23 MARCH 1861, Page 4

The judgment in the case of Brook versus Brook was

delivered in the House of Lords on Monday. Our readers will remember the case. The question was, whether a marriage celebrated on the 9th of June, 1850, in the Duchy of Holstein, between William Leigh Brook, a widower, and Emily Armitage, the sister of his deceased wife, they being British subjects then domiciled in England, and

England land as their place of matrimonial residence, is to be considered valid in England, marriage between a widower and the sister of his deceased wife being permitted by the law of Denmark. The point to be decided was whether such a marriage would have been voidable by the Ecclesiastical Courts before the Act of 1835, commonly called "Lord Lyndhurst's Act." Lord Campbell de- livered an exhaustive judgment, and decided, the House concurring, that if the parties be domiciled in England they cannot contract a valid marriage by going through the ceremony in a country where such a marriage is not illegal.

A somewhat complicated case has been tried in the Divorce Court. It was a petition by a husband for a decree of dissolution on the ground of the wife's adultery. The wife- denied the adultery, and alleged that the petitioner had been guilty of desertion, and also of adul- tery and of an indecent assault upon a girl. The petitioner pleaded, as to the adultery, that it had been condoned, and denied the other alle- gations. The parties resided at Brisworth, in Northamptonshire. The evidence proved that the state of morality at that place was ex- ceedingly bad, and every woman who had been called as a witness, admitted that she had borne at least one illegitimate child. In giving judgment the Judge said the facts raised two important questions— first, was the Court at liberty to take into consideration the adultery of the husband, the wife having condoned it; secondly,. if it could be taken into consideration, ought the Court, in the exercise of the dis- cretion vested in it, to refuse to avant the prayer of the petition. He decided that the Court had full discretion. Taking into consideration the former delinquency of the husband, in combination with all the circumstances proved respecting his subsequent mode of living, lie could not think that the petitioner was one of the persons for whose benefit this Court had been constituted, and, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him by the 31st section, he should dismiss the petition.