THE EMPEROR'S SPEECH.
THE Emperor of the French is falling into habits of Royalty. Every year his speech becomes more like a Constitu- tional Message, or the utterance of some hereditary absolutist, and less like his old deliverances, frank, haughty, and danger- ously incisive as they were. This year he has called his Chambers together earlier than usual, as if he had matters of moment on which to consult them ; but his address is dis- tinguished by none of his ancient qualities, is especially wanting in that formidable frankness which so often released him from the consequences of error. He does not even tell the Representatives what they have been summoned for. He- attributes it "to the interrupted discussion of important laws," which has obliged me to call you together earlier than usual ; but every Frenchman knows that if the object of the session were a law, it might have been postponed until the regular time of meeting. France has an Abyssinian expedi- tion on hand, it is true ; but then France has no constitutional re'gime, is not asked whether she will or will not defend the Pope. There is no sincerity in such a remark, and very little in the paragraphs upon foreign affairs. The Emperor evi- dently intends to reassure the public mind as far as he con- veniently can. Alluding to the notorious disquiet of Europe, he says :—" Notwithstanding the declarations of my Govern- ment, which has never varied in its pacific attitude, the belief has been spread that any modification in the internal system of Germany must become a cause of conflict. This state of uncertainty could not endure longer. It is necessary to accept frankly the changes that have taken place upon the other side- of the Rhine ; to proclaim that, so long as our interests and. our dignity shall not be threatened, we will not interfere in the transformations effected by the wish of the populations.' Did any nation ever go to war unless its interest or its dignity was threatened ? The Emperor might as well try to reassure the world by affirming that he would never fight unless he a reason, he himself remaining sole judge of what a " rea- son " might be considered to mean. Will the annexation of Baden be a reason, or will the absorption of Bavaria menace French inteiests and dignity ? Possibly neither, but Napoleon does not say so in any language from which he cannot escape, or inconsistent with the oft repeated assertion that the Treaty of Prague must be maintained. What was required by the- world was an assurance that France would regard the union of all Germany with tranquil eyes, and this is the precise assurance which Napoleon, though obviously anxious to quiet " disquietudes," will not give. The loud talk about the Exhibition, which "has destroyed a past of prejudices and_ errors," will not give it, nor will any banker in France risk an extra shilling because that big shop "has drawn closer the ties of fraternity between nations." He will think of the Roman expedition entered on just as the Exhibition closed,. and will not be consoled by the Emperor's observation upon that. His Majesty "has been compelled to protect the power of the Holy See." Italy, "for a moment surprised, now understands," but "for France the Convention exists until replaced by a new International Act," which Europe has been summoned to Conference to pass. But everybody knows the Conference will not meet, and the Emperor's Speech, therefore, explains nothing, promises nothing, prophesies nothing ; but leaves everybody to guess why he went to Rome, what he hopes to do now he is there, and what will be the end of it all. A hundred explanations may be placed upon the Speech, but no one will venture to say that he knows from it what the Emperor will tolerate in Germany, or what he means about. Rome,—that is, no one will gather from it any relief to the disquietudes which, as the Emperor admits, now alarm the world. Napoleon is as free to fight Germany or diaide Italy as he was before, and it is because he is free, because nobody can tell what he is at, that France is not satisfied or Europe tranquil. He sees, it is true, a "proximate period" at which he may recall his troops ; but if the Convention requires troops to enforce it, and must endure, how are the troops to be withdrawn? Ten years ago the Emperor, had he meant war, would have uttered a few words which would have set all Europe arming, or had he meant peace, would, with two lines, have sent up all funds ; but he would not have delivered an enigmatical speech, which every man will interpret accord- ing to his preconceived convictions. It is true there is a drift in the Speech, particularly if it is read by the light of the recent semi-official pamphlet, but that drift is by no means reassuring. It means that the great Em- peror has abandoned the idea of interfering in Germany, Germany being too strong for him, and will do as he likes in Italy, Italy being too weak to resist. Where is the hope of per- manent pacification in a policy like that ? It may soothe Ger- man susceptibilities, but Germany is not alone in the world. It certainly will not soothe France, which, besides being ashamed of striking the weak while yielding to the strong, is united in its jealousy of Germany, and by no means united in its reverence for the Temporal Power. The inhabitants of the cities will be twice as disposed for revolution if they think French soldiers are acting as gendarmes of the priesthood as if they were not, and though the peasants may be conciliated, both classes must be reasonably contented before France is at ease. The policy certainly will not quiet Italy, which is