THE PRIVY COUNCILLORS AND THE PRESS.
WE have heard a good deal of reproach during the last few days, both in the Press and in society, directed against the great public men who have, unsolicited, offered their opinion,—always a very weighty one, sometimes one of almost unique authority,—on the prospect of war with Afghanistan. It has been said that for the Queens' Privy Councillors to rush into print in this unofficial manner is a scandal to their position and almost to their fealty, and not only indicates a very grave deficiency in their feeling of political obligation, but tends to deprive their advice of all the weight which, if it were reserved until either the proper official opportunity for expressing it came, or till it was asked for, and were then given with the due earnestness and deference of reticent personal conviction, it would necessarily have. Again, it is said that in relation to India especially, this tournament of ex-Viceroys in the Eng- lish Press tends to weaken very much the authority of the Indian Government, to increase enormously the relative influence of the Government at home, and so to diminish the little chance there is of the administration of India by a well-trained and well-taught staff of officials, and to add to the danger of an injurious meddling in a most delicate duty by the nominees of ignorant popular constitu- encies. If English opinion once realises that on the most momentous questions of Indian policy, the initiated differ so widely that they do not hesitate to attack each other in the Press, the result will be, it is predicted, that the pot-houses will try to influence the Government of India almost as much i
as they influence the policy of an English Home Secretary or an English Chancellor of the Excheques. All this has been said by way of censure on Lord Grey, Lord Lawrence, Lord Northbrook, and we suppose, by inference, even on Sir James Stephen,—though it has been said chiefly by those who wished to detract from the influence of the former, and to add to that of the latter,=for the public newspaper correspondence in which they have engaged. And of course, it was sure to be said by those who (lid not like the opinions which the weightier of these great authorities expressed. One of the most uniform of all the political practices of our time is that those who do not like the opinions they hear from high authority, will endeavour to prove that those opinions ought never to have been given, or if given at all, ought to have been given in some other way. The effect of this contention necessarily is to throw a certain doubt over the impartiality and con- scientiousness of the opinions expressed, and so to depreciate their influence with the public. It is, therefore, not at all unnatural that such a policy of running down the motives and manner of these weighty advisers of the public, should be pursued ; but it is worthy of consideration whether there is any real substance in the objection, or whether what- ever substance there may be in it, is not more than over- balanced by other considerations, which censors of this kind carefully ignore.
And first, let us admit at once that if Parliament were in Session, the most effectual and weighty form for all these expressions of opinion would have been that of speeches in Parliament. Sir James Stephen, it is true, not being a Member of Parliament, could not have contributed his opinion in that form, but in all proba- bility those who have been so indignant with Lord Grey, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Northbrook, would have found no fault with Sir James Stephen for answering them, so far as he could, even by the less dignified channel of a letter to the Times. Indeed, though the complaint has been made in a form which would apply equally to the combatants on both sides of the question, we must not forget that it has been intended only to diminish the authority of the statements on one side, and that no one has yet used it to diminish the authority of the statements on the other side. We do not doubt, how- ever, that had Parliament been in Session, Lord Grey, Lord
Lawrence, and Lord Northbrook would have spoken with far more effect within its walls than they have written or spoken outside them. There they would have been face to face with the Secretary for India, would have heard all lie had to say before they spoke, and would have spoken under the very useful restraint of knowing that whatever could. be said in reply, would be said in the best form, by lead- ing members of the Government. So much we heartily admit. But as Parliament was not in Session, and there was no chance that it would be in Session before the great step of deciding whether or not we were to be launched into a very serious, and possibly even disastrous war, had been taken, the true alternative lay of course between contributing directly to the formation of the English public opinion on the subject, and abandoning the formation of that public opinion absolutely to those few persons in authority whom the Government had chosen to represent their own case, and whom the great letter- writers believed to be entirely in the wrong. Now, it is idle to tell us that Privy Councillors ought to tender their advice to the Crown before they tender it to the public. In point of fact, that is not true. If Parliament happens to be sitting, it is their right and duty to tender it to the Crown and to the public simul- taneously ; and every one knows that weighty advice of this kind has ten times the influence it would otherwise have on the Crown, because it is given in a form which also deeply affects the public judgment. What show or pretence of reason is there why, if Parliament is not in session, men of great weight and tried capacity should con- fine their advice to private representations, when they are aware that a large part of the influence which those re- presentations are calculated to exert, would he lost, if they were not simultaneously given to the Government and to the public ? Can it be fatal to the public interest to put forth in the newspapers directly what it would not be fatal to the public interest to put forth in the reports of Parliamentary debates ? It may be said that it is one thing to argue the case, ex parte, when the Government cannot plead their own case as they would in Parliament, and quite another to criticise official statements. But the fact is that the greater part of the recent controversy arose from the scandalous suppression of official facts by the Government. Sir Bartle Freres original Minute was communicated to the Press without the comments and objections of the former Viceroy upon it, and for several days the Times at least assumed—though it can hardly have seriously believed—that all the responsible opinion of the true Indian experts was on the same side as Sir Bartle Frere. Had not Lord Lawrence insisted on the publication of his own strictures in that Minute, and had not he and Lord Northbrook spoken out for themselves, we might to this day have supposed that Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook all agreed with Sir Bartle Frere. Under such circumstances as these, it is simply idle to pretend that the Government have been criticised ex parte, without an opportunity of stating their own case. It was the ex parte and very unfair publication of their case, without the proper official replies to it, which led to the most important part of that correspondence which the apologists for war now so bitterly condemn.
