'THE ATTITUDE OF GERMANY.
r 1.1HE spirit which is being displayed by Germany in defeat 1. is not at all to our liking. We shall have to, watch her behaviour most carefully, and if necessary apply the screw, not of course with any vindictiveness or with any thought of persecution, but simply to keep her up to the mark infilling both in the spirit and in the letter the terms of the armistice. .Those terms are the minimum that we require for the insurance of the world against any further outbreak of the disastrous methods of Germanism. To secure that they shall be carried out in all their essentials is the barest act of justice, not only to the outer world but to the German people themselves. The ominous signs which are appearing onthe horizon make it necessary for the Government to deter- mine that they will not commit themselves to any policy of drift. All the necessary implements for keeping the situation well under control are in their hands. So far as means are concerned, there never was a plainer or easier business. The clue to the whole situation is that an armistice is not peace. The Germans must not be allowed at any point to confuse the two things. The armistice can be denounced at forty-eight hours' notice, and the Government, although we earnestly hope that it will never be necessary to . proceed to such a drastic act, ought to let the German rulers understand that we shall stop at nothing' short of our full duty. It is not to be thought of that,after more than four years of this most terrible of wars, the opportunity of a thorough settlement should : be allowed ta.slip through our fingers.
It may be said that Germany is already crippled, in every military and naval sense, and that she cannot conceivably contemplate a renewal of hostilities. That is very true. But .there are many other possibilities. The Germans may hope to gain some profit for -themselves and to save their Laces, ea far as such a thing is now possible, by putting every kind of impediment in the way of the Allies. They may resort to their immemorial trick, of fishing in troubled waters, and it is this which must by all means be prevented. The appeals of:Dr. Solf, and .Prince Lichnowsky, the former German Am- bassador to London are couched in language which is so deliberately. unhelpful as to be, subversive. If there- are any particulars in which -by reasonable concessions in the use of transport the Allies can more readily aid the distribution of food in Germany, such. concessions will undoubtedly be made. As humane.men, the Allied soldiers and statesmen recognize the desirability, not to mention the duty, of saving Germany from thfe.pangs and madness of hunger. But .the- Germans, when they ask for help or suggest .changes of plan, must remember that they-Are_not- in the position of men who can advantageously 'employ A policy of pin-pricks. 'The facts which have been revealed since the cessation Of fighting prove that Germany was in even a worse case than had been supposed. She had fought on till all her food supplies and all her reserves were exhausted. • When the German armies stood on their last line they could not move either backwards or forwards. The roads behind them were hopelessly congested ; in front of them were the exultant armies of the Allies And the United States. lithe fighting had continued for another three weeks, . Germany would have been overwhelmed by far the greatest military disaster known to history. The certainty of this prospect was perfectly well known to Marshal Foch and Sir Douglas Haig. We stayed our hands because it was assumed-that enough had been done to teach Germany her lesson. Had the circumstances been reversed, this was the last thing the German Supreme Command would have done. If our assumption proves to have been wrong, -we must start again where we left off. If the appeals of Dr.. Self and Prince Lichnowsky were contumacious in their tone, what are we to say of the answer sent by the German Supreme Army Command to Marshal Foch's latest communication ? Marshal Foch pointed out that acts of violence were being committed by German troops in Belgium, and he required that these violations of the armistice should cease at once. The answer of the German High Command is that the blame for these ex- cesses "falls now and in the future exclusively on the Allied Supreme Command. The German Supreme Army Command protests against such unjust reproaches." The answer ends with the following words : "It [the German Supreme Army Command] again suggests that the armistice which was desired by all nations should be carried out in the spirit which does not exclude the observance of humanity by friend and foe." The brain reels in attempting to fathom the state of mind of men who, finding themselves in such conditions as Germany is in to-day, express themselves thus. The answer bears all the marks of the familiar German insolence.
There is another matter by which the sincerity of the German people and their rulers will have to be tested within the next few days or weeks. This is the position of the Kaiser and. the German Crown Prince in Holland. There is no evidence at present that any formal act of abdication has been signed by the Kaiser, or any act of renunciation of the suc- cession by the Crown Prince. The documents on the subject, so far as we know, are confined to a written statement by Prince Max of Baden that the Kaiser intended to resign. It consorts with the spirit we detect in Germany of hoping that something good. may yet turn up in the general confusion, that .the Kaiser should refrain from abdicating in due form, and that the new German democracy should refrain from defining its relation to the Kaiser. Surely if the so-called German democrats wish to show their sincerity to the world they would hasten to remove all doubts about'the abdication of the Kaiser. As we pointed out last week, there is bound to be trouble sooner or later if the Kaiser is allowed to remain so near to Germany. He is very much in the position of the French emigres who made their headquarters at Coblenz during the French Revolution. Marshal von Hindenburg has apparently been allowed to remain in command of the German armies, and it must not be forgotten that this means the possibility of a military Government rising to the :surface again. During the last phases of the war there was an. extra- ordinarily complete machinery of government at the German Army headquarters. This Government, under General von Ludendorff, was a kind of world within a world. It was a Government independent of the Chancellor's Government- at Berlin, and there is much evidence to' show that it controlled some of the Departments at Berlin, including the Foreign Office, And that it exercised-its awn. Censorship. and managed its own Press Bureau. When the Kaiser /eft:Berlin and:took refuge at headquarters, he was not, as wan supposed by many people at the time, fleeing from•the only- seat of Government ; while transferring himself to a. safer place thanBerlin, he was taking up with a-Government that had quite a good chance of suppressing the Berlin Government and completely ruling the country. We need not 'dwell on the -elements of danget embodied in these facts. The central necessity is that the Kaiser should not be allowed to stay in Holland. How the Dutch Government have.been able to distinguish between-the Kaiser and, the Crown Prince, regarding. the Kaiser as a private citizen and the Crown Prince as a soldier, we are unable to comprehend. Both crossed the frontier in uniform—i1i other words, as combatants. In our opinion, it is indispen sable that 'the terms of Peace should provide forrn rendering up the Kaiser's person. If a demand for his surrender comes from Germany, it cannot and must not be resisted by' Holland. The terms of Peace should require Germany to make this demand. The laws of asylum, which. are valued, as our record shows, by the British nation more than by .any people in the world, do not apply to the Kaiser. When all interned persons in Holland are handed over, he must be handed over too. In brief, Germany ought to be reminded without delay that the armistice terms are not Peace terms. A mere warning about victualling, as a vtort to the continued brutal treat- ment of prizoners, is not enough. The more trouble Ger- many makes, the more onerous must the terms of Peace necessarily be.
Previous page
