24 AUGUST 1918, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE.

" In November, 1914, Wangenheim [the German Ambassador to Turkey] told me it was part of Germany's system not only to be completely prepared for war, but also for peace. ' A wise general who enters battle always has at hand his plans for a retreat in case he is defeated,' said the German Ambassador. ' This principle applies just the same to a nation beginning war. There is only one certainty about war—and that is that it must end some time. So, when we plan our campaign for war, we must also consider a campaign for peace.' . . . No—if we really want to end this war, we must have an armistice. Once we stop fighting we shall not go at it again. History presents no instance in a great war where an armistice has not resulted in a permanent peace. It will be so in this case."—(Reminiscences in Land and Water of Mr. Morgenthau, late American Ambassador to Turkey, August 15th, 1918.) T .ACK. of imagination is a capital fault in our politicians. They are so much accustomed to watching for a whisper from the People, or rather from that section of the People whom they believe to control politics, that they lose the habit of looking forward for themselves. To be " previous " in one's views they regard, indeed, as an obstacle to the success- ful manipulation of the crowd. Success under our system means the maximum capacity for rapid changes of attitude. He wins who whirls quickest on his heels or toes. But this means the cultivation of improvisation rather than of steady thinking or of planning for the future. This instinctive dislike of looking ahead may prove very dangerous to the nation in the phase of the war which is soon coming—the phase of the enemy's Peace Offensive. For this reason we desire once more to place before our readers what we are convinced will be the German mode of procedure, and to suggest safe and efficient ways of meeting it.

Some day, it may be only a few weeks or it may be several months hence, we shall get a Peace communication from the Germans, which will come as suddenly and unexpectedly as they know how to make it to come. They will, most naturally and properly from their point of view, endeavour to hand us a surprise-packet. If circumstances have not compelled them to make it earlier, a day or two before Christmas will offer a very good opportunity. The German statesman or the German soldier, though at heart entirely possessed by the principles of Realpolitik, is by no means above using the appeal to religious sentiment. He will, however, in the main rely upon the well-prepared Peace Offensive described to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, late United States Ambassador at Constantinople, by his German colleague. The German statesman's words stand at the head of this article, and we must here express our gratitude to Land and Water for its enterprise in placing Mr. Morgenthau's very interesting work before the English public. As Germany will want Peace on the best terms possible, her instrument, as will be seen from the second half of this quotation, will b an Armistice. Again, if she asks for an Armistice, she will want it very urgently. What more likely then than that she should choose next Christmas— a time when it will appear sentimentally difficult for the Allies to refuse ? Germany will, in effect, say to the Allies: " Our troops, like yours, are winter-bound. Further, every- body agrees that fighting at Christmas will be deplorable. Let us therefore utilize this Holy tide to consider the position. Let us make the week between the eve of Christmas and the eve of the New Year an opportunity for seeing whether we cannot arrange for a regular Armistice in which the preliminaries for negotiations for Peace can be discussed. We do not want to put it higher, or to commit any one further than to a Christmas Peace talk." But if once the Germans can obtain an Armistice they can count, as the German Ambassador told Mr. Morgenthau, upon there being no renewal of fighting. They will rely upon war-weariness making it impossible for democracies like those of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States to resume hostilities. In short, the Germans, were they to be frank, would set forth their Peace plan of campaign as follows : " The moment we have stopped the guns we will begin the vigorous Peace Offensive which has always been part of our plans—. part of that preparation for Peace at which we have worked as actively and as continuously as we did at the old preparation for War. We have got in every country, and especially in Great Britain and America, emissaries who are in touch with important Pacificist bodies and important Pacificist leaders, and we must at once set these Pacificist organizations in motion. We have organized them without their knowing it, and have supplied them with plenty of funds through apparently perfectly innocent channels. They are only waiting the word to start active Peace agitation, and we may be quite sure that when they get the word they will not worry where it comes from. It will be welcome whatever its sources, and indeed to many of them it will appear to have a celestial origin." The internal Peace Offensive thus set in motion will be concentrated upon the one point of keeping the Armistice alive. The Pacificists in all Allied countries will be taught to harp on the string : " Are you really going to send our sons back to the slaughter-houses ? When so little a concession on your part would save them and us from untold miseries, do you really mean to refuse ?

We are proud of the way we have hitherto waged war, but if we are to refuse to stop fighting when our enemies ask it so frankly and so loyally, we shall be disgraced before the world and before the bar of history. The curse of the shedders of innocent blood will be upon the heads of those who either refuse an Armistice, or, when it is in existence, dare to insist on the renewal of war." Yet, in spite of all such appeals, our politicians, if they are to do their duty to their country, to the cause of the Allies, to the future happiness of the world, must set their faces like flint against giving the enemy any opportunity to place us at the disadvantage we should be placed at by a General Armistice for the purpose of Peace Conversations. No doubt the Pacificists who will be em- ployed in making such an appeal as we have described would really be an insignificant minority. No doubt again the real heart of the country would be quite sound. But this is just the kind of minority agitation to which Governments give way. They are very easily bullied. Did not the present Government run like hares before the rattle of the croziers of the Irish Bishops ?

