Commonwealth and Foreign
HUNGARY AND HER NEIGHBOURS
From A CORRESPONDENT
THE distinction of Hungarian foreign policy since the War has been its consistency. The revision of the Treaty of Trianon, by which it lost three-fifths of its pre-War territory, has been the unswerving aim not only of every Hungarian Government but even of all members of the opposition. The restoration of Hungary was the cry equally of schoolchildren and states- men, of socialists and aristocrats. Today it is notably absent from the speeches of Hungarian statesmen. Yet the chances of revision have never been greater.
Revision has become respectable. Lord Lothian approves of it. Professor Toynbee declares that the Peace Settlement is not permanent. Yet many Hungarians who are comforted by Professor Toynbee's statements of probability are disturbed by his liberal impartiality between one cause and another. Lord Lothian is there to remind them that one alternative to the dictate of Versailles is the dictate of Berlin. Hungarian statesmen who have consistently demanded revision when the chances of having it were nought cease openly to demand it when the chances of having it have risen. This is not because the restoration of the Crown of St. Stephen is less passionately desired, but because this may be more effectively hindered by revision than by the maintenance, temporarily, of the status quo.
The possibility of revision has increased during the last few years because of the rise of a strong revisionist Power. But the revisionism of Germany is essentially different from the revision- ism of Hungary, and it is significant that Hitler Germany has only weakly supported Hungarian revision. Revision to Germany means revolution ; to Hungary it is restoration. Germany wishes to draw afresh the map of Central Europe. Hungary wishes to restore the pre-War frontiers of Hungary. In the nineteenth century Berlin was called in to redress the balance against Vienna. If Germany redraws the map of Central Europe, Vienna will fall within the German frontiers. The traditional German oppressor will be transferred from Vienna to Berlin. The pan-German drive will be united under more formidable direction than ever before. Therefore Hun- gary hesitates to enlist the aid of a possible future oppressor.
Hungary has had a taste of the Nazis already. Their propaganda among the half-starving peasants, among the university students, among the anti-semites of all classes, has suggested to the ruling landowners of Hungary, as nothing else has done, the virtues of a possible liberal and Parliamentary regime. The self-interest of the great landowners has for centuries directed the policy of Hungary. Today they are more in fear of Nazi revolutionaries than of liberal reformers.
But it is not only the fear of internal and external German pressure which has made Hungarians hesitate at this juncture to press their revisionist claims. Hungary has watched the rise of Hitler Germany with mixed feelings of hope and fear, and even today she is reluctant to despair of German aid. Yet Hungary is far from assured that the frontiers which a dictating Germany would draw would be the frontiers which a dictated-to Hungary would appreciate. In an article last autumn Herr Rosenberg declared that Hungary could expect no support for the restoration of what is now Rumanian and Yugoslav territory. Only Czechoslovakia remains which, even with the possibility which it holds of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, is far from satisfying the Hungarian demands. Furthermore, if Czechoslovakia is partitioned and National Socialism advances beyond the ridge of the mountains which guard Bohemia's Northern and Western flanks, German pressure on Hungary would be considerably increased.
Finally, the influence of Germany on Italy is disturbing to the Hungarians. They have watched Italian influence retreat as German influence advanced ; and they can even detect a slight change in that influence since the Berlin-Rome axis came into existence. Italian reconciliation with Yugoslavia gives a colour to the Berlin-Rome axis which is far from reas- suring to the cause of revision. Mussolini followed his famous Milan speech with this reconciliation. If Italian interests can be subordinated to the necessity of friendship, Hungarian interests can hardly expect consideration.
Hungary is forced to share in Italian diplomacy which plots to make the Berlin-Rome axis not only a stick to belabour the Balkan States with, not only a means of blackmailing the Western Powers into concessions in the Mediterranean, but also as a brake on German penetration of South-Eastern Europe. The Rome Protocols have survived the formation of the Berlin-Rome axis because the interests of Germany and Italy in South-Eastern Europe are in direct conflict.
The Italians and Hungarians are playing on Machiavellian calculations. A Hungarian, Tibor Eckhard, is the strongest advocate of the Rome Protocols, even of the Berlin-Rome axis, and at the same time the strongest opponent of German South Eastward expansion. The calculations are nice but dangerous. They mean that for the time being both Czechoslovakia and Austria are seemingly isolated. The very determination and confidence of their resistance to German pressure would suggest that their isolation is more apparent than real. Austria is well aware that all Europe is interested in her independence. Czechoslovakia believes that no Great or Lesser Power can afford to see Germany in military command of the Sudetic mountains or in political command of her Danubian frontier. Czecho- slovakia is ready to treat with Hungary.
It is well known that semi-official overtures have been made to Hungary in recent months. Hungary is reluctant to respond. She is well aware that the Little Entente is weak and has never been weaker. Except in their relation to Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia can hardly be said to be allies. Each has a neighbouring Great Power of whom it is mortally afraid. Each has a tendency to seek its Allied Great Power in the enemy of its Little Entente neighbour. The Czech-Soviet Pact was signed without the question of Bessarabia being settled. Yugoslavia and Rumania flirt with Germany, from whom Czechoslovakia is in mortal danger. Hungary must enjoy the discomfiture of her Little Entente plunderers. If now she were strong she could probably secure substantial peaceful revision, but she is not strong.
An uncompromising demand for revision has been dropped from their public vocabulary and two conditions have been put in its place. These are the conditions by which Hungary may strengthen herself. They are—the recognition of Hun- gary's right to rearm and the improvement in the lot of the Hungarian minorities living in the Little Entente States. The lot of these minorities is unenviable, but behind this moderate desire to improve it is the claim for the revision of frontiers. If the Hungarian minorities are justly treated in the Succession States, their position will be strengthened and their pressure on the Governments under which they live will be increased. If this is accompanied by open Hungarian rearmament, internal pressure will join with external pressure to force revision. For this reason Hungary is more ready than ever before to conclude an interim arrangement with her neighbours. This is probably the only means to peaceful revision. The alterna- tive is revision by war and by German disposition. If Germany should lose a war provoked by Hungary, the chance; of the continued existence of the Hungarian State would be small.
Yet Hungary is unwilling to despair of German aid, even were she able. One-quarter of her foreign trade is with Germany. Germany is the Power before which all forces seem to bend, and there is a large measure of fatalistic acceptance in Hungary's attitude. She has no desire to be restored as a German colony, but she would prefer to be a favoured colony to a dismembered vassal, should Germany establish her hegemony in Europe.
For Hungary, as for all the Lesser Powers of Eastern Europe, the real desire is to gain favour with the winning side. If France and England should determine the course of Europe, they would support France and England. The firmness of these two Powers in the face of halo-German provocation has led to a very slight but perceptible change in Hungarian policy. She is unwilling to commit herself to German patronage or to close the door to co-operation with her neighbours. Like all her neighbours, Hungary is looking back once more at the two Great Western Powers before she yields to the pressure and rewards of the Central Despotisms.
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