BOOKS.

LORD DUNDONALD'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY..

At the close of his eighty-fourth year, but with a mental vigour that shows no sign of age, the Earl of Dundonald is giving to the world the history of his heroic life. It is a work which, once read, will imprint itself on the memory for ever, so strong and various are the feelings it excites—admiration for the genius, character, and exploits of the writer, sympathy for his unmerited sufferings, and abhorrence and scorn of the system and the men that thwarted his patriotic efforts, defrauded him of his well- earned honours, blackened his spotless reputation, and drove him from the service of the country he loved so well and served so purely and so bravely, and all for what P To protect the interests of corruption and gratify private malignity. Lord Dundonald's wrongs are a national reproach which the tardy redress afforded him is utterly inadequate to efface. The only worthy atonement which his countrymen can now offer, the only one which can pluck out the stings from the old man's memory and give peace to his noble heart, is the assurance of their deep contrition and their resolve to extinguish every vestige of the iniquitous system of which he was the victim, to profit by the counsels of his sage experience, and to make the naval service, so far as in them lies, all that his fondest wishes can desire.

Lord Dundonald, the tenth inheritor of that earldom, born at Annsfield, in Lanarkshire, on the 10th December, 1775, is the descendant of an ancient Scotch family not less distinonithed for the personal qualities of many of its members than for the im- portant part they bore in public affairs. Political confiscations cut deeply into their hereditary wealth, and the remnant of it perished wholly in the hands of the present Earl's father, who de- voted himself to practical science with considerable success as a discoverer, but complete failure in point of pecuniary returns. His straitened circumstances prevented his children from receiving more than a very imperfect education, for the improvement of which his eldest son, Lord Cochrane, took the unusual course of entering himself, when a post captain, as a student at the College of Edinburgh, where Lord. Palmerston was amongst his contem- poraries. The army was his original destination, and a commis- sion was procured for him in the 104th regiment, but his aversion for the military service was only surpassed by his ardour for the naval ; the commission was cancelled, and on the 27th of June 1793 he joined his uncle's frigate the Hind, at the mature age for a midshipman of seventeen years and a half. For his outfit he was indebted to Lord Hopetown who advanced 1001. for the pur- pose, and he went to sea " with his' father's gold watch as a keep- sake—the only patrimony he' ever inherited." After a cruise in the North he accompanied his uncle in the Thetis to the Hali- fax station, where he was made acting third lieutenant in less than eighteen months after his entrance into the service. The Thetis was ordered home in 1798, and in the autumn of that year Lord Keith went to relieve Lord St. Vincent on the Mediterranean sta- tion, and took Lord Cochrane with him. There, in the following year, the latter had opportunities of conversing with Lord Nelson, who surely would have loved him like a brother had their inter- course been closer and more prolonged, but it never was Lord Cochrane's good fortune to serve under the great admiral; but he took good note of one of Nelson's frequent injunctions, Never mind manoeuvres, always go at them," and the advice could not have been given o an apter scholar.

The first spring of the present century found Lord Cochrane cruising at his own discretion, the proud commander of a pigmy man-of-war, the Speedy. Her burden was 158 tons. Her narrow space was crowded with eighty-four men and six officers, and her armament consisted of fourteen 4-pounders. Her commander could walk about with a broadside of her shot in his pockets, and could only shave by putting his head through the opening of his cabin skylight, and making a toilet-table of the quarter-deck. But with this little craft he astonished everybody, and probably excited the jealous rancour of not a few, by his success in taking prizes, his practice being to keep out of sight of the coast during the day, and run in at night for action. After a year of this dashing service, he accomplished the astounding exploit of cap- turing in fair fight the Spanish frigate El Gamo, mounting 32 guns, their broadside weight of shot 190 pounds, and carrying 319 men, whilst the Speedy's crew had been reduced to 54, offi- cers included. This daring deed was done on the 6th May, 1801.

