The arguments in favour of Greece's immediate inter- vention on
the side of the Allies are set forth in a masterly letter addressed by M. Venezelos to King Constantine on January 11th last, and published in the Westminster Gazette of Wednesday. M. Venezelos's letter was prompted by a communication from Sir Edward Grey indicating the compen- sations which Greece would gain from participating in the war. Such a step, M. Venezeloa admits, involved dangers, but those of continuance in neutrality were even greater. For if they allowed Serbia to be crushed there was no security against Austria's crossing Greece's Macedonian frontier and coming down to &tonics, or—even if Austria failed to do this— against Bulgaria's occupying Serbian Macedonia. They would then either be obliged, in virtue of their treaty with Serbia, to hasten to her aid in circumstances far more unfavourable than if they went to her assistance at once; or if they discarded their moral obligation, to submit to the disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium in favour of Bulgaria. As for the conditions under which Greece ought to take part in the contest, M. Venezelos laid chief stress on co-operation, not only with Roumania, but with Bulgaria as well. Hitherto their refusal to discuss any concessions to Bulgaria or Serbia had been the only policy available. But matters had now been changed by the possibility of realizing Greece's national aims in Asia Minor, and he did not hesitate to recommend the cession of Kavalla to Bulgaria, subject to certain guarantees providing for the interchange of Greeks living in Bulgaria and Bulgarians living in Greece.