BOOKS.
MARITIME STRATEGY.* THE recent publication of two books on war at sea is a remarkable sign of the times. In Some Principles of Mari- time Strategy the author quits the domain of history, where he has done much good work, and starts a new venture in the more difficult field of war. In the first part the theory enunciated by Olnusewitz is set forth with results certainly not as illuminating as might be wished. This will not be surprising if the inherent difficulties of the undertaking are remembered. In the second part the theory of war at sea is developed. Its object is declared to be control of communi- cations and to be fundamentally different from war on land, of which the object is said to be conquest of territory. We had thought that the primary object in war is to destroy, or neutralize, the armed forces of the enemy. Surely a theory which starts by omitting all mention of the most important premiss in the argument cannot but lead to false conclusions. Let us examine whether this is so in this case, and inquire in the first place whether there really is a fundamental difference between sea war and land war. Is it true that the ultimate aim or object in land war is always the conquest of territory P Was it so during the wars of religion P Or during the Civil Wars in this country and in the United States ? Or during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 P Was it not the ultimate object in all these land wars to assert an idea ? And were not the destruction of the armed resistance and consequent control of particular areas the means P Are not these the means by which communications are controlled in sea wars ? In what lies the difference P The trend of the author's mind on this point is shown by his assertion on p. 19 that in the campaign of 1805 " Napoleon made the hostile capital (Vienna) his objective, as though he believed its occupation was the most effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power and will." Are we wrong in our belief that military opinion is solid against such a view P Surely the French objectives were the armed forces in Central Germany, first Mack's army, and then the combined Austro-Russian force which was defeated at Austerlitz, The Archduke Charles, who commanded in the somewhat analogous campaign of 1796 against Jourdan and Moreau, declared emphatically : "It matters not if Moreau gets to Vienna, provided 1 meantime crush Jourdan." Again, on p. 90, the sea is said to be a barrier which is removed from our path by winning command. That the enemy is the barrier to be removed does not seem to have occurred to the author.
Again, Mr. Corbett thinks that the difference between the control of a land area and a sea area is that subsistence can be provided and neutrals excluded from the former, but not from the latter. But surely modern armies cannot always gain subsistence from the area they occupy, and neutrals are not only excluded from blockaded areas, but are subject to visita- tion and search in those more lightly held.
Maritime communications are stated to include lines of supply for the fleet as well as the sea trade routes, whereas military communications on land are held to comprise the lines of supply for the army but not the land trade routes. Is not this too narrow a view ? Is there any difference between the advance of a fleet into a disputed area and that of an army P When the German Army advanced into France in 1870, leaving a force to blockade Metz, did it not cover the land routes in North-Eastern France as well as its own lines of supply ? In what did its action differ in this respect from that taken by the British fleet in 1803, when it blockaded Brest and other French Atlantic ports P Was not the effect in each case to give control of an area ? Was not the control in each case acquired by neutralizing the opposing armed force P Where is the fundamental difference P Surely, in principle, land and sea war do not differ. Is net the con- clusion that such a difference exists derived from giving in the argument so much prominence to the ulterior object that the primary object of crushing armed resistance has been obscured P Is not the author's theory really that which
• (1) Some Principloo of Maritime Strategy. By Julian S. Corbett, LL.M. London i Long-mans and Co. [9s. not,)—(2) Naval Strawy Compared and Contrastud with tits Principles and Proolioo of MI, Rory Operations en Land. By - aiptain A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D. London: Sampson Lbw, Marston and Co. [Les. net. I
underlay the discredited policy pursued,, more especially by France and Spain, during the eighteenth century P The confusion introduced into the argument by starting from a wrong premiss is well seen in the chapter on the Con- stitution of Fleets. As has been pointed out by other writers, both ships of the line and cruisers are required to hold an aree,--i.e., to control communications. The relative value assigned to the two classes of ships depends largely on whether the first place in our minds is given to the enemy or to the.area (cominunications). The author, keeping the latter in the forefront, arrives at the conclusion that "the true function of the battle fleet is to protect cruiser and flotilla at their special work," Those who lay stress on the former will say that its true function is to destroy, or neutralize, the enemy's fleet. In the one case the idea is defensive, in the other it is offensive. The practical difference between the two points of view is very great. If our comments are accepted as moderate and just, the reader may, perhaps, think that the statements and conclusions in this book should be closely examined before they are accepted as correct, In Naval Strategy the subject is treated in a very different manner. The armed forces and the ulterior objects are kept in due relation, and the reader is never allowed to forget that the former are the governing factors. Not the least instruc- tive trend of the teaching is the close identity shown to exist both in theory and in practice between land and sea warfare. Principles are illustrated by examples drawn equally from the practice of the leaders on either element both in ancient and modern times. These lectures—for such they are—were originally delivered in the year 1887, and have since been revised and added to from time to time. Captain Malian's extensive knowledge, ripe experience, and mature judg- ment—the result of more than twenty-five years of study and a lifetime of thought—have combined to produce a wealth of illustration which cannot fail to impress the reader.