Its history is as follows-

" We made towards the frigate, which was now coming down under steer- ing sails. At 9.30 A.M., she fired a gun and hoisted Spanish colours, which the Speedy acknowled by hoisting American colours, our object being, as we were now exposed to her full broadside, to puzzle her, till we got on the other tack, when we ran up the English ensign, and immediately afterwards encountered her broadside without damage. Shortly afterwards she gave us another broadside, also without effect. My orders were not to fire a gun till we were close to her ; when, running under her lee, we locked our yards amongst her rigging, and in this position returned our broadside, such as it was. To have fired our popgun four-pounders at a distance would have been to throw away the ammunition ; but the guns being doubly, and, as I after- wards learned, trebly shotted, and being elevated, they told admirably upon her main deck ; the first discharge, as was subsequently ascertained, killing the Spanish captain and the boatswain. My reason for locking our small craft in the enemy's rigging was the one upon which I mainly relied for victory, viz., that from the height of the frigate out of the water, the whole of her shot must necessarily go over our heads, whilst our guns, being elevated, would blow up her main deck. The Spaniards speedily

• The Autobiography of a Seaman. By Thomas, tenth had of Dundonald, G.C.B. Volume 1. Published by Bentley.

found out the disadvantage under which they were fighting, an gave the order to board the Speedy ; but as this order was as distinctly Leard by 119 as by them, we avoided it at the moment of execution by sheering off siiiii- ciently to prevent the movement, giving them a volley of musketry and a broadside before they could recover themselves. Twice was this imuneuvre repeated, and twice thus averted. The Spaniards, finding that they were only punishing themselves, gave up further attempts to board, and stood to them— ,s, which were 'cutting up our rigging from stem to stern, but doing little farther damage ; for after the lapse of an hour the loss to the Speedy was only twcrmen killed and four wounded. This kind of combat, however could not last. Our rigging being cut up, and the Speedy's sails riddled with shot, I told the 111011 that they must either take the frigate or be themselves taken, in which case the Spaniards would give no quarter— whilst a few minutes energetically employed on their part would decide the matter in their own favour. The doctor, Mr. Guthiie, who, I am happy to say, ie still living to peruse this record of his gallantry, volunteered to take the helm ; leaving him, therefore, for the time both commander and crew of the Speedy, the order was given to board, and in a few seconds every man was on the enemy's deck—a feat rendered the more easy as the doctor placed the Speedy close alongside with admirable skill. Fora moment the Spaniards seemed taken by surprise, as though unwilling to believe that so small a crew would have the audacity to board them ; but soon recovering themselves, they made a rush to the waist of the frigate, where the fight was for souse minutes gallantly carried on. Observing the enemy's colours still flying, I directed one of our men immediately to haul them down, when the Spanish crew, without pausing to consider by whose orders the colours had been struck, and naturally believing it the act of their own officers, gave in, and we were in possession of the Gamo frigate of thirty-two heavy guns and 319 men, who an hour and a half before had looked upon us as a certain if not an easy prey. Our loss in boarding was Lieutenant Parker, severely wounded in several places, one seaman killed and three wounded, which, with those previously killed and wounded, gave a total of three seamen killed, and one officer and. seventeen men wounded. The Gamo's loss was Captain de Torres—the boatswain—and thirteen seamen killed, together with forty-one wounded; her casualties thus exceeding tho whole number of officers and crew on board the Speedy."

According to the rules of the service this brilliant action ought to have been immediately followed by Lord Cochrane's promotion to the rank of post captain ; but there was against him somewhere ; his commission was delayed for upwards of three months; and what was worse, the affair led to a misunderstand- ing with Lord St. Vincent, then First Lord of the Admiralty, which bore most unfavourably upon all Lord Cochrane's future prospects. Lord St. Vincent was already prejudiced against him before there was any personal communication between them,

"Brenton, in his _Life of Lord St. Vincent, thus alludes to the delay in my promotion : • Lord St. 'Vincent was so much pressed on the subject of Lord Cochrane's promotion for taking the Gamo, that it became almost a point of etiquette with the Earl not to make him a captain ! An illustrious person is reported to have said, " My Lord, we must make Lord Cochrane ' post,' " to which Lord St. Vincent replied, " The First Lord of the Ad- miralty knows no must." ' There is no doubt that Captain Brenton re- ceived this account from Lord St. Vincent himself, and as the object of his book was to shield his Lordship in questionable matters, we may receive this version as it was given to his biographer."

