A PAUPER NATION'S WAR EXPENSES.
IT is very instructive to compare the enormous sums lavished every year by rich peoples on the mere maintenance of their armies on a so-called peace footing with the absurdly small cost at which a nation, however poor, can make war effectively if it has set its whole heart on doing so. When we see England and France spending close on forty millions sterling for military and naval purposes as a. matter of course, it seems more than astonishing that the Greeks, with an annual revenue of less than four millions, should venture to consider such a luxury as war within their reach at all. The fact that Greece had hardly any income, and had exhausted her credit with the moneylending centres, was probably responsible to a great extent for the general belief, which has been so completely upset by the events of the last week, that her statesmen had no real intention of fight- ing, and had only massed an army on the frontier in -order to keep up their game of bluff. Having thus falsified the conclusion generally drawn by out- siders, the Greeks must next proceed to falsify the premises on which it was based. It is impossible for them to show, unless by some miracle, a large monetary income, but we are much mistaken if they cannot prove readily enough that this is not at all essential for vigorous, and perhaps protracted, warlike operations. In the first place, the Greek leaders have at their command an asset so valuable that it can hardly be capitalised, in the enthusiasm and determination of the people, which may have rendered the diplomatists' task more difficult, but will certainly lighten the burden of the Minister of Finance. The Greeks are evidently prepared to fight, and to fight well, for nothing, and almost on nothing, and it need not be doubted that the non-combatant part of the population will assist the Government with all alacrity by cheerfully providing whatever may be required in the way of means of transport and other subsidiary stores. The question of pay for the army is one that may be deferred until after the conclusion of the war; all that is now necessary is its bare sus- -tsuance and its adequate equipment with arms and ammunition. As for sustenance, the Greek soldiers' wants are easily satisfied. Accustomed to a hard and frugal diet, they can fight and march and bivouac on mountain crags on a very moderate amount of bread and water. On these terms, about 10s. a week per head should probably suffice to keep the army fed and adequately equipped. The distance of the seat of war from the base is not considerable at present, so that the expenses of transport are not heavy ; and if, by any favour of fortune, the distance should be lengthened and the war carried back into Macedonia by a flanking move- ment, the greater difficulty of forwarding supplies from the base would probably be more than counterbalanced by the eagerness with which the population of Macedonia would contribute to the support of the invading army. So that after making full allowance for the innumerable extras that add some 20 per cent. to the cost of most enterprises, both warlike and peaceful, we may safely infer that the Greeks could maintain an army of one hundred thousand men in the field at the paltry cost of some £60,000 per week. If we take six months in the year as the period during which active operations are probable—and it is obvious that the Turks will hardly be able to conduct winter campaigns at so great a distance from their base, especially as they are helpless at sea—we arrive at the conclusion that about a million and a half sterling will suffice the Greeks for the immediate expenses of a year's fighting. Public opinion appears to have decided already that the war will be over in a few weeks now that the Turks have, by their first rapid successes, opened their way to Larissa, but it is forgotten that the Greek fleet has as yet hardly come into action, and that every mile by which the Turks increase their distance from their base makes their future success more difficult ; so that the possibilities of a long and. desperate struggle are still worth considering.
When we turn to the financial position of Greece, in order to see what retrenchments are possible with the Budget on a war basis, we find that nearly a quarter of the country's annual expenditure is absorbed by the public Debt, which took 21,892,000 drachmai out of a total of 90,222,000 in the estimates for 1896. It is well known that Greece has already suspended the payment of 70 per cent. of the amount due as interest on her gold loans, and the establishment of this precedent in time of peace will make the path easy for the Government if it wishes, under the stress of war, to suspend the service of the Debt altogether. Mercantile and investing opinion here would naturally regard such a policy with horror, on the principle that a nation, like an individual, must pay its creditors before it has any right to indulge in other expenses. Greek statesmen, however, can argue with at least some show of plausibility that the national honour would have been far more seriously smirched if they had left Crete helpless under the Ottoman rule than by any default in the service of the Debt. This argument will hardly convince bondholders—who forget when they lend money to poor States that national existence is more highly prized than national credit—but it will be accepted readily enough by the Greek people, and if the war is at all protracted, it is almost certain to be brought forward and acted upon. The Govern- ment will also be able to call with the fullest con- fidence for enormous sacrifices on the part of the non-combatant population. In the matter of a life and death struggle with the Ottoman Power, it will be a simple matter to divide by two the pensions item, the Civil List, " various " expenditure, and the cost of the Ministries of Justice, the Interior, and Instruction, and of the Chamber of Deputies. In some cases these retrench- ments could obviously be carried still further, and altogether we have no doubt that the Greeks could, though with a desperate strain and at the sacrifice of national credit, save some forty millions out of the ninety million drachmai allowed for expenditure under normal circumstances. On the other hand, however, we must allow for a decline of at least a third in the Government's ordinary revenue, so that the possible saving of forty million drachmai would probably be counterbalanced to the extent of some thirty millions by this decrease on the other side of the account. So that if our estimate of the cost of maintaining their forces in the field is near the mark, the Greeks would be rather more than a million sterling per annum to the bad. This is a large sum for a poor nation with no credit, but the financial advisers of Greece ought to succeed in providing it, though perhaps largely at the expense of the future. Frederick the Great paid his way in the Seven Years' War, chiefly with the help of English subsidies, and secondly, by debasing his coinage. National subsidies voted by Parliament are of course out of the question on this occasion, but there can be no doubt that individual subscriptions will pour into the Greek Treasury from all parts of the world where the hatred of despotism is a moving force. We do not debase coinage nowadays, as issues of paper money are found to be cheaper, equally efficacious for the present moment, and more easily remedied when the trouble is past; this is a device of which the Greeks have already availed themselves, and we need not doubt that they will continue its use as far as they can dare to do so. Moreover, a State is rarely in such a position that it has absolutely nothing left to pledge. The revenue of the Greeks from customs and excise, stamps and dues and monopolies, was estimated for 1896 at sixty million drachmai. Even if the yield diminished by one- half owing to the war, and a premium on gold of 100 per cent, were established, this asset would still be a valid security for an 8 per cent. loan of five millions sterling. It may be contended that the investor would not look at it, and he certainly would not unless the Greeks consented to insure his position by making over the collection of these imposts to the agents of the bondholders. Such a sacrifice to the national amour propre has hitherto been obstinately refused, perhaps because Greek states- men wished to hold it in reserve for a desperate emergency. But for the purposes of furthering war against the Turk it might be made without loss of dignity, and such a provision would materially assist the enthusiasm of Greek sympathisers, presenting them with an opportunity of giving a material expression to their feelings and at the same time earning a handsome return on their money. And this arrangement might ultimately, on the return of peace and full revenue, be made the basis for that settlement with her creditors which Greece has long been unable to conclude.
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