is, we contend, what the Government ought now to say and do, but what, unfortunately, they do not say and do. Though they know that we shall not evacuate Egypt, though the country knows it, though all the foreign Powers know it, the British Government still refuses to officially admit the fact. The pretence that the idea of evacuation has not been abandoned has become a mere farce which takes in nobody. The only result is that England gets all the disadvantages of both lines of action. France abuses us for breaking our word and for saying one thing and doing another, and also hates us because we are in Egypt " to stay." Thus we get all the evils of permanent occupation. At the same time our refusal to repudiate the notion of evacuation makes us take up a very false position in Egypt itself, and does there, though nowhere else, give a certain impression of impermanence to our rule. A certain section of the natives are the only people in the world who do not now feel quite convinced that we shall continue in occupation of Egypt. Yet they are the people whom we most want to impress with the idea of permanence. Thus we get all the odium of permanent occupation and very few of its advantages. If last week Mr. Balfour had said frankly we are not going to leave Egypt, we should not, in reality, have made ourselves one whit more hated by the French. There would have been a howl in the French Press no doubt, but the French people would not have gone to war with us. If they meant fighting about Egypt, they would have fought long ago. But, it may be argued, if Mr. Balfour had spoken in the House in the sense of the words we have given, the French Government would have demanded an explanation, and this might have produced serious consequences. Possibly France might have asked explanations, but we do not think it likely. And for this reason. If France were to do so she knows that she would instantly be met with a demand for explanations in regard to her action in Tunis, and especi- ally at Bizerte.. A reminder by France as to our statements in regard to Egypt would, that is, draw forth a reminder as to French statements about the Regency. But these French statements were every bit as specific as ours, and if carefully examined pledge France not to occupy permanently, even more effectually than do our declarations in regard to Egypt. But France wants no reminder of this kind. Therefore, we may be sure that she will never address to us a specific and official demand as to our intentions in regard to the evacuation. of Egypt. Proof of this is to be found in the fact that, in spite of the great provocation given her, first by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, next by Lord Salisbury, and lastly by our gift to the Egyptian Treasury, France has never ventured to ask us for explanations. She was afraid of the counterclaim of Tunis, coupled with a distinct declaration that we could no more leave Egypt than she could leave Tunis. For ourselves, we can only say that we sincerely wish that France would officially ask us to make a renewed declaration of our intentions in regard to Egypt. That would give our Government the oppor- tunity to put matters on a sound footing and to show the French that we are not unmindful of the history of their occupation of Tunis. And here we ought perhaps to deal shortly with the French suggestion that we cannot say anything about Tunis, because Lord Salisbury invited the French to take it. Well, what if he did ? The French asked us to intervene with them in Egypt and then them- selves withdrew. In any case, France refused to act ma Lord Salisbury's original suggestion, and when later they did go to Tunis they assured Lord Granville that their occupation was only to be of a temporary character. Wes do not, of course, object to France being and staying in Tunis, but it is always on the understanding that the- same rules as to evacuation which apply in Tunis apply in Egypt.
But, in truth, it is absurd to labour the point. France- knows and the world knows unofficially, though not offici- ally, that we shall remain in Egypt, and France and the rest of the world are at heart very glad that the Nile should belong to a people who do not in commerce practise the principle of exclusive dealing. That being so, the manly and honest course, as we have said above, and shall continue to say, is to make no more pretences before the- world that there is any chance of our evacuating Egypt.. We know it and they know it, and the sooner both we and they acknowledge it the better. The fact that the Government prefers to keep up the notion that there is still a chance for evacuation is to be regretted, but it cannot prevent the English Press expressing its opinion. We trust, therefore, that our leading papers will in future combat the notion that our continued occu- pation of Egypt is a matter of doubt or uncertainty. If the Government will not clear their words of cobwebs oft the subject of Egypt, at least the newspapers can, and the fact of their outspokenness will largely absolve the nation, from the charge of hypocrisy,—one to which we become liable if, after realising that we cannot and shall not evacuate Egypt, we continue to use language conveying the impression that evacuation is still possible.
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