It was useless to her, the Memorandum points out, because
obviously Italy would break from her bonds in the event of war. Then " Austria was absolutely dependent on Germany in peace and war, without an Alliance," and the best way to increase her dependence was to cultivate friendly relations with Russia. In the Balkan troubles, " as usual, we stood on the wrong side. . . . We have always ridden horses whose collapse could be foreseen— Kruger, Abdul Ariz, Abdul Hamid, and William of Wied—and finally we came to grief in Berchtold's stable." There is more criticism of German policy in detail, of an equal frankness. The Memorandum is excellent reading ; but somehow or other it leaves out the core of German policy, not only during Prince Lichnowsky's residence in London, but for ten years before that. No doubt, in writing to intimate friends and "good Germans," it was unnecessary to mention that the war came because Germany was deliberately and resolutely bent upon a war of conquest and expansion, and that her pretended friendliness towards Britain was part of a policy of deceit, of which Prince Lichnowsky was the instrument.