This statement made by Lord St. Vincent's apologist, who no doubt received it from himself, does little honour to his Lordship's memory ; but matters soon became worse.

" Before quitting the Mediterranean a letter was addressed by Inc to Lord St. Vincent, requesting him to promote my gallant First Lieutenant Parker, who, as stated in my despatch, was severely wounded in boarding the Gamo. No answer being returned to this application up to the period of my arrival in England, another letter was forwarded to his Lordship, which met with the same reception, and afterwards a third, which produced from Lord St. Vincent the reply that my application could not be entertained, for that it was unusual to promote two officers for such a service • besides which the small number of men killed on board the Speedy did noewarrant the appli- cation.' It was impossible not to feel nettled at a reply so unexpected; that because few men had been killed on board the Speed) her First Lieu- tenant was considered unworthy of promotion, though terribly cut up. To argue with a First Lord is no doubt an imprudent thing for a naval officer to attempt, and my remonstrance in this instance had such an effect as to get my name placed on the black list of the Admiralty, never again to be erased. In my letter to Lord St. Vincent the following incautious observa- tions were made, viz., that his reasons for not promoting Lieutenant Parker. because:there were only three men killed on board the Speedy, were in opposition to his lordship's own promotion to an Earldom, as well as that of his Flag-Captain to Knighthood and his other officers to increased rank and honours; for that in the battle from which his Lordship derived his title there was only one man killed on board his own flag-ship, so that there were more casualties in my sloop than in his line-of-battle ship.' From the receipt of that letter Lord St. Vincent became my bitter enemy, and not be only but his successors thought it incumbent on them to perpetuate his Lordship's displeasure. My reply was no doubt keenly felt at the time, when it was a common reined( in the Navy that the battle of St. Vincent was gained by the inshore squadron, under Nelson, the commander-in-chief being merely a spectator, at a distance which involved only the loss of one man in his own ship."

Thenceforth it became "a point of etiquette" with the Admi- ralty to stop the promotion of officers serving under Lord Coch- rane. On the renewal of war with France he applied for a ship, and after many refusals Lord St. Vincent at last appointed him to the Arab, a vessel which had been converted from a collier into a man-of-war and sailed like a haystack. In this worthless tub which was totally unfit for service on the French coast, the most dashing officer in the service was sent to cruise for fifteen months to the N.E. of the Orkneys, nominally to protect the fisheries where fisheries there were none, and where not a single whaler was seen from the mast-head during the whole of that lonely cruise. From this dreary punishment Lord Cochrane was released by Lord Melville, the successor of Lord St. Vincent, and appointed to the Pallas of 32 guns, in which he made a very successful cruise off the Azores, and another off the French coast, at the termination of which he entered Parliament as Member for Honiton. In May, 1807, he was returned for Westminster, and made himself so formidable by his motions on the subject of naval abuses, that Ministers were glad to get rid of him by ordering him off in the Imperieuse to join Lord Eollingwood in the Mediterranean. There his principal occupation was harassing. the French on their own coasts and on those of Spain. For none of these most im- portant services, which brought him no prize money, did Is

ever receive praise or reward from the Admiralty autho- rities, though their value was repeatedly acknowledged by Lord Collitigwood in the most cordial terms, testifying Lord Cochrane's surpassing zeal, ability, and -heroic spirit, and de- claring that " his resources for every exigency have no end." But it would be wronging the Admiralty authorities to let it be supposed that they passed over this part of his career in total silence; they did notice it openly, but it was to reproach him " fur the expenditure of more sails, stores, gunpowder, and shot, than had been used by any other captain in the service!" This was an aggravation of his original and habitual.offence, on which he is still stubborn enough to congratulate himself, "that no com- mander having gone through such service ever had fewer men killed."