What then should be the answer of the Allies when the request for the Armistice comes, a request made with a great appearance not only of generosity but even of contrition ? Our answer should be : " We will have no Armistice under any sort of conditions. What we will do, and it is the most we will do, is to agree to an honourable understanding that each side shall stand purely on the defensive for a day or two. The land offensive, that is, shall be suspended by a ' Stand fast' order for, say, a hundred hours. But this period is not to be spent in Peace Conversations, and still less in Negotiations. It will be merely allowed for the read- ing by oer chief enemies of the terms upon which we are prepared to grant them Peace, or, if they care to put it in another way, a Permanent Armistice." As we have explained before, this does not mean that our Peace Terms are therefore to be ungenerous, or rough-and-ready, or ill-considered, or, in fact, worse than the Germans would get at a Peace Conference. It means something very different from that. Though it is impossible for us to negotiate with those whose word cannot be trusted either in peace or war, as they have shown by the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, and in the actions who have followed that Treaty or alleged Treaty of Peace, and though the German word cannot be relied on either as binding them- selves or their Allies, we are not going to play Shylock or insist upon the full pound of flesh. When we tell the Germans there are to be no negotiations, we shall be able to point out to them that our dictated terms have been the result of generous and careful consideration, and that we have given them as many concessions as, perhaps more than, they could have got from us at a Peace Conference, where they were attempting to play off one Power against another, and so raising the anger of the Allies.

We should tell them that as far as possible we have resolved not to inflict upon the Peoples, even though they have in fact shared the guilt of their rulers,• the full punishment called for by their acts. We should tell them that wherever possible we have given the Peoples the benefit of the doubt. Finally, we should tell them that if the terms are not now accepted, and if the Germans and their allies ( ompel us to revoke the temporary order to " Stand fast," they must never expect such good terms as we now offered them. If they insist upon the resump- tion of bloodshed rather than accept our terms, they must take the consequences—and the chief of these will be worse terms in the future. Later terms will not only contain increased war indemnities, but must deprive the Peoples of the excuses which, as we have said, the first terms might recognize. If after having known our terms it could be shown that the Peoples of enemy countries had not insisted upon their rulers accepting those terms, they would thereby become parlicipes criminith It will be said no doubt that this is an impracticable scheme ; that we could not draw up just, or even workable, Peace Terms without negotiating with Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria ; and that there must be a Peace Conference. Further, this demand for a Conference will no doubt be urged with all that vehemence and arrogance of tone which is habitual In the advocates of Peace at Any Price. As a matter of fact, it will be perfectly possible for the Allies by negotiations with each other to lay down just Terms of Peace, terms which, as the Spectator has insisted ever since August, 1914, shall not involve the sowing of the dragon's teeth, shall not carry with them the seed of future wars, which shall not be dictated by the desire for aggression, or even by over- anxiety in regard to the security of frontiers, but shall look to a settlement of the world in which Justice and Security shall go hand-in-hand. A great part of the ground has already been covered by Allied negotiations, and Allied declarations and detailed terms could now be easily agreed on if only the Allied statesmen would give up their habit of " waiting and seeing," would use their imaginations, and would envisage themselves being suddenly asked the question : " On what terms will you cease fighting 1 " An objection which is sure to be urged against our scheme is Russia. There is nobody in Russia to assist in the inter- Allied negotiations, for even the most hardened Pacifieist would at this time of day hardly suggest that M. Lenin and M. Trotsky could be recognized as the true representatives of the Russian People. But even this difficulty can be got rid of. From many points of view, the solution of the problems presented by Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Poland, and the Ukraine would be facilitated rather than rendered more difficult by the recent course of events. It remains to be pointed out that our " dictated terms " would 'eave the Democracies in enemy countries free to work out their own salvation. We should deprive Hungary of the right to crucify her Slays and her Rumanian subjects, but we should not dictate what her relations should be in future with the Hapsburgs and with the Germans of Vienna. Again, it would not be our business to keep German-speaking Austria apart from Prussia if her People really develop a desire to place their necks under the foot of the Prussian. Further, we should not attempt to say whether Bavaria and the rest of Southern Germany ought or ought not to seek their sal- vation outside the German Empire. Within the boundaries that the Allies will draw in the interests of Justice, Peace, and Security those who are now our enemies will be welcome to do what they please. Moreover, it will be open to the States with which we have been at war to seek admission into that League of Nations which exists in fact, and which we hope will very soon endow itself with a fitting organization. They will not of course be allowed to enter the Alliance till after Peace is made, and they will then be bound to submit themselves to certain special conditions, probably for a pro- bationary period. Otherwise they will be under no dis- abilities. And here we may add that it is high time not only that the League of Nations should be formed, but that the Neutrals should be made to understand clearly that they will not be allowed to, take part in drawing-up the Terms of Peace unless they have been in the League before the cessation of hostilities and have played some part in putting an end to the world-war. In a word, it ought to be made clear to them that there is going to• be.no Peace Conference, but only negotiations between the Allies as to the nature of the terms which they will grant to.their, enemies. Neutrality, whether we call it selfish or self-preservative, will not be considered as a ground for sharing in the responsibility of settling the world on its Peace basis.

In our opinion, there is no sort of reason why the Powers, having agreed on their terms in detail, should not publish them to the world. The secrecy of diplomatists and Foreign Offices is a very poor and ineffective thing. No doubt in certain delicate cases the Allies might find it necessary to reserve the right to alter certain details in their terms up to the last moment, but this would not in the least prevent the publication of the general outline. Before we leave the subject of Peace Preparations it is worth while to draw the attention of our readers to the gradual abandonment of the idea of a great International Debating Society. For example, the Morning Post of Tuesday pub- lished a despatch from Washington which shows that America does not mean to tolerate any folly of this kind. America is not going to overthrow Militarism with one hand and raise it up with the other. France and Italy will be of a similar opinion ; and though the Pacificists here, in obedience to inspiration from Berlin, call never so loudly for a Round Table at which Germany may be rewarded instead of punished, the mass of the British people will be solid with their American kinsmen. There must be no second edition of the iniquities of Vienna.