Again, when it is said that the transfer of the jurisdiction from Parliament to that arena of popular opinion which is provided by the newspapers, is dangerous and subversive of official traditions, it must not be forgotten that it is the most remarkable feature in the policy of the present Government that they have done all in their power to promote this transfer of jurisdiction. Par- liament was told that there was no change at all in the policy of the Government of India in relation to Afghanistan, and only on the very eve of the prorogation was it reluctantly admitted that there was a new phase opening in the North-Western frontier question. Even now the correspondence promised in the House of Commons has never been produced, and to-day we are at war with Afghanistan, without any attempt on the part of the Govern- ment even to inform Parliament before war was declared, of the issues at stake,—and still less, of course, to ask its advice. In this, as in all other questions of foreign policy, the Govern- ment have deliberately pursued the policy of keeping Parlia- ment in the dark to the last moment, and of acting on its own responsibility, without even permitting Parliament to know in what direction the exercise of that responsibility had been tending. So far as the opinion of the country was regarded at all, it was not the opinion of Parliament, but the opinion of the Press and the people, which was appealed to. Sir Bartle Frere's one-sided Minute was four years old when it was suddenly communicated,—not to Parliament in Session,— but to the Press and the people. This Government is apparently guided by a Minister who believes that it is better to reach the opinion of the multitude immediately, and through that opinion to control the opinion of Parliament, than it is to supply Parliament with the means of so sifting out opinion as to form the opinion of the people. If the Government take the initiative in such a policy, who can complain that the Opposition follow it ? In forming opinion, you must necessarily move along the lines of least resistance ; you must be guided in your policy by the political conditions of the case. Lord Beaconsfield despises Parliament, and appeals directly to the people. Can his supporters be surprised that those who are most startled and revolted by his policy are compelled to follow his example ? To the people he appeals,—to the people his critics must follow him. It is he who chooses the tribunal ; they must plead before the only tribunal he will admit. We deny that the Liberal critics of the Government are directly re- sponsible for the course pursued by them in this newspaper con- troversy. The Government has forced it upon them. It is the Government who, by their suppression of all information to Parliament, by their suppression of it even to the public up to a certain point, and by their supply of onesided information when that point was passed, have forced those who wished to see a sound popular opinion on the subject to take the line they have taken.
Finally, as to the tendency of all this breaking of lances between the great Indian authorities to weaken the direct authority of the Indian Viceroy and his Council, and to induce a somewhat ignorant English public opinion to interfere in the higher politics of India, we entirely admit it, and to a large • extent admit the mischief of it ; but we fail to see how the blame can be cast upon those who are doing all in their power, by the only effective means in their power, to prevent what is, in their opinion, a great calamity to India, and a great in- justice to the people of India. Would any one maintain that, when the only hope of preventing the Afghan war lay in a public exposition of the strong reasons against it, the exposition of those reasons ought to have been suppressed, on the ground that it is more important to India to refrain from interfering in its State affairs, than it is even to prevent the Afghan war ? Why, an unjust Afghan war might well turn out to be the first step towards the fall of the British Empire in India. It is hardly possible to overestimate the importance of preventing a great injustice of this sort, and quite impossible to overestimate the importance of insisting on the application of such conceptions of justice as we have to the conduct of our Indian Administration. If we are to govern India from England at all, we cannot afford to say that, when questions of the highest moment arise, we will refuse to try them by such principles of popular justice as they admit of, in deference to the doctrine that the Viceroy of India and his Council should be left unfettered by the public opinion of an uninstructed English public. That is sound doctrine enough, where the matter is so complex and technical that a sound public opinion on the subject is not to be found. But where the issue is of a wider kind, and involves the comparatively simple moral questions of reck- less and unprovoked invasion, or the reverse, then it is fatal, —it is simply suicidal,—to attempt to withdraw such questions from the purview of English public opinion. The true infer- ence from the admission that no public opinion worthy of the name could be formed on such a subject, would be that we have no right to hold India at all. If English public opinion is paramount, and yet is worth nothing, on a policy of the highest possible moment to the future of India, England and India must be in a false mutual relation altogether. And sooner or later, that would be the inference drawn even by England herself, from so fatal an assumption as this,—that England ought not to be permitted to form any opinion, even on so supreme an issue as that of the war which has just been declared. The attempt to withdraw such issues altogether from the purview of the public conscience, is really the first step towards the condemnation of a popular empire, in which the people are told that they may not do justice when they see clearly, or think they see clearly, what justice really is.
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