informed, indeed, that there is a "proximate" end to the occupation, but assured also that France will maintain the Convention, and which, when much weaker than at present, has, under similar provocation, repeatedly tried to let the Revolution loose. Italy in frenzy is a danger for Europe, and so is France uneasy, and neither Italian rage nor French uneasiness are in the least degree soothed by this speech. France, indeed, gets something. The Emperor gives up his pet Bill for the reorganization of the Army, which will be replaced by a "simple modification of the Jaw of 1832," intended to reduce the effective during peace and increase it in time of war, an excellent object, if only Frenchmen saw how it was to be accomplished. So would be the promise of carrying out the liberal proposals of January without surrendering any portion of "my power," but then how are the two ideas to be recon- ciled? It is certainty that the nations are wanting, not vague talk, and especially certainty about financial requirements. Napoleon gives them none. Europe will not be tempted to disarm by his remarks either on Germany or Italy, or by a greater right of public meeting, or by the assurance that his new Bill will not strengthen the Army except in time of war. Who cares how strong it is made at any other time ? Nor will financiers be _much reassured by the admission that the French budget "does not completely balance," but that "the provisions of the finance laws will not be modified," and that one "may be allowed to foresee the period when a reduction of taxation may be taken into consideration." Is that to-morrow or ten years hence, or after Utopia has been realized, or when ? Is there to be a loan or not ?—that is the point, and on that point the Speech is entirely silent. The Treasury wants to make its estimates balance, M. Magne is a loan minister, and the "distress of the agricultural classes" is to be relieved by some "great measure," which, as great measures are always expensive, is believed to include a loan,—is one coming or not? One word either way would have relieved the world, but the word is not spoken. France, with a debt not half that of Great Britain, is rich enough to borrow more, if needful, but no prosperity can stand up under the suspense, the protracted inability to calculate, which the Emperor's Speech, instead of removing, will intensify and continue. The Emperor seems to us to be losing his wonderful rapport with the latent thought of France. There are a half-dozen definite questions which are impeding commercial action, and the Emperor gives an enigmatical reply to each of them. Is he going to fight Germany ? Yes, if the dignity or interest of France demand it. Is he going to occupy Rome ? Yes, till an International Act replaces the Convention. Is he about to raise a loan? Hm the expenditure and the income do not quite balance.
We do not mean to say that there are no excuses to be made for the Imperial reticence and hesitation. There are a hundred. Napoleon does not want to fight Germany, but he does not know if France will stand his refusal of her challenge, so he promises peace subject to a limitation which includes every conceivable incident of the future. He is perplexed beyond measure by the struggle between Liberal and Catholic France, France which can write and France which can only vote ; so he takes refuge from perplexity in an appeal to Europe. He knows the Opposition hate loans, and knows also that he must have money ; so he says no word about a loan, but suggests that expenditure and income do not balance. He believes his authority essential, yet fancies France wishes for liberty ; so takes refuge in vague gene- ralizations about his power and his proposals of January last. Two sets of impulses are pressing on him heavily in each department of his action, and we do not wonder that he yields by turn to either. Any other man would ; but then the claim of the Emperor to his place is, that he is not as any other man. All we contend is, that ten years ago he would have seen which was the stronger, and obeyed that, instead of doing his best to obey neither ; would have been clear, frank, and even peremptory, instead of enigmatical and hesitating ; would have led his people, instead of saying please do not run so fast. As it is, his subjects and Europe will believe that events are driving him, that he has lost his power of ruling them, that, in short, he is beginning in his self- imposed role of earthly Providence to fail. His power, indeed, is still immense. He can plunge Europe into misery by declaring war on Prussia. He can break up Italy. He can support or crush the Temporal Power. He can do anything within France which he deems it expedient to do. But the wisdom which has used this grand authority, the cool saga- city, the clear purpose, the unfaltering nerve which have hitherto directed these immense powers, these seem to be about to fail. Europe is governed by a man, who either does not know what he wants, or does not think he can get what he wants, or wants something so difficult of attainment that he must conceal the want, each supposition being equally fatal to security and repose. If the past ever helps to explain the future, Napoleon wants a divided Germany, an Italy recon- ciled with the Pope, a France content, because arbiter through him of the world. Is he getting nearer, we ask all observant men, to any one of those three ends, or has he abandoned any one of them I—and until one of those two results has been obtained, can peace be anything but an armed and most costly truce?
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