SIR,—In his notice of my book The Desert Generals, Christopher
Sykes makes some points which do not seem to me altogether well founded. May I ask him: 1. On the most generous view, what political re- ward can he see resulted from or could have resulted from our intervention in Greece in 1941? What evidence has he that political considerations were uppermost in the British decision to intervene?
2. How could Auchinleck, as C-in-C of the vast Middle East theatre, take direct command of one of his field armies (except in dire emergency and at prejudice of his other responsibilities)?
3. Which of the factual points I have made,about the course of Lord Montgomery's desert campaign does Sykes dispute? Has he checked the Field- Marshal's account in the Memoirs with other pub- lished accounts, such as Alexander's Despatch?
In any case, I would submit that General Horrocks's book A Full Life, published since my own book, lends me support on certain crucial points—Auchinleck's plans when Montgomery took over, that all infantry reserves but two brigades were consumed during the second Battle of Alamein, that the pursuit afterwards was on two axes and slow to start. Comparing General Horrocks's account with Lord Montgomery's, I am convinced my own version is neither unsound nor prejudiced.—Yours Cat bridge House, East Carleton, Norwich [Christopher 'Sykes writes: 'I. The anticipated political reward was a strengthening of pro-British parties in Eastern Europe and Asia by a tangible proof that we would always support a victim of Nazi aggression. To a very limited extent this object may have been realised, and it is certainly arguable that without that tangible proof our difficulties in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Persia would have been much greater even than they were. Such is the argument and when I say that Mr. Barnett should have pre- sented it, I am not expressing my own unqualified agreement. The argument concerns a matter about which no one can possibly be certain. Cogent evi- dence that political considerations largely influenced the decision is conveniently to hand in Lord Ismay's forthcoming memoirs. '2. How could he? He did. The regret is that Sir Claude Auchinleck refused to take this unconven- tional step earlier, against wise advice. Had he taken the advice the Middle East Command would not have suffered as much as it did from the "dire emer- gency"—as we now know. (Heaven forbid that I should read lectures to an Auchinleck!) '3. I have nowhere said that I dispute Mr. Bar- nett's facts. I doubt whether his more extreme in- terpretations of them are sound. 'Given Mr. Barnett's undoubted scholarship it would be odd if General Horrocks failed to support him on certain crucial points. Comparing Mr. Bar- nett's account with that of General Horrocks I remain convinced that the former is quite extra- ordinarily prejudiced.'—Editor, Spectator.]
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