THE BRITISH ADVANCE TO ABU HA.MED.
WE see no reason to doubt the truth of the telegrams from Cairo in regard to an advance to Abu Hamed as soon as the water rises sufficiently to allow the steamers now at Merawi to pass through the fourth cataract,—an operation which cannot be undertaken until July. That such an advance should be contemplated by the Egyptian authorities is most natural and reasonable, for with a very little extra trouble they will thus be able to get within striking distance of Khartoum. When once they are at Abu named, and have accumulated there the necessary stores, troops, and gunboats, they can at any moment lay their hands on Khartoum. But it will perhaps be said that this new advance into the Soudan is a very serious matter, and may involve us in all sorts of difficulties and dangers, and this at a time when we ought not to be getting into fresh ad- ventures. If there were really any risk of an advance to Abu Hamed involving us in big things we should certainly agree with this objection, and should most strongly condemn -the proposed movement. But an advance to Abu Hamed is not really an advance into the Soudan and the lands of the Khalifa. TheKhalifa lives and tortures and spoils to the south of Old Dongola and Korti and Merawi, where we now are. But those who go from Merawi to Abu Hamed must turn their backs on Khartoum and set their faces towards Cairo and the north. In other words, the river Nile when it makes its great bend almost reverses its course, and if you follow it up from Korti you actually go north as well as east. Therefore it happens that Abu Hamed, the place where the river begins again to assume its normal course, is a good deal further away from Khartoum than Korti. Thus no one must be allowed to represent an advance to Abu Hamed as a plunge into the wilderness of Mahdism,—a perilous advance into the heart of the Khalifa's territory. Any such talk may be instantly silenced by a glance at the map.
But if Abu Hamed is not only no nearer to Khartoum, but actually further off, what is the good of going there ? The good of going there is to reach a place which is practically beyond the cataracts. From a place a little above Abu 'lamed, Khartoum can be reached by water at all times of the year. If the invader holds Abu Hamed and has stationed there a flotilla of well-armed gunboats, he can advance on Khartoum whenever he chooses. But it will next be said, What is the use of taking Abu Hamed when, except for a month or so in the year, it is entirely cut off from our new province of Dongola by a hundred miles or so of practically impassable cataracts?' The objection would be a perfectly sound one if it were not intended to accompany the occupation of Abu Hamed by an extension of the rail- way from Wady Haifa to Abu Hamed. It will not take more than a year at the most to make this line, and need .not take so long if there were any cause for hurry, and when it is made Abu Hamed will be absolutely safe. The country through which the line will go is now clear of Mahdists, and so the danger of the rails being torn up is practically over. But the railway will be able to bring gunboats in sections as well as troops, and thus the spring of next year should see a most efficient flotilla of fast armoured steamers ready at Abu Hamed,—a flotilla capable, if necessary, of " raiding " Berber or Khartoum at any moment. We do not, of course, mean to say that the instant the flotilla is assembled it ought to be used, or again, that there should be a straight dash for Khartoum. Probably it would be best to give two bites to the cherry, and to take Berber first. Berber taken, and communica- tions once opened with Suakin, it is by no means impossible that Khartoum would fall of itself,—the Khalifa and his tribe, that is, would retreat into Darfur. These, however, are speculations for next year, not for this. What is wanted now is (1), to push along the river from Merawi during the high Nile and. occupy Abu flamed; (2), to make the railway from Wady Haifa to Abu flamed; (3), to establish a flotilla of gunboats at Abu Hamed, or rather at the point a little above where begins a fair, or almost fair, waterway to Berber and Khartoum.
It only remains to be considered whether Abu Hamed is held by the Khalifa in sufficient force to make the advance a risky matter. If it is, we admit that it would be better not to advance at present. But the reports from the frontier show that Abu 'lamed is not strongly held, and that, on the contrary, there are only a few demoralised troops stationed there,—troops who will pro- bably be only too ready to evacuate it when they hear of the advance of the gunboats. Possibly, it will be said that this view of the condition of things at Abu Hamed is mere guesswork. People who take this line forget that we have had a permanent garrison at Murat Wells for the last four years, and that from Murat camel and horse patrols are constantly sent out into the desert between Murat and Abu Hamed. The Intelligence Department have thus ample means of knowing what is going on at Abu Hamed. Again, Colonel Wingate's spies both at Suakin and at Merawi would be able to give him trustworthy accounts of the strength of the garrison, and if Colonel Wingate before he set out for Abyssinia reported to his chiefs that there was nothing to stop an advance to Abu Hamed, we may feel pretty certain that he had good grounds for doing so. If this is called guessing, all we can say is that Colonel Wingate has acquired the habit of guessing right. The only other doubt is,—Would not the Khalifa, if Abu Hauled were captured, do everything in his power to retake it ? Assuredly not. He would feel the fall of Abu Hamed not a tenth part as much as he felt the fall of Dongola ; yet he made no effort to retake the province. We may rely upon it, then, that if Abu Hamed falls, the Khalifa will only do what he did after his last reverse,—concen- trate his forces at Khartoum, and do his best to make that impregnable. In other words, we may conclude that if Abu Hamed is taken, the Khalifa will, like Dogberry, presently call the watch together, and thank God he is rid of a knave,—an outpost which scatters his forces. Just now the Khalifa is inclined to adopt the frame of mind of those diplomatists who hold that the integrity of the Turkish Empire is best preserved by lopping off its extremities. There will be no crusade to drive us out of Abu named.
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