TOPICS OF THE DAY.
WHAT WOULD BE AT STAKE IN A GENKR A T. WAR. CorivEnsmoii in Vienna as well as in London and Paris, in Berlin, Brussels, and Rome—in New York and Washington—to say nothing also of Cape Town and the Australian capitals—is concerning itself with the prospect of a general war. The Conti- nental veterans of the last war, the Germans and Austrians espe- cially, are speaking as if their old experiences were rising to a premium, and they are laying down the law as to the probabilities of such occurrence with great vivacity. They are considering the probable results of this or that combination when the outbreak may happen. Louis Napoleon, they say, will not be able to stick to peace by his own will; his army and entourage will force him into hostilities. A war between France and England would be pleasing to Austria, especially if Prussia joined England ; for then Austria might make war in Germany and strengthen her own empire. We attach no great importance to the speculations of old gentlemen whose political views are based mainly upon the state of affairs thirty or forty years ago, and who fmd great difficulty in bringing the understanding of 1815 to bear upon 1852 or 1853. The general tendency, however, to talk of a subject, al- though of no great moment at any particular place or time, becomes clearly significant as soon as it extends over successive years and many countries. If people in places so far apart as those which we have mentioned for two or three years persevere in dis- cussing war as an imminent probability, it is all but certain that they are moved by some common impulse resting upon reality. If a Viennese general, an Italian patriot, a Cape rebel, an Australian colonist, a 'saute Yankee, a French adventurer, and a London trader, all find their minds inclined to run upon the same idea, there must be some real and solid fact at the bottom, upon which they all really stand, and of which they are conscious. It does not matter that the fact may lie below the surface, may be vague, and difficult for us to scrutinize and describe. We all feel it is there ; it is the common cause of the common thought in so many different communities and understandings. The general concurrence, there- fore, of superficial signs, indicates that this war-talk has in it a reality; that war is a thing to be, at no very distant day. But if war is to fall upon the world, what does it involve P What are the main things at stake, if Europe should be involved in a general contest? This is a question which concerns us not remotely, not lightly; because in the brief interval allowed be- tween that event which all concur in expecting, the position of our own country in the conflict—the things in which it takes the most lively interest—may be materially influenced.
The first thing that appears to us to be at stake is freedom. The freedom of Europe is preeminently at stake, especially ac- oording to our English understanding of the word. Although the modern idea as to the " rights of the people," prevalent upon the whole in England and in those countries which have been endea- vouring to copy her institutions, is of comparatively recent growth, yet for some century or two or even more, Europe has upon the whole been adopting a civil rather than a military form of govern- ment. It is sometimes said that this progress of civil freedom is endangered and checked by outbreaks like those of 1848: and as a fact it may be so ; but as a matter of logic, the result is not cre- ditable either to the state of intelligence in Europe or to the moral courage of those who support constitutional freedom. The excesses of an uneducated populace and its especial friends have no logical force against the merits of regulated liberty ; as little as the excesses of arbitrary government can be taken to defend freedom of any sort. It is the business of those who uphold regulated liberty to see that their doctrines be maintained in the face of both opposing extremes ; and it argues little for the conviction, the moral cou- rage, or even the practical intelligence of men, when they flinch from maintaining their principles at the time when those principles are most peremptorily challenged. The revolution of 1848, and the reaction of 1849, were exactly the times when the upholders of constitutional freedom should have used their utmost exertions; and it was exactly at those times that they most especially drew back from their opportunity. The struggle has been left to the ex- tremes. One extreme has vanquished; arbitrary rule has pressed with such iron force on the populations, that a chronic rebellion is maintained by counter-irritation ; and in the ease of a general war, it is probable that provocatives of the same kind, on both sides, would be sufficient pretence for increase to the aggressive spirit of arbitrary rule. Immense armies have been formed for the main- tenance of that rule ; they are all now engaged in practical en- croachments; a period of general disturbance would give them the opportunity of extending those encroachments and confirming them. Although none of us can determine the ultimate results of a general commotion in Europe, the first result seems tolerably certain—the establishment of a military machinery as the ordinary rule of government. An illustration of that is seen in Northern Italy, where even municipal affairs are administered by the sol- diery of the empire. If freedom is at stake, therefore, in the next European war, the most obvious danger which threatens it is the general establishment of military administration. The next thing which England more especially has at stake, in ease there should be any general conflict, is her commerce. This is assailed in many ways. Her intercourse with countries quite willing to trade with her might of course be stopped by any power able to intercept that intercourse, especially if England failed, by the peculiarity of the position that she might assume, to engage on her side the good-will of any such community. NirtJukin I and Hungary, for example, have signified their desire td-e
commercial relations with this country, and we know that their re- sources for that purpose are ample. But in the case of a war, it might be quite possible for Austria to intercept even the existing- trade of England with both these countries. Her commerce at sea would be much more manifestly endangered. The Australians already .perceive that; and in the Australian newspapers, as well as in private letters brought by the last mail, we find a sombre re- flex of the reports from Europe that a war might probably break out. The Australians are alarmed for their own produce trade ; for the gold traffic ; for the trade from England ; and, in short, for commerce in any form. Freights and insurances, they say, will rise. Of course they would. The long voyage even more than the short would be menaced by a state of the world which should let loose the maritime powers and privateers against our trading ships.
In these respects England stands in a perfectly different con- dition from what she did before. At one time, her sailors were exclusively her own ; but since that period, great progress has been made in manning with English sailors the navy of a foreign country—the navy of the American Republic. At a more distant period, it was highly amusing for British privateers to in- tercept Spanish argosies bearing gold to Europe. At the present day, the great argosies are Englishand, amusing as it might be to bring a Spanish gold-ship into London or Bristol, the counte- nances in London and Bristol would look very blank at bearing that an English gold-ship had been carried into New York or Brest. Yet the contingency is by no means impossible. Much, indeed, would depend upon the question who were our enemies or our foes. Some we need scarcely fear ; others would turn the scale against us, or for us, in an immense proportion. The underwriters would be able to tell the mercantile equation of dangers like these, but they could not form the estimates until they knew the distribu- tion of animosity or amity. Using the word in a very high sense, commerce would be at- tacked still more vitally in another form ; and the Australians foresee it. A general war would pat a stop to emigration—emi- gration to Australia, emigration to America. A general war, in other words, would stop the outlet oT our people and the inlet of our wealth ; that is to say, if we had arrayed.against us strong maritime powers. This check to emigration would have its effects not only upon us at home—it would injure our colonies and our remote dependencies ; it would exasperate them, and our relatives and allies might be so disgusted as to see no value in longer affi- ance. A general war in Europe might materially affect the poli- tical geography of the British empire. But much, as we have said before, would depend upon the distribution of animosity or amity. The insurance-broker could not exactly furnish the mer- cantile equation for this contingency ; the statesman may have some idea both of its importance and its bearing. Although contingencies not less momentous than these might be included in the possibility of an European conflict, it would be a very false policy to let the recognition of that truth render us timid. There is council in courage as well as in caution. By a. timid policy we might court the dangers which we deprecate. England will not obtain any safety in a troubled future except that which she can secure for herself. The distribution of amity or alliance may affect the facility of that insurance, but the effect of insurance or perdition must depend upon England. If she can- not defend herself, and all that is precious to her, it might prove the most paying policy to declare herself politically insolvent, at once give up her place amongst the nations to some more wealthy ruling power, and accept the protectorate which any state may be willing to give her on reasonable terms. There may be commer- cial men who would. jump at this suggestion; we trust there are few statesmen who cannot look beyond it.
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