Take, for instance, the examples chosen to show the advan- tage of concentration, of a central position, and of .interior lines. These are the purely land campaign in Germany of 1796, the mixed land and sea struggle between France and the Hapsburg dominions during the period 1630-1660, and the Anglo-Dutch sea war of 1652.1654. In the first the position of the Archduke Charles enabled him to beat Jourdan with- out the. intervention of Moreau. In the second the central Situation of France gave opportunities both by land and sea to hinder the movements of the Hapsburg armed forces between Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. In the third the limited area forced concentration, and the position of England enabled her to stop the Dutch trade.
The close analogy in principle between land and sea war is shown, by comparing Napoleon's campaign in Italy in the year 1796 with the operations of the British Navy during the war with France which began in 1803. In the former the French advanced to the line of the Adige, occupied the fortress of Verona, bloCkaded and eventually captured the 13,000 men in Mantua. In the latter the British advanced to the French coasts and blockaded, or masked, the French squadrons in Brest and other ports. Thus in the one case all Italy was covered from.the Austrians and in the other the sea from the French. The author might have pointed to the close analogy between the methods of using the British squadrons and the French army corps, Flexibility with a view to rapid concentra- tion on the decisive points was in each case the dominant feature both in strategy and tactics. Numerous instances are given to ilhistrate the interaction of land and sea operations. For example, the. British neglected in 1794.6 to establish a firm bold of the coast along the Riviera, as Nelson affirmed was feasible. This failure gave Napoleon a more forward jumping- off place in 1796, and materially facilitated his operations. The French successes on land in turn contributed to the Franco-Spanish alliance and to the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean in December 1796.
Not the least interesting are the chapters which deal with the, strategical situation in the West Indies. Written several years before the war between the United States and Spain, they probably exercised, a profound influence on those who guided American policy. Quito possibly they were the root- (muse of the war. Captain Mahan at great length explains that the advance to Cuba, Porto Rice, and Culebra has given the United States fleet a firmer hold over the Caribbean Sea. and the routes from the-Panama Canal. Future An:erican. objectives in that region are clearly indicated.
In his discussion of the Russo-Japanese War Captain, Mahan seems. to have been misled into attributing the Russian defeats to what he calls. their theory of a " fortress, fleet." It is evident that he is not acquainted with their plan. of campaign, which was . originally drawn up by Admiral Alexeiev in April 1901 and revised from time to time.. That plan laid down that the mission of the fleet was to conquer the command of the Gulf of Pechili, the Yellow and South Korean seas; that a Japanese disembarkation at Chemulpe and at the mouth of the Yalu would then be impossible, while the Russian Army would be able to concentrate on the line Mukden-Liao-Yang ; that to carry out their mission with the greatest chance of success the fleet should be divided into two groups—viz., a main body, based on Port Arthur, to bar access to the Yellow Sea. and prevent a disembarkation on the west coast of Korea,. with a detachment, based on Vladivostok, to act on the• enemy's communications and to draw away a part of the enemy's fleet. Certainly the plan is very faulty in many respects, but no idea of a "fortress fleet" is to be found, there. The real fact is that the Russians not only did not understand their business, but underrated their enemy. Rear-Admiral Vitgeft expressed the official opinion that "our fleet cannot be beaten by the Japanese fleet either in the Gulf of Korea or in the Yellow Sea." The Russian Navy was. larger than that of the Japanese, but was beaten because it was not used properly. The lesson of that war is that success —victory—depends less on the size of a navy, fleet, or ship than on the use made of it, The great question to-day is Will the British Navy be used properly in the next ware
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