In one of Lord Collingwood's despatches he states his belief that by his services on the coast of Languedoc Lord Cochrane "pre- vented these troops [2000 men] which were intended for Figueras from advancing into Spain, by giving them employment in the defence of their own coasts." " It is wonderful," says Lord Dun- donald, " what an amount of terrorism a email frigate is able to inspire on an enemy's coast. Aotions between line-of-battle ships are no doubt very imposing; but for real effect I would prefer a score or two of small vessels, well-handled, to any fleet of line-of- battle ships." Actuated by these views he obtained permission to return to England in the spring of 1809 ; for, he says-

" During our operations against the French on the Spanish coast, I had seen so much of them as to convince me, that if with a single frigate I could paralyse the movements of their armies in the Mediterranean— with three or four ships it would not be difficult so to spread terror on their Atlantic shores, as to render it impossible for them to send an army into Western Spain. My object then was—as from long and uneeasino.' expe- rience I considered myself entitled to the command of more than one ship— to propose to the Government to take possession of the French islands iu the Bay of Biscay, and to let me with a small squadron operate against the enemy's seaboard there, as I had previously done with the Speedy and Im- Odense, from Montpellier to Barcelona. Had this permission been granted, I do not hesitate to stake my professional reputation that neither the Penin- sular war, nor its enormous cost to the nation, from 1809 onwards, would ever have been heard of, It would have been easy—as it will always be easy in case offuture wars—that is, provided those who have the direction of national affairs have the sagacity to foresee disaster, and, foreseeing it, to take the initiative, so to harass the French coast as to find full employment for their troops at home, and thus to render any operations in Western Spain, or even in foreign countries, next to impossible."

Before Lord Cochrane could submit his proposal to the Admi- ralty he was sent for by the First Lord (Mulgrave), and requested to suggest a plan for destroying, by fire-ships or otherwise, the French fleet, which was then. blockaded by Lord Gambier in the Basque Roads. His plan was approved, and he was pressed to undertake its execution ; but to this he strongly objected, fore- seeing that it would provoke a great amount of professional jea- lousy against him, as he was junior to most of the captains in the squadron. Now the fact was, that the existence of the Ministry depended on his consenting to undertake this service, which had been declined by every other officer whom the Admiralty had con- sulted, and the responsibility of which Lord Gambier had distinctly declined to take upon himself. Knowing all this, but acting upon his invariable rule to shrink from no duty to his country under any circumstances, however disadvantageous to himself, Lord Cochrane sailed for the Basque Roads to do what was required of him. The result is well known, and our limited space will not allow us to enter upon details. We must content ourselves with saying that the portion of the enterprise under Lord Coch- rane's immediate control was splendidly successful, and all the rest of it disgracefully the reverse. Of all the fire-ships, up- wards of twenty in number, four only reached the enemy's position, and not one did any damage. A single explo- sion-ship, fitted up by Lord Cochrane, led by him, and fired by his own hand, blew the whole of the enormous boom to pieces, and struck such a panic into the French as left them at the mercy of the English, all their ships, with two exceptions, helplessly aground. There Lord Gambier left them unmolested to get off with the rise of the tide. Ile acted like an idiot in the whole business, and like something much worse than an idiot in his subsequent conduct respecting it. In a history of that night, written in the Revue des Deux Mendes for 1858, by Admiral Graviere, who was present at the attack, are these words : "La mollesse de Lord Gambier, le courage et le sang froid de quelques- uns de nos officiers, preservarent seuls l'escadre Franemse d'une ruine totale." It was impossible that a man like Lord Cochrane should forbear from opposing, as a Member of Parlianient, the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier; and, because he had the civic courage to fulfil that duty, he was robbed of opportunity to render his country still greater services than any he had yet performed. With this wretched episode Lord Dundonald closes the first volume of his admirable contribution to the naval history of England.