MILITARY ORGANIZATION.
Sin—In your observations on the war you have shown a moderation and reflection which, I have no doubt, have raised your paper in the estimation of that public which, strong-minded and free-spoken as it is, has nevertheless a love of justice at the bottom, and will generally take a fair, honest view of every case, provided the plain facts are put before it without ingenious colouring. If all your contemporaries had followed the same course, we should have had the whole truth more plainly before us, and a calmer spirit to judge of it.
It is this moderation which induces me to point out for your consideration and that of the public some questions concerning our military institutions, now that they are likely to undergo great alterations. The first department on which Lord Panmure will have to exercise that gradual reform which he has so cautiously promised, will be his own. Now for the first time has Eng- land resolved upon having a military system ; and the first most necessary step towards it is, doubtless, the establishment of a central point upon which the whole shall revolve. But as it sometimes happens in English history that when the feelings of the people are excited and the opportunity presents itself the reform becomes a revolution, the overboilings of which have to be reduced to a working level by the next generation, so I am afraid that, judging by the tone of a high authority on these-points, the noble ex-Secre- tary for the Colonies, there may be a temptation to push the reform too far, even under the experienced rule of the present War Minister. There is a feeling—I don't know whether the public see it, or whether Parliament sees it—but there certainly is a feeling among some of the political chiefs of the present age to get the whole executive power into their hands as well as the administrative—to control not merely the material but the personal part of government. It is the law of England that the Commons alone shall have the power over all money matters, and that the Queen's Ministers shall be personally responsible to Parliament ; but the law of England leaves a very large power of appointing the civil officers of the Government, administrators of the law, in the hands of the Sovereign: this has been considered a wise precaution even as concerns the internal economy. of the state ; and I think we may affirm that whenever it is evaded, by political circumstances or other- wise, that it is the subject of complaint on the part of the body into whom the appointment is made, and is not unfrequently reprehended by the public.
There is no very deep knowledge of politics required to investigate that question : it is simply a law of nature, that the man who has only got a temporary idterest in and a temporary knowledge of the duties of his office, is not the most fitting man to go into the qualifications of those who are to work out the professional details ; be is the man to decide upon the general bearing of each question on the state politic, but he must necessarily leave the details to those who have made it the study of their lives. I know that the political chiefs of our great departments do exercise that patronage; but I should think it was a fair question for the next Commission on the Civil Service, how far that service might be raised by placing them more directly under the authority of the Sovereign.
But if the personal power, the power of patronage, is thus a doubtful ques- tion in the domestic concerns of the country, how much more important does it become in our foreign relations, in the intercourse between Great Britain as a nation and other nations of the world. There, then, is nothing
known of Parliamentary parties, the talents of the Minister of day are scarcely felt. All acts are there considered as the acts of the Queen and peo-
ple of England, and every officer is a representative of the nation at large : how important to avoid the slightest shade of party feeling, and to make the lowest officer feel that he is the servant of the whole nation, let the Go- vernment be what it may ! And how infinitely more important does it bes come when you consider the defence of our interests against enemies of all races, creeds, and politics, abroad, and our protection against civil broils at home! Hitherto, in the history of the British Army, it has been remarkably distinguished for the absence of all party feeling, and for its implicit devo- tion to the head of the nation. This, which must certainly be considered as the healthiest condition for a national army, would soon be lost if the whole power over it was concentrated in a tabinet Minister : we should soon see political generals and party staffs, and perhaps even the scenes of a Parisian emeute or an Irish election might be enacted in the streets of Lon- don. In place of a professional Commander-in-chief responsible for life to the nation, we should have an irresponsible dictator—despotic because ig- norant, and responsible only for his three-years term of office. The arguments for this novel proposition are, that our Navy has already such a government ; that our enviable Allies have such a military govern- ment ; that the necessity of the time demands such a government. With respect to the Navy, I believe if the opinions of the officers were taken, there would be scarcely one, certainly not one of the younger officers, who would not strongly advocate a change to our military system—at least a naval First Lord of the Admiralty, which would soon amount to the same thing. There is a very general complaint among them of political patronage, and there is a tendency to look to the Lords of the Admiralty personally and in- dividually as their chiefs, rather than to the Queen and nation : I do not say it affects their conduct to their country, but it certainly does affect their feelings towards their own service. The unfortunate display at a late public dinner is an evidence of what I mean ; and I think most officers of the Navy will agree with me, that that triumph to our enemies could not have occur- red if the orders had emanated from the Queen direct instead of from the Lords of the Admiralty. To say that the Lords of the Admiralty have be- haved shamefully, is simply a political opinion ; to say that the Queen has done wrong, is a national disgrace. And again, I think there is a difference between the duties of the Army and Navy. The Navy have always a duty to do in peace or war of working their ships and looking after our com- merce, and our seamen interchange constantly with the merchant service: but the Army is taken out from the nation and kept always a distinct class, solely for the duty of risking their lives against the enemies of the country ; and they require to be more continually reminded by the voice of the Sove- reign herself, that such is their high and special service.
With respect to the military organization of our Allies, it must be re- membered, that not only is the Minister of War in France a soldier, but the Sovereign is a soldier also ; in fact, that the Ministers of War and Marine are only his adjutants, to carry out his orders to the Army and Navy : and be- sides, these Ministers of War and Marine are not chosen for their political power, liable to be turned out in a fortnight by a chance majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but they are the permanent servants of a permanent Monarch, who, having commenced the war, cannot be supposed to be so likely to change his views concerning it quite so rapidly as a popular house of representatives. In the details of our military organization, we shall doubtless do well to learn from these masters of that art ; but for the prin- ciples of our military government we must not lock to France, or to any other country, but be guided by our own institutions and the history of England. Those systems which have prospered in civil matters are good for the naval and military too ; and that system which made the officers and men who have fought and suffered through the Crimea cannot be so totally defective as some journals wish the public to believe. Finally, with respect to the present emergency, the medicine whiph is good for a disease may be fatal-to the restored patient. To give thsf Wad Minister great powers, may save the Army and the nation; but to change the whole system of officering the Army, and to take the command of it out of the hands of the Queen and her Commander-in-chief, might make a blaze for a moment, but give you no military system and after a year's war not so I
much of an army as you have at present. It is not so much new blood that we want as a stirring of the present blood. The officers who distinguished themselves at Alma and Inkerman are well qualified, if taught and given the opportunity, to conduct the staff of any army. The surgeons, so much abused at Scutari, are the same class of men as those who have devoted their lives to the care of the Russian prisoners. - Admit, if you will, a proportion of officers into the Army by public examination, thus leaving a fair opening to the middle classes; but I do maintain, that the aristocratic officers have shown in this war a heroism worthy of their ancestors of the days of chival- ry, and that it is most unjust to their devoted courage to raise a -cry for new blood and working men : they have shown their blood already, and they are burning to show their working powers, if the system would set them free. And surely it would not be difficult to provide a military government suited to the emergency, without upsetting the whole Horse Guards. If there is no man fitted for the part of War Minister and Commander-in-chief, can they not divide the duties fairly ? cannot the War Minister act as the Governor of a colony employing its own troops in war, directing the general measures of war, controlling its expenditure, and by means of his staff of secretaries supplying all the stores and munitions and sinews of war ; and yet leaving the execution of the duties in the field and the personal command over the troops entirely in the hands of those who by profession are alone fit to con- duct them ?
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