If Bulgaria refused co-operation on these terms, it would be
important to secure Roumania's co-operation, without which it would be hazardous for Greece to join in the war. But the dangers of remaining impassive spectators of the struggle were not restricted to those already mentioned. Even if Austria and Germany confined their efforts to Poland and Flanders, they would, if successful, be able to impose the same changes on the Balkans as if they had crushed Serbia. Beyond that their victory would mean the deathblow to the free life of all small States. Again, if the war ended indecisively, it would mean the complete and systematic destruction of Hellenism in Turkey. In fine, great as are the dangers of participation, M. Venezelos holds it to be absolutely imperative alike on moral and material grounds. There was the legitimate expectation that they might save the greater part of Hellenism in Turkey and create a great and powerful Greece; and even if they failed, they would fail in a noble cause—that of freedom, humanity, and the liberty of small nations, which German and Turkish rule would irretrievably endanger—and preserve the esteem and friendship of the nations who created and had so often helped and supported Greece. This remark- able letter, alike by its farsighted views and fervent patriotism, confirms M. Venezelos's title to rank among the greatest and wisest of Balkan statesmen.