WAR ON TWO FRONTS
By STRATEGICUS
SOME time before the invasion of Sicily it was pointed out that certain of the effects of war on two fronts were already being experienced by the enemy. General Dietmar now admits that the Allied plan for such a war is taking concrete shape, and it is obvious that the effects are becoming daily more searching. The invasion of Sicily in that sense has profoundly changed the military outlook, not so much by the fact that the Allies have set foot within the European fortress as by the decision and success of the invasion. A week ago it was not certain that the second stage would pass as successfully as the first. The Allies had weathered the most trying moment of their adventure, and the enemy had missed his best chance of ejecting them. But there re- mained the second phase when the enemy should have concentrated his forces and delivered a deliberate and decisive counter-attack. That phase, too, has now passed, and the Allies have thus established a remarkable precedent ; for the enemy had full warning, ample time to make his preparations in advance, a powerful fleet, and a by no means negligible Air Force.
All the Italian boasts have gone up in smoke, and the only considerable action they have taken is that still continued by the determined rearguard about Catania. Along the whole. of the forty miles or so of the Eighth Army front the troops are making head- way against as stiff a resistance as they faced when in Tunisia. There appear to be only two German divisions, and they are forming the stiffening for the enemy stand around Catania. This is, of course, a big town on the Sicilian scale, and three river courses bar the advance. But it is not the size of Catania nor the local facilities for defensive fighting that explain the resolute stand here. -It is the fact that the Etna massif lies in the rear and must break the order of a retreat. The troops can fall back by the coast road that runs along the eastern fringes of Etna, but they face the discouraging prospect of shelling from the sea as well as from the air. The communications to the west of Etna are poor. The central railway has probably been -cut by this time, and the few roads which lie between it and the coastal routes are under continuous bombardment from the air. If the enemy intends to evacuate the western part of the island, the pivot of his defensive flank can only lie somewhere about the Catania position. The latest reports suggest that, while the enemy is making every endeavour to maintain that pivot, he is far from sanguine that it can be held beyond a few days. This would explain the stiffness of the resistance in front of the Canadians and British troops while the United States units have the pleasant experience of receiving " wholesale surrenders." In less than a fortnight the Allies, after an operation so hazardous that the military student held his breath during the first few days, have secured a sort of strangle-hold on a territory greater in area than Wales. It is a Wales, moreover, that should be connected with the metropolitan territory, with all the resources which Mussolini had so loudly and so frequently boasted. It is not known whether any reinforcements have been received by the garrison ; but it seems certain that the Italian Navy has been neutralised, the Regia Aeronautica subdued and the control of the narrow strait seized.
So weak, indeed, has been the 'attempt to cope with the Allied offensive in Sicily, that it begins to seem that not only is the fate of the island being determined at Catania, but, perhaps, also that of southern Italy. It might be better to have made this statement more positive by insisting on the brilliance of the Allied handling of this difficult operation ; since there is more fighting ahead, and it is the best assurance for the future that so searching a test has been passed with such undeniable credit. In this connexion the United States troops have gained invaluable experience ; and it is not only an army which the Allies now possess, but another powerful army group, lavishly provided with equipment and proficient in that technical improvisation for which the United States and Britain are famous. .
There is so much that calls for praise in this operation that it is only passed over because the military situation is undisguisedly trembling with potentialities that may at any moment be realised. The appeal to the Italian people may be followed by an invasion of the Italian mainland even before the completion of the conquest of Sicily. Even if the course that is apparently expected shou.d be followed, there are other invasion beaches that must see the /silted troops before long. The Allies have not unlimited forces, but they have a very considerable army now, and the trained and experienced units can assimilate those who have still to win their spurs in appreciable proportions.
. But it is not only in the south and west that great events are pending. The Russian counter-offensive is an impressive portent. Hitler's offensive against the Kursk salient made up in quality and material for its lack in numbers. The German commentators have made a distinct point about the amount of material used, and, if we are to believe their accounts of the results of the recent fighting, they have destroyed fabulous numbers of tanks and guns. It seems to me that, now as ever, these claims, in so far as they cannot be brushed aside altogether, reflect the sort of material losses of the German Army. It is the most natural thing in the world to imagine that if one's own losses are great, those of the enemy must also be large, if not larger. Moreover, it is known that in the original offen- sive against the Kursk salient Hitler used is Panzer divisions to 54 of infantry, and the armoured divisions included some of the most famous units in the German Army.
In fine, this was a it . determined offensive ; and, when it is
borne in mind that it was a German initiative, the sequence of events is worthy of serious note. I pointed out before that the offensive was very dangerous, and that it certainly achieved a deep penetration on the Bielgorod sector: Even if the attack be:ow Orel was checked from the outset and the claim to have taken 28,000 prisoners was mere joie de vivre, it is certain that the Germans bit deep into the Russian defences and probably crossed the upper Donetz. It is necesary to remember the formidableness of the offensive if we would fully appreciate the Russian achievement. For the plain fact is that, once again, the Russians proved themselves
the world's best shock-absorbers. They held the attack before the penetration became critical. They fought the elite of the present German Army to a standstill, and then, having destroyed one illusion of their enemy, they swept aside another.
As far as one can read the German military mind, in its recent garrulous mood, it has been more or less tacitly assumed that the " winter to you and the summer to us " represented the outlook vis-a-vis the Russians. Facts had suggested the acceptance of the position, but the Germans held that in the summer they could do more damage than the Russians in winter, and, in the worst case, their defensive would prove impregnable. It is this situation that gives the background of the Russian counter-offensive. The Russians not only beat the Germans to a standstill, but then proceeded to take advantage of the probable diversion of troops from the Orel salient towards the south. There have been noted 4o German divisions, some of them, as I have said, the very elite of the Army. There are on the Russian front about r8o or ino German dvisiems. There have been drawn into this fighting, therefore, over a fifth of the total number of German units on the Russian front, and they have suffered severely.
The result of the counter-offensive cannot yet be accurately measured, but it is at least certain that the Russian penetration has been remarkably deeper than the German, and the enemy had held Orel for nearly two years. From some of the reports it seems that Orel is now almost isolated. It has been officially stated that Gorodische has been captured, and this village lies across the Briansk- Orel railway, some 22 miles west of Orel. That thrust is being approached by another from the south-east, and the encirclement and fall of Orel may be imminent. At least, it is certain that in their drive from the north, east and south the Russians have overrun many square miles of country which had been held by the enemy for almost two years. The Germans seem to be exaggerating the Russian attacks across the Donetz and the Mius, the former towards the rear of Kharkov and the latter towards the flank of Rostov. It may be their hope that by fictitious victories there they will be able to divert attention from Orel, where they seem to be on the verge of yielding a prize similar in role and magnitude to that of Rzhev.
For the Allies can now claim to have accepted the problem set • them by Hitler, and to have begun 'so significantly to solve it that, just as in Sicily the fate of Southern Italy seems to be at stake, so in Russia it is the fate of the Ukraine that quivers in Orel. The Luftwaffe are now inching back to Russia the aircraft they took to defend the west and south. The Command are said to have gravely weakened the strategic reserve, though it seems unlikely it has been so much drawn upon as some commentators assert. At least, in this as in other directions the enemy is suffering the effects of a second front in a manner that can no longer be concealed. That this is only a beginning can be confidently assumed. There is worse to come.
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