TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SITUATION. THE situation, as we understand it, is rather disagreeable than dangerous, but of course either the Czar or the British Government can make it dangerous at any moment. At present the two Powers stand face to face with each other, protesting and arguing, and growing angry, but still unwilling to allow themselves to resort to actual violence. Lord Derby has demanded, reasonably enough, that before Congress meets Russia shall distinctly agree that the whole Treaty of San Stefano shall be presented to the Plenipotentiaries, and they shall decide what portion of it must be debated by Europe, and what portion may pass as an arrangement between two Powers. The Russian Government is annoyed at this demand, apparently for three reasons. Her leading men, who are, of course, elated, however slightly, with her victories, are inclined to think that she has as much right to impose a Treaty on Turkey as Germany had to impose a Treaty on France, and feel that to ask the assent of Europe is derogatory to their position as conquerors. This kind of pride does not, perhaps, greatly influence the Emperor, but it is felt in a degree by Prince Gortschakoff, who has always measured himself by Prince Bismarck, and very strongly by the military party, which can never in Russia be entirely dis- regarded. Moreover, the Russian diplomatists suspect that England pushes her demand quite as much from temper as from a genuine desire to consider the whole Treaty, and have a lurking fear lest in the Congress, if everything is to be dis- cussed, Russia should be stripped of all her gains. This fear is unreasonable, as Russia can retire at any moment, but it is felt, and is expressed and exaggerated by the organs of national opinion. Nevertheless, as Lord Derby remains firm, and in this instance clearly means what he says, the Russian Govern- ment will, it seems to be understood, at last give way, and so suffer the Congress to meet. A notification to this effect has, it is stated, been made to the German Government, and its transmission to England is only delayed because the Russian Foreign Office is considering the most dignified form of giving way. The minor difficulty of the representation of Greece has already been adjusted. Russia will not allow her a vote because Greece did not sign the Treaty of Paris, and has not made herself a belligerent, but she may either be represented directly by a consultative member, or may entrust her interests to one of the Great Powers. If, therefore, the British Government has no further objection to raise, the Congress will meet, and meet with men in attendance who have large questions to bring before it. Prince Bismarck, for instance, and Count Andrassy have both stated that they have plans in petto, which it would be imprudent to reveal before the Congress has assembled. In the presence of any large plan, minor differences will be for- gotten, new combinations will be made, and the Congress, possibly after long debate, will either accept some solid arrangement, or break up in despair of a solid peace. The trivial points upon which so much stress is now laid will disap- pear, or be compromised, and the true Eastern Question, the disposal of European Turkey, now that the Sultan is de- feated, will be fairly, or, at all events, seriously considered.
The break-up we consider improbable, unless it arises from some unexpected cause. The Treaty of San Stefano has now been published textually, and there is nothing in it which can afford this country ground for war. It is nothing to us how much Roumania, Servia, or Montenegro get, and nothing whether Russia shall or shall not reacquire a corner of Bessarabia. We shall resist that demand, of course, be- cause it is unjust ; but it is for Germany and Austria to resist it seriously, for it is their interest, and not ours, which is con- cerned. Nor are we seriously menaced by any delimitation of Bulgaria, though we may wish that Greece should be more fairly treated, and may resolutely support Austria in de- manding that Bulgaria shall be truly independent, and not made even at first a Russian appanage. Russia, however, will not fight about that, for she could not do it without defending Bulgaria against both Austria and England, and in presence of the hostility, very formidable even if latent, of the Roumanian State which bars her only road. She could not run the risk on the first defeat of seeing Roumania join the alliance against her, and so dividing her armies in two. She has no assistance on such a question to expect from Germany, and unless pressed nn- endurably hard, will be sure to accept some working com- promise, injurious possibly to the Treaty, but not to her in- terests. On the question of the Straits she has already given way, so far as that the old arrangement is to continue, and we can hardly fight to put an end to a plan which we ourselves originally proposed. There may be difficulties and misunder- standings on this subject, but there can hardly be war unless both Russia and England directly desire it, which is not the case. As to Armenia, England will be isolated, even if she had, as she has not, strong interests there, and her diplomatists are too well instructed not to know that Armenia neither is nor can be the Russian road to India. She has a readier access already by the Caspian. There remain& the indemnity, and on the indemnity the war party, we perceive, is already fixing its attention. The amount, apart from the nominal and very silly value placed on Armenia—a& if Provinces were or could be properties is, if the rouble is taken at three shillings, £45,000,000, and the theory is that this debt will enable Russia to interfere at any time and in any way with Turkish affairs, or to insist on " securities " which will be virtually conquests. That, however, is merely saying that Russia will deliberately choose a bad pretext for a great war, when she might have a good one. The Powers affected' by her interferences can fight her on account of them when they happen, and they can insist in advance that dangerous securities—for example, a position dominating the Bosphorus— shall not be claimed or conceded. It may not be within the province of the Congress to settle the amount of the Indemnity, though we do not see why ; but it is certainly within its province, as Lord Derby has already said in Parliament, to arrange about the securities, and see that they are not dangerous to peace. That is the very object for which the Congress meets, and to declare itself incompetent on such a point would be to declare itself incompetent on any. We do not believe, however, that Russia will be stubborn on such a point as this. If she has a secret " design," she can carry it out, without pre- venting its success by describing it as a "security :" and her general security, her power of declaring war if Turkey does not pay, cannot be impaired. That will continue, in the nature of things, and no security which Europe will concede can be equal to that.
What, then, remains to quarrel about ? Egypt ? It is not mentioned in the Treaty, and will not be in any sense which could aggrieve England. The occupation of Bulgaria ? What possible good can such occupation do Russia, which would, as it were, during the occupation leave 50,000 men in pawn, liable to be cut off by Austria at any moment ? There must be troops in Bulgaria till the national militia is organised, but that need not take a year, and if Europe has any better plan to suggest, it is sure to be adopted. Nobody wants Russian troops there except for the sake of order, and least of all Russia herself, which knows perfectly well that the occupy- ing Power is the Power that the Bulgarians will hate hardest.. When was it ever otherwise since the world began t Indeed, in the very text of the Treaty Russia propose& joint occupation, and there is no visible reason whatever why, if money is forthcoming, the Roumanian army should not undertake the task. The Roumanians would do it very well, and they do not take their orders from St. Petersburg. Or is it the general vassalage of Turkey to Russia which is to cause the war ? That is a serious question indeed, but it is one which Englishmen knew would be raised when we refused to join Russia in imposing the Conference project on Turkey, one which we cannot now affect with- out exchanging Turkey for a less submissive Power,—that is doing just what the war party do not want, and one on which we can guard ourselves completely at any moment by an arrangement with France as to the occupation, or the secure and neutral Government of Egypt. Nothing the Congress could do could make Turkish Constantinople independent, and if we went to war we should simply, when war ended, find Turkey on our hands, a new and a more dangerous India to govern. The very difficulties of the situation will, we believe, compel the Congress to devise some arrangement with a pros- pect in it of permanence for a generation.
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